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Abstract
During the recent years, a huge augmentation of the data traffic volume has
been noticed, while a further steep increase is expected in the following years. As
a result, questions have been raised over the years about the energy consumption
needs of the wireless telecommunication networks, their carbon dioxide emissions
and their operational expenses.
Aiming at meeting the high traffic demands with flat energy consumption and
flat incurred expenses, mobile network operators (MNOs) have opted to improve
their position (i) by deploying heterogeneous networks (HetNets), which are con-
sisted of macrocell base stations (MBSs) and small cell base stations (SBSs) and
(ii) by sharing their infrastructure.
However, questions could be raised about the extend to which HetNet densifica-
tion is of aid. Given that network planning is executed according to high traffic load
volumes, BS underutilisation during low-traffic hours cannot be neglected. Similarly,
the aggregated energy needs of multiple SBSs equals the ones of an energy hungry
MBS, having thus a respectable share of the net energy consumption.
In this context, a set of research opportunities have been identified. This thesis
provides contribution toward the achievement of a greener and more cost efficient
operation of HetNet deployments, where multiple stakeholders develop their activity
and where energy support can have the form of various alternate schemes, including
renewable energy (RE) sources. Depending on the network energy support, i.e.,
whether RE sources are used in the network or not, the main body of this thesis is
divided in two research directions.
The first part of the thesis uses the technology of switching off strategies in
order to explore their efficiency in terms of both energy and costs in a HetNet. The
HetNet is assumed to be a roaming-based cooperative activity of multiple MNOs
that is powered exclusively by grid energy. A switching off and a cost allocation
scheme are proposed, using as criteria the BS type, the BS load and the roaming
cost for traffic offloading. The performance of the proposed schemes is evaluated
with respect to energy efficiency, cost savings and fairness, using computer-based
simulations.
The second part of the thesis explores energy and cost management issues in en-
ergy harvesting (EH) HetNet deployments where EH-BSs use an EH system (EHS),
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an energy storage system (ESS) and the smart grid (SG) as energy procurement
sources. The EH-HetNet is assumed a two-tier network deployment of EH-MBSs
that are passively shared among an MNO set and EH-SBSs that are provided to
MNOs by an infrastructure provider. Taking into consideration the infrastructure
location and the variety of stakeholders involved in the network deployment, ap-
proaches of RE exchange (REE) are proposed as a cooperative RE sharing for the
shared EH-MBSs, based on bankruptcy theory, and a non-cooperative, aggregator-
assisted RE trading, based on double auctions, for the EH-SBSs. The performance
of the proposed schemes is evaluated in terms of the hours of independence of the
studied system from the SG, the fairness regulated by the provided solution and
the economical payoffs extracted for the stakeholders.
Resumen
Durante los u´ltimos an˜os, se ha notado un aumento enorme del volumen de
tra´fico de datos, mientras que se espera un nuevo aumento en los pro´ximos an˜os.
Como resultado, se han planteado preguntas sobre las necesidades de consumo de
energ´ıa de las redes inala´mbricas de telecomunicaciones, sus emisiones de dio´xido
de carbono y sus gastos operativos.
Con el objetivo de satisfacer las altas demandas de tra´fico con consumo de en-
erg´ıa constante y con gastos incurridos constantes, adema´s de utilizar soluciones
basadas en la nube, los operadores de redes mo´viles (MNOs) han optado por mejo-
rar su posicio´n (i) desplegando redes heteroge´neas (HetNets), que consisten en esta-
ciones base de macro-ce´lulas (MBSs) y estaciones base de ce´lulas pequen˜as (SBSs),
y (ii) compartiendo su infraestructura.
Sin embargo, podr´ıan plantearse preguntas sobre hasta que´ punto la densificacio´n
de una HetNet es de ayuda. Dado que la planificacio´n de la red se ejecuta de
acuerdo con los volu´menes de carga de tra´fico ma´s elevados, no se puede descuidar
la subutilizacio´n de las estaciones base (BS) durante las horas de poco tra´fico. De
manera similar, las necesidades de energ´ıa agregadas de mu´ltiples SBSs son iguales
a las de una MBS que consume mucha energ´ıa, teniendo as´ı una parte respetable
del consumo neto de energ´ıa.
En este contexto, se ha identificado un conjunto de oportunidades de investi-
gacio´n. Esta tesis contribuye al logro de una operacio´n ma´s ecolo´gica y rentable
de las implementaciones de HetNet, donde mu´ltiples partes interesadas desarrollan
su actividad y donde el apoyo energe´tico puede tener la forma de varios esquemas
alternativos, incluidas las fuentes de energ´ıa renovables (RE). Dependiendo del so-
porte de energ´ıa de red, es decir, si las fuentes de RE se usan en la red o no, el
cuerpo principal de esta tesis se divide en dos direcciones de investigacio´n.
La primera parte de la tesis utiliza la tecnolog´ıa de las estrategias de apagado con
el objetivo de explorar su eficiencia en te´rminos de energ´ıa y gastos en una HetNet.
Se asume que la HetNet es una actividad cooperativa basada en la itinerancia de
mu´ltiples MNO que se alimenta exclusivamente de energ´ıa de la red. Se propone
un esquema de desconexio´n y de asignacio´n de costes, que utiliza como criterios el
tipo de BS, la carga de BS y el coste de la itinerancia para la descarga de tra´fico.
El rendimiento de los esquemas propuestos se evalu´a con respecto a la eficiencia
v
vi
energe´tica, el ahorro de costes y la equidad, usando simulaciones en computadora.
La segunda parte de la tesis explora los problemas de gestio´n de energ´ıa y de
costes en las implementaciones de HetNet donde las estaciones base recolectan en-
erg´ıa usando un sistema EH (EHS), un sistema de almacenamiento de energ´ıa (ESS)
y la red ele´ctrica inteligente (SG) como sistemas de adquisicio´n de energ´ıa. Se asume
que el EH-HetNet es una implementacio´n de redes de dos niveles donde los EH-MBSs
se comparten pasivamente entre un conjunto de MNOs y EH-SBSs se proporcionan
a los MNOs de un proveedor de infraestructura. Teniendo en cuenta la ubicacio´n de
la infraestructura y la variedad de partes interesadas e involucradas en el despliegue
de la red, se proponen enfoques de intercambio de RE (REE) como un intercambio
cooperativo de RE para los EH-MBS compartidos, basado en la teor´ıa de bancar-
rota, y un no cooperativo comercio de RE para los EH-SBSs, que es asistido por un
agregador y basado en las subastas dobles. El rendimiento de los esquemas prop-
uestos se evalu´a en te´rminos de las horas de independencia del sistema estudiado
con respecto al SG, la imparcialidad regulada por la solucio´n proporcionada y los
beneficios econo´micos extra´ıdos para las interesadas.
Acknowledgements
The Ph.D. was an experience with many ups and downs. I am happy to reach
the end of this era. However, this would not have been possible unless some people
provided their assistance through these steps.
I would firstly like to thank the Generalitat of Catalunya, Doctorat Industrial
and Iquadrat Informatica S.L. for giving me the opportunity to be part of the
program. I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisors, Dr.
Christos Verikoukis and Dr. Luis Alonso for their continuous support, motivation
and guidance through all the stages of the doctorate program.
At the same time, I am also grateful to Dr. Angelos Antonopoulos for his con-
tinuous support, his patience, his advices on how my work could be improved and
for motivating me to continue.
During these past years, I had the opportunity to meet a lot of new people
and to reunite with an all time friend. All of them help me in their way to put a
closure to this experience. I will make a special mention to my oldest friend, Agapi
Mesodiakaki and to a new friend, Georgia Tseliou. Both of them offered me support
on both a personal and a professional level. I would also like to thank Akis for
encouraging me to press the submission buttons for my articles almost all times.
I am always thankful for receiving the unconditional love of my mother and my
sisters. It was important for me to know that I had their support no matter what.
Finally, I would like to thank my father for the time he devoted working for his
family. I wish I could share my experiences with him. I know he would be proud.
Thank you all.
vii
viii
List of Acronyms
4G Fourth generation
5G Fifth generation
AC Alternate Current
ADA Aggregator-auctioneer payoff from Double Auction
AMC Adaptive Modulation and Coding
BBU BaseBand Unit
BG Bankruptcy Game
BS Base Station
BSV Bankruptcy Shapley Value based cost allocation
CapEx Capital Expenditure
CAGR Compound Annual Growth Rate
CCS Charge Control System
cMTC critical Machine Type Communication
CO2 Carbon Dioxide
Cool Cooling
CSO Cooperative (base station) Switching Off
D2D Device to Device
DA Double Auction
DC Direct Current
DER Distributed Energy Resources
DL DownLink
DOD Depth of Discharge
EE Energy Exchange
EH Energy Harvesting
EHS Energy Harvesting System
EI Expectation Index
ix
x LIST OF ACRONYMS
eMBB Enhanced Mobile BroadBand
EQ EQual allocation
ESS Energy Storage System
FON Full Operational Network
GIE Generalized Ibn Ezra value
GPC Green Power Controlling unit
HetNet Heterogeneous Network
ICT Information and Communication Technology
IndSO Individually applied CSO
InP Infrastructure Provider
IndREE Individual (single-MNO) Renewable Energy Exchange
IPU Integrated Power Unit
LTE Long Term Evolution
LTE-A Long Term Evolution Advanced
MB MegaByte
MBS Macrocell Base Station
MCS Modulation and Coding Schemes
MEC Mobile Edge Computing
MIMO Multiple Input Multiple Output
mMTC massive Machine Type Communication
mmWave millimetre Wave
MNO Mobile Network Operator
MS Main power Supply
NF Noise Figure
NFV Network Functions Virtualisation
NoCA No Cost Allocation
No RE-BG No Renewable Energy Bankruptcy Game
NoREE No Renewable Energy Exchange
NR New Radio
NS Network Slicing
OFDMA Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access
OpEx Operational Expenditures
PA Power Amplifier
PC Prioritised-Claim allocation
xi
QAM Quadrature Amplitude Modulation
QoE Quality of Experience
QPSK Quadrature Phase-Shift Keying
QSO Q-based Switching Off
RAN Radio Access Network
RAT Radio Access Technology
RB Resource Block
RE Renewable Energy
RE-BG Renewable Energy Bankruptcy Game
RE-DA Renewable Energy Double Auction
REE Renewable Energy Exchange
RF Radio Frequency
RSO Random Switching Off
SBS Small cell Base Station
SDN Software Defined Networking
SG Smart Grid
SG-only Energy procurement from Smart Grid only
SNR Signal-to-Noise Ratio
SV Shapley Value
TRX Transceiver chains
TU Transferable Utility
UA User equipment device Association
UE User Equipment device
URLLC Ultra-Reliable Low-Latency Communication
V2X Vehicle to vehicle/infrastructure
VDC Virtual Data Centre
xii
Contents
List of Acronyms ix
List of Figures xv
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Structure of the Thesis and Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3 Research Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3.1 Other Research Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2 Background 11
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Heterogeneous networks (HetNets) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 BS energy consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4 BS Switching off in HetNets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.5 Use of Renewable energy sources in HetNets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.6 Energy exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.7 Open issues and challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.7.1 Multi-Operator ventures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.7.2 Open issues in multi-operator HetNet deployments . . . . . . 25
3 Energy and cost issues in multi-operator HetNet deployments 27
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.3 System set up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.3.1 Network System Model and Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.4 Energy Efficiency Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.4.1 Energy Efficiency Problem Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.4.2 Cooperative Switching Off Algorithm (CSO) . . . . . . . . . 36
3.4.3 Cooperative UA Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.4.4 CSO Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
xiii
xiv CONTENTS
3.5 Cost allocation Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.5.1 Cost allocation Problem Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.5.2 Bankruptcy game with Shapley Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.6 Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.6.1 Simulation Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.6.2 Performance Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4 Energy and cost issues in grid-connected multi-operator HetNet
deployments 59
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.2 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.2.1 System Model and Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.3 RE exchange (REE) and challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.4 Energy sharing among EH-MBSs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.5 Energy trading among EH-SBSs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.5.1 Sellers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.5.2 Buyers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.5.3 Auctioneer-aggregator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.5.4 The auction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.5.5 Analysis on RE-DA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.6 Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.6.1 Simulation scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.6.2 Performance results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5 Conclusion and Future Work 93
5.1 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.2 Future work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Bibliography 99
List of Figures
2.1 DC power consumption breakdown for different types of BSs at max-
imum traffic load. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2 Indicative example of BS switching off in a single operator HetNet
deployment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3 Power configurations of an EH-BS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4 Configurations for performing energy exchange (EE). . . . . . . . . . 22
2.5 Indicative example of a multi-operator HetNet deployment. . . . . . 25
3.1 Studied macrocell-sized area with a shared HetNet. . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2 CSO flowchart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.3 BSV flowchart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.4 Normalised MNO UE traffic, Kn, with n=1, 2 and 3 corresponding
to MNO 1, 2 and 3, respectively. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.5 Average hourly network energy efficiency vs. switching off schemes. . 49
3.6 Average hourly network energy efficiency vs. switching off schemes
with night peak MNO traffic profiles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.7 Average network energy efficiency vs. analogy factor ξ and switching
off schemes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.8 Average Network Energy Efficiency vs. analogy factor ξ and Coalitions. 52
3.9 Average MNO network cost, φn, vs. cooperation cases. . . . . . . . . 53
3.10 MNO cost allocation before and after consideration of roaming rev-
enues: Allocation of the cost to cooperative MNOs considering dif-
ferent cost allocation methods before and after the consideration of
inter-operator roaming revenues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.11 MNO EI vs. studied cost allocation methods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.12 Mean EI of each cost allocation method vs. analogy factor ξ for the
MNO traffic loads. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.1 Detailed system model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.2 Suggested energy procurement order. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
xv
xvi LIST OF FIGURES
4.3 Typical DA case between the set of buyer EH-SBSs, Y and the set of
seller EH-SBSs, X (Y and X correspond to the Y and X characters
that are indicated in the legend of the figure). The figure depicts the
ordering of the DA reservation RE volumes and prices, the critical
trade point G with the DA and the DA payoff of the auctioneer-
aggregator, ADA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.4 RE Generation vs. Time, June 21st, Barcelona, Spain. . . . . . . . . 83
4.5 Monitoring of energy for different energy sharing methods. . . . . . . 85
4.6 Jain’s fairness index, J , (i) for the studied energy sharing methods,
EQ, PC and RE-BG, (ii) for varied traffic loads, κ1 and (iii) peaks
of n = 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.7 24-hour evaluation of SG energy purchases based on ratio γ(t) for the
(i) NoREE, (ii) IndREE and (iii) RE-DA energy procurement schemes. 87
4.8 Normalised total daily DA (i) cost for winner buyers, (ii) payoff of
winner seller EH-SBSs, and (iii) payoff of the auctioneer-aggregator,
vs. the ratio of solar powered SBSs, β. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.9 Efficiency of RE-DA trades based on mean ef vs. indicator β. . . . . 89
4.10 Monthly MNO costs per macrocell area with the application of pro-
posed and traditional methods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The expectation of the latest years for wireless service provision anywhere,
anytime, anyhow and by any means, has lead to a huge augmentation of the data
traffic volume. A recent report from Cisco has indicated that the busy-hour internet
traffic (or the internet traffic of the busiest 60 minute period in a day) is expected
to increase by a factor of 4.6 between 2016 and 2021, while the average Internet
traffic by a factor of 3.2. Moreover, mobile data traffic, which has grown 18-fold
over the past 5 years, is expected to increase sevenfold between 2016 and 2021 [1].
These expectations on traffic needs indicate that network capacity will have to be
augmented considerably in order to provide enough service. The implementation
of a network capacity boost to this extend, where it can properly address traffic
demands, brings forward issues of significant energy consumption and creation of
costs for mobile network operators (MNOs) of the fourth and fifth (4G and 5G,
respectively) generation networks.
Three are the main generic 5G services that are planned to be running on top
of them so that the high data traffic demands are met [2, 3]:
1. enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB): It represents the provision of increased
data rates, as well as continuous and improved quality of user experience
(QoE) and latency. Higher data rates, beyond the 4G values, are necessary
for high-demand applications, such as augmented reality or remote presence.
Ubiquitous and reliable QoE represents the provision of moderate rates (>99%)
anywhere and anytime, even in challenging situations, such as in high mobility
cases (e.g. in trains) and in very densely or sparsely populated areas. Graceful
performance degradation in terms of data rate and latency as the number of
users increases represents as well a ubiquitous and reliable QoE.
2. massive machine type communication (mMTC): It provides simultaneous con-
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nectivity for a massive number of devices. Low latency and low energy opera-
tion for the devices is considered necessary. Therefore, low software and hard-
ware complexity are vital for the use of cost- and energy-constrained devices.
3. critical MTC (cMTC) or ultra-reliable low-latency communications (URLLC):
They address the needs for ultra-reliable, time-critical services, such as en-
ergy distribution, industrial processes, sensor networking and vehicle-to- ve-
hicle/infrastructure (V2X) applications. The main attribute is high reliability
and security, as well as low latency, at levels of milliseconds, since the number
of devices and the required data rates are relatively low compared to mMTC.
Towards the implementation of these services, a unique network approach with
new and mostly cloud-based service capabilities has been proposed for the 5G wire-
less networks [4, 5, 3]. The integration of multiple radio access technologies (RAT)
for seamless and reliable coverage is an important feature of 5G networks. The Long
Term Evolution (LTE) technology has been included in the non-standalone 5G New
Radio (NR) framework so that the 5G requirements can be achieved [6]. The use
of massive Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO) technology with extremely ac-
curate beamforming is also considered an integral part of 5G wireless networks so
that more possible signal paths with better performance in terms of data rate and
link reliability is achieved. Moreover, 5G standards use different frequency bands
(low, medium and high), such as millimetre wave (mmWave), while communication
with machines, such as the device-to-device communication (D2D) is also enabled
for capacity augmentation and service providing to devices located out of the cell
coverage via others that are located within it. Software based technologies are used
extensively in 5G wireless networks, so that network functions can run over a unified
operating system in a number of points, especially at the network edge and so that
5G performance requirements are met. As a result, technologies such as Software
Defined Networking (SDN), Network Functions Virtualization (NFV), virtual data
centres (VDCs), Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) are fundamental for achieving
the required 5G network performance, scalability and agility. Finally, the new air
interface of the 5G NR framework allows an optimized and more dynamic usage
of resources, while multi-tenancy models that will enable MNOs and other par-
ties to collaborate in new ways, are to be supported. MNO collaborations will be
aided greatly by the network slicing (NS) technology, which allows the definition of
multiple logical networks (or slices) on top of the same infrastructure.
Despite the extensive use of cloud-based services, which are dominant in 5G
wireless networks, the traditional technique for capacity augmentation, i.e., the de-
ployment of denser networks, which has been extensively used for the 4G era, is
to be continued as well [7]1. Denser networks are closely related to the current en-
vironmental issues. In detail, Information and Communication Technology (ICT)
infrastructure has been held responsible in the past for having a large share in the
total global energy consumption and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, with mo-
bile network base stations (BSs) being accounted for the largest contribution [8].
1https://www.techradar.com/news/mobile-industry-shouldnt-wait-for-5g-to-roll-out-small-
cells
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More recent studies have predicted that, unless countermeasures are taken, a global
percentage equal to 51% and 23% of energy consumption and CO2 emissions, re-
spectively, will be generated by the ICT infrastructure [9]. A report from British
Telecommunications expects that ICT’s own footprint will reach 1.25Gt CO2e in
2030, or 1.97% of global emissions by 2030 [10]. These numbers are far from negli-
gible and only highlight the need to act towards their limitation.
Energy consumption is also a major contributor to network operating expendi-
ture (OpEx) of MNOs and studies have intended to express in numbers its impact
on network expenses. Nokia has concluded that up to 15% of network OpEx is spent
on energy in mature markets, while the respective percentage in the developing ones
can vary from approximately 15% up to 30% [11]. According to the same report,
what seems to be more discouraging is that just 15% of the energy spent on oper-
ating a network is used for forwarding bits, which means that 85% of the energy
does not contribute to generating revenues.
The impact of excess OpEx is also imprinted on the revenues of MNOs. In
detail, GSMA predicts that global revenue will grow only by around 1% between
2017 and 2020 (Compound Annual Growth Rate, CAGR) and will roughly stabilise
beyond 2020 at  1.1 trillion [12]. However, this is expected to happen mostly thanks
to only one market, i.e., the Chinese one, while other big markets are foreseen to
struggle with the growth of their revenues. Indicative examples are the USA and the
European market. The former, despite being one of the largest markets by revenue,
its revenue growth is expected to be near-stable, while the latter is expected to
see only small benefits by 2025, after a decade of continuously declining mobile
revenues (since 2008) [12]. With the increasing number of data-hungry end users,
whose service providing demands significant investments from MNOs’ part, profit
generation is foreseen only as marginal, highlighting thus the need for MNOs to
improve their current and future cost position.
However, augmenting network capacity of large-scale networks on flat energy
and costs is not an easy task for MNOs to deliver. It is without a doubt though
that efforts have already been made towards the achievement of this goal. Typical
examples are the extensive deployment of heterogeneous networks (HetNets) and
the operation of networks, including HetNets, in various business model forms of
operation, such as infrastructure sharing.
HetNets, which have been widely embraced over the last years, are an outcome
of the densification of wireless cellular networks with small cells [13]. A small cell
is a radio access point, of varying radio access technologies and with low RF power
output, footprint and range. It is operator-controlled, and can be deployed indoors
or outdoors, and in licensed, shared or unlicensed spectrum [14]. The deployment
of multiple small cell base stations (SBSs) has aided capacity augmentation thanks
to (i) the reduced distance achieved between user equipment devices (UEs) and
BSs, which in turn leads to higher signal-to-noise ration and data rates, while (ii) it
has multiplied the possibilities for the employment of higher frequency reuse within
the network, resulting in higher spectrum efficiency (bps/Hz/m2) (i.e., for given
bandwidth more users can be served in a specific area). Moreover, an individual
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SBS creates less energy demands [15] and is easier and cheaper to deploy thanks
to its smaller and cheaper equipment in comparison to the big and energy hungry
macrocell BS (MBS). Finally, its site acquisition is also both cheaper and easier to
encounter than the one of an MBS in dense urban environments, since finding new
locations for MBSs, so that the in-between them distance is the proper one, can
prove to be extremely expensive [16].
As a result, the popularity of small cells and, therefore, HetNets, has become
abundantly clear during the last years and is expected to continue in the future
with MNOs planning for denser HetNets, even if they do not intend to deploy a
5G radio network at scale until well into the 2020s [17]. According to a Small Cell
Forum report, the biggest uptake in new small cell deployments is expected to be
seen in the 2018-2020 period with a 50% increase. Moreover, the same report states
that, a second sharp increase is expected between 2023-2024, which is when 5G
densification will be getting into full swing [17].
However, given the high number of SBSs that is expected to be deployed, ag-
gregated SBS energy consumption is far from negligible. This is based to the fact
that, although the energy consumption of an individual SBS is not considerable,
the summed up energy consumption of multiple SBSs can equal the one of a single
MBS. A simple mathematical calculation is needed to confirm that. Moreover, given
that in dense urban environments, network planning is implemented based on the
high peak traffic volume patterns, plenty SBSs and MBSs are underutilised during
low-traffic periods. Thus, both energy and money that could be saved, are instead
wasted. The phenomenon of inefficient energy and cost management is further high-
lighted, in urban environments, since multiple MNOs roll out their deployments and
develop their activity on a stand-alone business model. The impact of these issues
is already apparent in the expected numbers on network energy consumption and
costs and MNOs have to make more efforts in order to resolve them.
Infrastructure sharing, which was mentioned earlier, was used as a counteract
approach against this inefficiency of energy and cost management in areas of multi-
operator activity and with an aim to efficiently utilise their network capacity [18, 19].
By applying a form of infrastructure sharing, MNOs are able to quit the model of
single ownership of all network layers and elements that require individual activities,
such as building, rolling out, maintaining and expanding an infrastructure consisted
of a combination of diverse types of assets. These assets include passive infrastruc-
ture assets, such as masts or ducts, active infrastructure assets, such as antennas
or transmission components, and intangible assets like spectrum licenses [20]. Thus,
when MNOs set agreements, either among them or with other stakeholders, e.g.,
infrastructure providers, in order to regulate a level of cooperation on sharing net-
work infrastructure, spectrum or both [21, 22], apart from multiplying the number
of their access points, improving in consequence their individual network coverage,
they are also relieved of a heavy financial burden of holding complete responsibil-
ity of the financial investments, capital expenditure (CapEx) and OpEx for their
networks.
In order to extend the benefits of the HetNet deployments and network sharing in
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terms of energy and cost savings, MNOs have turned to the deactivation or sleeping
of a whole network or of network elements [23, 24, 25]. Infrastructure switching
off relies on the deactivation of BSs based on different criteria, such as the low
traffic load, with simultaneous traffic offloading to other (usually neighbouring)
BSs that are capable to provide service. It emerged as one of the green technologies
that does not require upgrade of equipment to reduce the total network energy
consumption, while it also offers low implementation costs. It was also motivated
by the need to overcome the issue of network infrastructure underutilisation and
to achieve a network operation approach that could be adaptive to the traffic load
variations. The effectiveness of the method is based on a selection of the network
infrastructure portion that will be deactivated so that the service to the offloaded
traffic is reassured. Therefore, proper criteria need to be selected so that they do not
render switching-off algorithms ineffective, while when it comes to network sharing
scenarios, the conflicting interests of the involved stakeholders have to be given
consideration.
In the same context, more recently, a shift of MNOs towards a green and cost
saving network operation based on the usage of renewable energy (RE) sources for
powering the RANs has been noticed [26]. In spite of the high CapEx that may
come along with the deployment of energy harvesting (EH) infrastructure, the use
of RE sources comes with valuable benefits. More specifically, not only does it imply
the reduction of CO2 emissions during their period of use, but also, in the long run,
a bulk of savings in OpEx by replacing the use of grid energy. Apart from that,
network elements powered by RE sources are trusted to provide a more reliable use
and recovery of the network operation in cases of emergency, e.g., an earthquake or a
tsunami. Usage of RE sources in order to support or entirely power network elements
is gaining popularity as great focus has been concentrated on the implementation
possibilities of EH MBSs and SBSs (EH-MBS, EH-SBS) [27, 28, 29].
It is worth noting that the consideration of RE as a power source for wireless
telecommunication networks has been aided greatly by the evolutionary steps that
have been made in the recent past for the deployment of smart grid (SG) networks
[30, 31, 32]. The overall aim of the SG use was the implementation of an energy
efficient ICT system that would include the integration of RE sources as an en-
ergy procurement source, as well as the introduction of a smart demand-response
management system in energy allocation. The real-time observation of the network
infrastructure that is allowed with the SG, thanks to the installation of smart me-
ters, enables techniques that can improve the system observation in terms of energy
availability and shortage. Moreover, it balances, up to a certain degree, the unpre-
dictability that characterises the generation profile of RE sources. Thus, techniques
that promote cooperation schemes for an effective energy and cost management
are enabled. Indicative examples are energy exchange (EE), in the form of energy
sharing or trading, variable pricing and corresponding billing actions [33, 34, 35].
Consequently, usage of RE sources in combination with the one of SG has been an
attractive energy and cost efficient solution for wireless networks.
Although the energy and economic benefits gained from the aforementioned
technologies have been studied individually for the case of HetNets, we believe that
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steps are left to be made towards studying the combined use of these technologies
in shared HetNet deployments. As HetNets become denser and UE demands rise,
energy requirements are higher and new technologies are used. Thus, the need is
created to study novel possible cooperative endeavours that would use these tech-
nologies while keeping intact the operation of different HetNets in terms of quality
of service as if they were individually managed. At the same time, the cooperative
schemes could reassure a greener approach in network operation for the protection
of the environment. Moreover, as new technologies are deployed, stakeholders of dif-
ferent profiles and interests may be involved in such collaborative activities. Thus,
the perception of a profitable cooperation agreement becomes disputable and the
individual interests of the parties within it are considerably heterogeneous. It is
more than necessary to strictly define a cooperation agreement among such differ-
ent stakeholders so that the requirements of a healthy competition are fulfilled and
so that both holistic and individual profitability of the cooperation is reassured.
Hence, the design of novel analytical frameworks that promote the combined use of
such different technologies in shared HetNet deployments is imperative.
To this end, the present thesis aims at filling the gap in the literature by bring-
ing forward the issues in relation to fair and energy and cost efficient management
techniques in multi-operator shared heterogeneous deployments of 4G and, dynami-
cally, of 5G wireless networks. When it comes to a cooperative energy management,
we take into consideration the network characteristics of the cooperative stakehold-
ers, i.e., the type and quantity of infrastructure composing their network, so that
they improve the energy efficiency of their HetNets and, at the same time preserve
their service providing and network coverage. Consideration is also given to the fact
that BS underutilization may be different for each involved stakeholder over a 24
hour period, due to different data traffic patterns and volume profiles. When RE
sources are introduced in the network, apart from the traffic load patterns that
affect BS and MNO aggregated energy needs in the traditional grid-connected Het-
Nets, the variability in RE generation profiles and availability of EH equipment are
also considered, as they may result in mismatching energy availability profiles of
the network’s EH-BSs. When it comes to a cooperative cost management, energy
management procedures that have preceded are taken into account, since energy
is a major contributor to network OpEx and thus greatly affects the stakehold-
ers’ revenues and profits. Moreover, in both cases of the traditional grid-dependent
HetNets and the grid-connected HetNets that powered by hybrid energy sources,
i.e., grid and RE sources, we value the exchange of information among the different
stakeholders accordingly. Expectations on traffic loads and RE generation, as well
as limitations introduced by the used infrastructure, are considered as information
for an agreement’s regulation so that disgruntlement for the cooperation schemes is
avoided.
The structure of the thesis and the main contributions of this work will be
discussed in detail in the following section.
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1.2 Structure of the Thesis and Contributions
The present thesis aims at bringing forward energy and cost management tech-
niques for multi-operator shared heterogeneous deployments. More specifically, the
contribution of this thesis relies on the proposition of novel schemes that (i) address
the open issues described in Section 1.1 and (ii) regulate energy saving mechanisms
and cost efficient operation frameworks, for networks that primarily use 4G tech-
nologies. In order to achieve that, there are two conceptual roads that are followed.
The first one studies typical HetNets that are shared by multiple MNOs and pow-
ered exclusively by the electrical energy of the grid. In this case, deactivation of
network elements, and more specifically of BSs, is used as the chosen energy saving
technique. Cost related issues that motivate cooperation of MNOs are addressed
with a study on cost allocating schemes. The second conceptual road also aims at
addressing energy and cost management issues, though in multi-operator HetNet
deployments powered by hybrid energy sources, and more specifically by an EH
system (EHS) that uses RE sources, an energy storage system (ESS) to save the
harvested RE and the SG. Energy sharing and trading schemes among different
stakeholders, such as MNOs, are studied with regard to energy management issues,
while focus is also given to the cost related issues that come up with the adoption
of energy trading. In particular
  Chapter 2 that follows, provides some necessary background information con-
cerning the technologies that are used in the thesis.
  Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 provide the innovative contributions of the thesis.
More specifically,
– Chapter 3 is the first part of the thesis and it studies energy and cost
issues of a HetNet that is a cooperation result of many MNOs and is
powered by the grid exclusively. Each MNO owns a HetNet of LTE-
Advanced (LTE-A) technology, while MNOs share their infrastructure
and cooperate by switching off a part of it. We propose a cooperative
BS switching off scheme (CSO) that uses BS types and traffic load as
switching off criteria. CSO also incorporates a proposed roaming-cost-
based user association scheme to roam traffic to neighbouring BSs. In
order to assess cost alterations created by the possible MNO coalitions,
we propose a Bankruptcy Shapley Value based cost allocation scheme
(BSV) to allocate the obtained cost to the cooperative MNOs and to
motivate them thus to maintain their sharing agreement instead of fol-
lowing a non-cooperative tactic.
– Chapter 4 is the second part of the thesis and investigates energy and
cost issues in multi-operator HetNet deployments of LTE-A technology
that are grid-connected, i.e., they are supported by both the SG and
RE sources. Aiming at reducing cost and SG energy consumption, this
chapter studies possibilities of RE exchange (REE) in late-trend network
deployments of EH-MBSs and EH-SBSs, that use an EHS, an ESS and
the SG as energy procurement sources. On this basis, the chapter studies
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a two-tier network composed of passively shared, among a set of MNOs,
EH-MBSs, and EH-SBSs that are provided to MNOs by an infrastruc-
ture provider (InP). Taking into consideration the infrastructure location
and the variety of stakeholders involved in the network deployment, REE
approaches are proposed as (i) a cooperative RE sharing for the shared
EH-MBSs, namely RE bankruptcy game (RE-BG), based on coopera-
tive game theory and more specifically based on bankruptcy games, and
(ii) a non-cooperative, aggregator-assisted RE trading for the InP pro-
vided EH-SBSs, namely RE double auction (RE-DA), which uses double
auctions.
Finally,
  Chapter 5 discusses the conclusions of the presented work, making some rec-
ommendations on how the proposed schemes could be formed for application
to 5G networks and identifies potential lines for future investigation.
In continuation, the main contribution of the thesis will be outlined in more
detail.
1.3 Research Contributions
The novel proposals discussed in this thesis have been included in two journals
and two international conferences, cited next:
[J2] M. Oikonomakou, A. Antonopoulos, L. Alonso, and C. Verikoukis, “En-
ergy Sharing and Trading in Multi-Operator Heterogeneous Network Deploy-
ments,” under review in the IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology.
[J1] M. Oikonomakou, A. Antonopoulos, L. Alonso and C. Verikoukis, “Evaluat-
ing Cost Allocation Imposed by Cooperative Switching Off in Multioperator
Shared HetNets,” in IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, vol. 66, no.
12, pp. 11352-11365, Dec. 2017.
[C2] M. Oikonomakou, A. Antonopoulos, L. Alonso and C. Verikoukis, “Fairness
in Multi-Operator Energy Sharing,” in 2016 IEEE International Conference
on Communications (ICC), Paris, 2016, pp. 1-6.
[C1] M. Oikonomakou, A. Antonopoulos, L. Alonso and C. Verikoukis, “Coop-
erative Base Station Switching Off in Multi-Operator Shared Heterogeneous
Network,” in 2015 IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM),
San Diego, CA, 2015, pp. 1-6.
1.3.1 Other Research Contributions
Apart from publications directly related to the thesis contributions, a number of
other research works have been carried out during the elaboration of this thesis:
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[C5] M. Oikonomakou, P. Kaloudis, A. Antonopoulos, P. Maniotis, E. Kartsakli
and J. S. Vardakas, “Internet services market across Europe during crisis:
A study focused on low-income groups,” in 2017 IEEE 22nd International
Workshop on Computer Aided Modeling and Design of Communication Links
and Networks (CAMAD), Lund, 2017, pp. 1-5.
[C4] G. Kalfas, P. Maniotis, M. Oikonomakou, E. Kartsakli, J. Vardakas, N.
Pleros and C. Verikoukis, “On converged Medium-Transparent MAC proto-
cols for mm-wave Fiber-Wireless Networks,” in 2017 IEEE 22nd International
Workshop on Computer Aided Modeling and Design of Communication Links
and Networks (CAMAD), Lund, 2017, pp. 1-5.
[C3] J. Vardakas, I. Zenginis and M. Oikonomakou, “Peak demand reduction
through demand control: A mathematical analysis,” 2016 IEICE Information
and Communication Technology Forum (ICTF), Patras, 2016.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to provide energy and cost efficient frameworks for multi-
operators shared deployments of heterogeneous networks (HetNets). In this context,
we will focus on the energy and costs saving approaches of switching off network
elements and using renewable energy sources for the power support of the network.
Each of these techniques has individually a different impact on single operated
cellular networks and HetNets, that has to be understood before examining their
effect on shared network architectures. To that end, in this chapter, we provide
background information and the main principles of these fundamental concepts.
2.2 Heterogeneous networks (HetNets)
The major challenge of mobile network operators (MNOs) lately has been to
provide uniform coverage especially in urban areas, which are densely populated
with end users of high data demands. As mentioned in Chapter 1, a way to achieve
this challenging network augmentation, which has been traditionally used in the
past, is to expand the existing network through the addition of extra infrastructure.
During the recent years, adding infrastructure refers mostly to the installation of
multiple small cell base stations (SBSs) and less to the addition of macrocell ones
(MBSs), resulting thus in the formation of HetNets [16].
Small cells allow HetNets to dynamically provide increased bit-rates per unit
area [36]. This is due to the fact that they are primarily added to increase capacity
in hotspots with high user demand and to fill in areas which are not covered by the
macro-tier network, such as the cell edge, while they can be used both outdoors and
indoors. They also improve network performance and service quality by offloading
traffic from the large macrocells and they are able to increase the quality of service
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during high traffic load periods. However, in order to achieve a successful network
planning from a coverage, energy and cost point of view, the coverage range of the
base station (BS) type that will be chosen for installation in each of these positions
is of utmost importance.
The coverage range of a BS is related to its power consumption levels. MBSs,
who are more energy demanding than SBSs, can have a coverage of hundreds of
meters. On the contrary, an SBS, whose power consumption is low and varying,
can have different coverage ranges, starting from ten until several hundred meters.
Depending on their coverage ranges and power consumption levels, SBSs can be
referred to as femtocells, picocells, microcells and metrocells [14]. In Section 2.3
that follows, we present the parameters that can affect the power consumption of a
BS, while we also present formulas that attempt the mathematical formulation of
the BS power consumption.
2.3 BS energy consumption
The variations on the energy volume that is consumed by the BS equipment
is related to the BS system components and network system parameters. Their
characteristics highly depend on the BS type, due to constraints in output power,
size and cost, mandating thus the extraction of a power model that is tailored to a
specific BS type. The aim of this section is to present power consumption models
that have been extracted for the different types of BSs and that have been frequently
used in the past, with a focus on the Long Term Evolution (LTE) technology.
A widely known energy consumption model for both MBSs and SBSs are pro-
vided in [37]. The aforementioned work provides two different models of a site’s
power consumption, which changes accordingly the minimum and maximum net-
work coverage of the site. Dividing BSs into two categories, i.e., MBSs and SBSs
and assuming average power consumption and radiated power per site, the work
employs linear models of power consumption.
In the case of MBSs, the linear model is described as
PMBS = aMBS · Ptx + bMBS , (2.1)
where PMBS and Ptx denote the average consumed and radiated power per site,
respectively. Moreover, parameter aMBS is considered constant and accounts for the
power consumption that scales with the average radiated power due to amplifier and
feeder losses as well as due to the cooling at the MBS site. Lastly, parameter bMBS
represents an offset of site power that is consumed independently of the average
transmit power due to signal processing, battery backup, as well as site cooling.
The work makes reference to the fact that the cooling equipment and the number
of sectors (and in general the transmission lines) have an impact on the site’s energy
needs, both for the transmission and simpler BS processes, which are expressed via
the aMBS and bMBS of eq. (2.1).
Chapter 2. Background 13
In the case of SBSs, a respective power consumption description is given for
microcell BSs with one omni-directional antenna, as follows
PSBS = L · (aSBS · Ptx + bSBS) . (2.2)
In eq. (2.2), factor L reflects the dependence of the site’s power consumption on
its current activity level. The rest of the parameters in eq. (2.2) have a respective
meaning as in eq. (2.1), though for a microcell BS. Thus, the numerical represen-
tations of aSBS and bSBS value are different from the respective ones of aMBS and
bMBS .
One of the most accepted energy consumption models was provided by the
EARTH project [15, 38], since it proceeds to a detailed breakdown of a site’s power
consumption. More specifically, in the aforementioned works, a description is given
on how the power consumption of a BS type is affected by its components. The BS
components of the antenna interface that are mentioned are the power amplifier
(PA), the radio frequency (RF) chains, the baseband unit (BBU), the main power
supply (MS), the cooling (Cool) and the direct-current to direct-current (DC-DC).
The work highlights the dependency of power consumption on the traffic load that is
served by a BS, depending on its type and its components. More specifically, MBSs
are characterised as more energy demanding, with their power consumption having
higher dependence on the changes in the served traffic load volume in comparison
to any type of SBS. On the contrary, power consumption of the less energy hungry
SBSs is more rigid to changes in traffic load volumes.
Based on [15] and [38], we provide Fig. 2.1, which indicates the distribution of
power consumption at each individual component system in selected BS types and
at maximum traffic load. As can be observed, the power consumption distribution
to each component varies for the different kinds of BSs. More intense differences are
noticed for the case of SBSs of Fig. 2.1b, Fig. 2.1c and Fig. 2.1d, in comparison to
the case of the MBS, which is apparent in Fig. 2.1a. The figures confirm the higher
dependency of the MBS power consumption on the traffic load volume, mainly
due to the energy needs of the PA. In the case of SBSs, smaller are the power
consumption proportions that correspond to the PA in an operation at maximum
traffic load, while larger the ones that correspond to the RF chains and the signalling
processes of the site’s BBU. Thus, power consumption of an MBS is more dependent
on the volume of its traffic load in comparison to the one of an SBS.
The EARTH project provided two versions of a power consumption model that
can be used for every BS type, a detailed and a short one, with the values of some
parameters changing, depending on the case of studied BS. Assuming that the
BS power consumption, Pin, grows proportionally with the number of transceiver
chains (TRX), NTRX , the breakdown of the BS power consumption at maximum
load amounts to
Pin = NTRX ·
Pout
ηPA·(1−σfeed) + PRF + PBB
(1− σDC) (1− σMS) (1− σcool) , (2.3)
where the term Pout denotes the output power of the BS, with Pout = Pmax, since
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Figure 2.1: DC power consumption breakdown for different types of base stations (BSs)
at maximum traffic load.
the BS is assumed to be operating at maximum traffic load conditions. Moreover,
ηPA accounts for the PA efficiency, while PRF and PBBU stand for the power con-
sumption at the RF units and the BBU, respectively. Finally, losses incurred by
DC-DC power supply, main supply, and active cooling are represented by σDC ,
σMS and σcool, respectively, and they are assumed to scale linearly with the power
consumption of the other components.
The shorter version incorporates the loss parameters in single variables that
provide a simpler linear form of the formula in eq. (2.3) as
Pin =
{
NTRX · (P0 +ΔP · Pout) , 0 < Pout ≤ Pmax
NTRX · Psleep, Pout = 0. (2.4)
In eq. (2.4), P0 is the linear model parameter that represents power consumption
at the zero RF output power and ΔP is the slope of the load dependent power
consumption. Finally, Psleep indicates the BS power consumption at sleep mode,
i.e., in the case when BS components are deactivated, e.g., when there is nothing
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to transmit, in order to save energy.
Although aforementioned works of [37] and of the EARTH project were pub-
lished around 2009 and 2012, respectively, and thus were based on measurements
and estimations of past BS models, they are often encountered as the chosen BS
power consumption model on current state-of-the-art works. Special reference is
made to the work of project EARTH [15, 38], which is probably the most encoun-
tered BS power consumption model.
The deactivation of some BS components, which is mentioned in eq. (2.4), or
even of a whole BS, is believed to be a solution with prospects to save considerable
amounts of energy for a network. The technique falls into the area of our interest
and, therefore, the following section provides information on the concept.
2.4 BS Switching off in HetNets
As explained in Chapter 1, switching off a network or a part of is based on a
simultaneous traffic offloading to neighbouring BS sites that remain in an active
mode and whose range can reach the area covered by the switched off BS. The
main aim of switching off network elements is to optimise the utilization of energy,
meanwhile keeping user experience intact. The technique is enabled by the fact
that network planning aims at satisfying MNOs’ peak traffic, which in turn leads
to infrastructure underutilization at low traffic conditions. As a result, a part of
the BS infrastructure can be deactivated, while a smaller portion of the network
infrastructure can remain active and provide service to the region [39].
The critical task that MNOs face in such cases is determining the criteria accord-
ing to which BS deactivation will be performed. In the case of HetNets, switching off
strategies could be designed either for SBSs or for the coverage-overlapped MBSs.
The deactivation of the latter though may affect gravely network coverage since
they can provide the largest network capacity in the area. Thus, many efforts have
been put by people into designing switching off strategies for SBSs, while keeping
the MBS always active to guarantee coverage [25, 39].
The main criteria categories that have been presented for BS switching off strate-
gies are the following [25]:
  Random strategy: This is the simplest strategy that can be followed in order
to switch off BSs. It can be implemented based on the geographic position of
the BSs or by deactivating them based on a certain probability [40, 41, 42].
  Distance-aware strategy: This method has been based on the attribute of
the distance that either user equipment devices (UEs) or BSs have in relation
to a specific BS, which is usually the MBS of the macrocell that covers their
position. The attribute firstly appeared as a criterion in the work of [43], which
designs an intelligent BS switching-off scheme based on the average distance
that UEs have in relation to their associate MBS, while in [44] the distance
16 2.4. BS Switching off in HetNets
of SBSs from the MBS of the area was used as the switching off criterion1.
Load-aware strategy: The traffic load distribution in time and space has
been the most popular switching off criterion that can be encountered at re-
search works, since it is closely associated with the phenomenon of BS under-
utilisation [45, 46, 47]. As far as traffic load fluctuations in time are concerned,
during the day hours, people are working and doing the majority of their ac-
tivities, creating thus higher data traffic volumes than during the night hours,
when the majority of people are sleeping. As far as traffic load fluctuations in
space are concerned, business areas correspond to higher levels of data traffic
during working days and hours, as people usually are occupied with their work,
whereas residential areas present larger data traffic volumes during evening
hours and weekends, when people are more likely to be at home [15, 48].
Game-theoretic models: Game theory has been used in switching off schemes
in order to relate the method to cost related issues of the network. In this
context, game theoretic schemes that regulate resource allocation or a kind
of leasing infrastructure to offloaded traffic have been used for activation and
deactivation policies of BSs. The ultimate aim though is to avoid significantly
increased capital and operational expenditure (CapEx and OpEx) caused by
densely deployed SBSs [49, 50, 51].
Fig. 2.2 illustrates an example of a switching off process in a single operator
HetNet deployment, with the responsible MNO controlling and operating spectrum
and infrastructure. In the example of the figure, SBSs, with low or no traffic load
and overlaid in a macrocell area, are switched off offloading their traffic to the MBS
with whom the UEs have better reception signal.
MBS
SBS
Switched off SBS
UE
Communication link
Before Switching Off
After Switching Off
Figure 2.2: Indicative example of BS switching off in a single operator HetNet deploy-
ment.
1It is noted that work in [43], along with the one in [40] that was mentioned in the random
strategy criterion, do not refer to HetNet deployments. However, they are conceptually easy to
apply to them and therefore were mentioned in our description.
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2.5 Use of Renewable energy sources in HetNets
The present chapter has referred so far to HetNets that procure energy exclusively
from the traditional energy procurement source, i.e., the grid. In the new era of
wireless telecommunications though, when data traffic volume will be larger, the
use of renewable energy (RE) sources gains popularity as an alternative energy
procurement source of wireless networks. The use of RE can reduce usage of grid
electricity and thus network OpEx and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions [9, 39].
Wireless telecommunication networks that support energy harvesting (EH) from
RE sources, or the EH networks as we will call them hereafter, can use different
approaches in terms of energy procurement and exploitation. Moreover, they can
have as network elements BSs that are supported by an energy harvesting system,
the EH BSs (EH-BSs). In the following, we refer to the main approaches of energy
procurement and exploitation, as well as to the structure of an EH-BS that can be
encountered.
Component structure of EH-BSs
A typical EH-BS is usually composed of a(n) [52, 26, 53]
  EH system (EHS): it refers to the equipment that will primarily be used to
harvest RE. For example, in the case of solar RE the main RE equipment is a
photovoltaic panel, while in the case of wind RE that is a wind turbine. The RE
that is harvested from this main RE equipment is then converted to electricity
(48V of DC current, [52]) with the aid of converters. The power generated by
the main RE equipment is communicated to a green power controlling unit
(GPC) that keeps track of the availability in RE at the site and is provided
either for consumption to the load, i.e., the radio equipment, or for charging
the energy storage system, if there is any.
  Energy storage system (ESS): It is usually an equipment of battery banks
that powers the load in periods when RE generation is low or non-existent.
According to the usual network operation, batteries are charged when excess
RE is harvested. More specifically, the harvested RE is primarily used to fulfil
the current needs of the EH-BS and then any excess harvested RE is stored
in the available ESS. Characteristics that need to be given consideration for
the choice of battery that will be installed are (i) its purchase cost, (ii) its
predicted lifetime, (iii) its capacity, and (iv) its size. The purchase cost of a
battery needs to be balanced by the cost savings that will be achieved with
its use. The predicted battery lifetime is of critical importance as it is largely
affected by the battery’s depth of discharge (DOD), i.e., the percentage of
the maximum battery capacity that can be discharged so that battery health
is preserved. The capacity of the ESS has to be properly calculated so that
it fulfils the needs of its load, while the size characteristics are related as
well with the space availability at the site. Batteries are also characterized by
an charge efficiency indicator, which is connected with its ability to accept
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charge. Various battery types used to support BSs, such as the lead-acid,
nickel-cadmium and lithium-ion battery [54].
  Integrated power unit (IPU): The power requirements of a typical BS
include the load offered by the transceiver equipment, cooling and other mis-
cellaneous loads (e.g. lights). The power supply to these loads, as well as the
conversion and storage of the harvested RE is managed by the IPU. A typical
IPU consists of alternate current (AC) and DC converters, battery charger,
charge level monitors and regulators and a GPC unit. DC-DC converters are
used to supply power to the transceiver equipment and to store the harvested
RE in the batteries, while DC-AC converters supply power to the AC loads,
such as the cooling equipment. The battery charge regulator monitors the
battery state and disconnects it from the system when the overall charge goes
below a specified DOD (generally 50-80%). Finally, the GPC unit controls the
power supply from the RE source to the main RE equipment.
Procurement configurations for EH-BSs
In a traditional configuration of a BS, energy procurement is performed exclusively
from the grid, with each BS using existing rectifiers to support its operation. When
considering though the possibility of having RE sources, configurations of power
management may vary. More specifically, depending on the availability of grid and
other RE sources, a BS may be powered solely or partially by either of them. The
following configurations can be encountered for an EH-BS [26]:
  Stand-alone operation: The BS is powered exclusively by RE sources, while
an ESS is usually available at the site to store energy for future use.
  Fuel-supported: The BS is primarily powered using the harvested RE. How-
ever, in cases of prolonged periods of minimal or zero RE generation, diesel
generators are used to meet the power needs of the BS.
  Grid-connected: The BS is primarily powered by the harvested RE. How-
ever, in cases of RE shortage, it procures energy from the grid. An ESS might
also be available at the site to store energy for future use.
  Hybrid: Such an operation scheme includes a combination of RE equipment,
grid power, diesel generators, etc., at the BS site.
The stand-alone operation, as well as the fuel-supported one, are usually en-
countered in remote locations where commercial power of the grid is not available.
In these stations, the surplus of generated RE is that is not consumed by the BS,
i.e., the load, is either lost or used to charge the available at the site ESS. Moreover,
in these cases, where there is usually plenty of space availability, the power supplies
at the site are designed so that BSs can operate for a considerable amount of time.
In the cases though, when a BS site is located within the grid network range, the BS
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(c) Grid-connected BS, NTT DOCOMO model
Figure 2.3: Power configurations of an EH-BS.
usually consumes the harvested and stored RE on a first place and then proceeds
to the procuring energy from the grid.
In order to visualise the concept of the exploitation of RE sources in the net-
work and the structure model of an EH-BS, we provide selected architectures in
Fig. 2.3 [52]. Fig. 2.3a describes the model of an EH-BS following the stand-alone
procurement scheme. The main RE harvesting equipment, i.e., the EHS, generates
energy that is converted to, the necessary for the support of the radio equipment,
electricity voltage thanks to the available current converters. Then, the availability
in harvested RE is communicated to the GPC. The distribution board, which con-
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nects all power sources, i.e., the main RE harvesting equipment (or EHS) and the
ESS, to the radio equipment, changes the energy procurement source based on the
energy availability. In the figure, the current converters, the GPC unit and the dis-
tribution board constitute the IPU of the EH-BS. Fig. 2.3b provides the structure
model of a grid-connected BS, in its usually encountered commercial model. This
EH-BS model is identical to the one of Fig. 2.3a, with the difference that the site
of Fig. 2.3b is also connected to the grid via rectifiers that change the AC current
of the grid to the suitable for the load DC one. Finally, Fig. 2.3c displays a pro-
posed by NTT DOCOMO EH-BS model in a grid-connected power configuration
[52]. The difference between Figs. 2.3b and 2.3c, is the activity of the GPC unit.
More specifically, in Fig. 2.3b, GPC controls the energy at the main RE equipment
only, whereas in Fig. 2.3c, it also has the control of the ESS charging and of the
grid power supply. Thanks to this change, it provides a remote control of the com-
bination of the three power sources and enables the “power virtualisation” of RE
generation data, battery charge levels, etc.
2.6 Energy exchange
Although the adoption of RE sources and the use of EH-BSs can lead to sig-
nificant energy savings due to purchases of grid energy, it is often a challenging
problem for operators to handle the mismatch between network energy demands
and RE generation at the EH sites. A typical example is the one of solar energy
harvesting, whose peak hours of RE generation are normally in the noon. A wireless
telecommunication network also has the peak hours of its energy demands in similar
hours, leading thus to an effective exploitation of energy during this specific time
period. However, it is possible that the traffic load volume is large during evening
hours as well, when solar energy is not generated. In such cases, covering the energy
deficits is a task that is usually addressed either with a connection to an ESS system,
which stores redundant RE for future use, or by procuring commercial energy from
the grid. However, the progress that has been noticed in relation to smart grid (SG)
networks has enabled more innovative energy management techniques that aim at
a greener operation of the network and at a lower cost. An indicative example of
such techniques is the concept of energy exchange (EE) within a network.
The technique of EE represents the act of energy transfer between entities that
have abundance in energy and entities with energy shortage. Depending on whether
economical transactions are used, it is expressed via energy sharing policies and
energy trading agreements. On one hand, energy sharing refers to exchange of energy
with the involvement of no economical transaction, using for example power lines
[33]. On the other hand, the term energy trading has been historically used to
refer to the act of buying and selling energy, e.g. electricity and gas, in wholesale
markets, such as the European Energy Exchange2. Moreover, it traditionally takes
place between producers, retailers and traders, as well as large industrial users,
while more recently, the use of the term refers as well to the “local” transfer of
2http://www.ecc.de/ecc-en/
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energy between users or small groups within a SG [55].
In such scenarios, the task for MNOs is to find optimal strategies for each entity
such that EE would be implemented in the best matching amount possible. In
its turn, the aforementioned matching would result in a better exploitation of the
generated green energy. In order to do that though, it is important to decide first
the way that the actual EE will be performed. Depending on the decision taken on
this issue, we extract the following ways for performing EE:
  Power lines: When electricity is generated at power plants, it then moves
through the grid elements, i.e., electricity substations and transformers via
power lines, connecting thus electricity producers and consumer entities. In-
terconnection of sites via power lines facilitates the coordination and planning
of electricity supply [56]. Moreover, a connection of power lines avoids a possi-
ble destabilisation of the power system that may occur when energy is trans-
mitted through an AC line. Compared with traditional AC line, a short DC
power line has lower power losses [57]. Moreover, it is the most cost-efficient
solution when no third party entities are involved in the EE procedure.
  Smart Grid (SG): The SG has enabled a continuous and more precise moni-
toring of the electric energy usage thanks to the use of smart meters. Depend-
ing on the feature set, the meter may also notify the utility of a power outage
or allow the utility to remotely switch electricity service on or off. Moreover,
the SG enables selling and buying energy under variable pricing policies that
permits flexible economical management. The options are to purchase energy
either from the day-ahead market, which is mostly based on historical (col-
lected over the years) data, or from the real-time market, which uses the
hour-to-hour electricity price. In either of these options, SG energy has higher
price during high-demand periods than the price set for the low-demand ones.
This operation approach serves energy trading with abundant harvested RE
being sold back to the SG and with energy shortages being served by SG
energy purchases [31].
  Aggregator: The utility of the aggregator is attributed to a threshold energy
volume that is usually required by the current SG market structure. This
threshold of minimum 10 MW is usually required for a bid in energy mar-
kets3 and thus for a direct energy transfer through the SG lines. Therefore,
the concept of an aggregator is related to the existence of distributed energy
resources (DERs) that have the potential to deliver the valuable electricity
services that have traditionally been provided by centralized generating units
and new ones based on their distributed nature. The term is referring to a
company4 that acts as an intermediary between electricity end users, DER
owners and the power system participants that wish to serve these end users
or exploit the services provided by the DERs [58, 59]. Thus, aggregators pos-
sess the technology to perform demand-response energy transactions and can
3http://econgrid.com/index.php/the-role-of-aggregator/?lang=en
4http://econgrid.com/?lang=en, https://reaggregators.com/
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take on the negotiations from the part of end users more efficiently. This hap-
pens in the sense that the aggregator buys energy from a utility company
through a wholesale market and provides it to its customers. An EE act is
usually executed by the aggregator at the cost of a fee. However, aggregators
can reduce searching costs (i.e., transaction costs) for market agents, as the
aggregator can benefit from the centrality in the marketplace and scopes in
managing information. More specifically, aggregation mitigates uncertainty by
gathering all data relevant to potential demand or generation and translating
this data into quantity bids in a market. This could be done by a number of
small aggregators or by a single aggregator (e.g., a system operator) for all
uncertain variables in a market (e.g., the output of variable generators or the
behaviour of a number of consumers) [59].
Figure 2.4 shows in detail the aforementioned configurations with which EE can
be performed.
Power lines
Final load Final load
(a) Power lines
Energy Generation
Final load
SM
Final load
SM Final load
SM
SM Smart meter
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(b) Smart Grid (SG)
Aggregator
Energy Generation
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Figure 2.4: Configurations for performing energy exchange (EE).
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2.7 Open issues and challenges
As has been discussed so far, respectable efforts have been done aiming at
improving the energy and cost efficiency of wireless networks, whether they procure
energy exclusively from the grid or from other energy sources as well, i.e., the
renewable ones. What is missing so far from our study though is to present the
main obstacles that each of the aforementioned techniques brings forward in the
case of shared networks, which of them have been addressed and which remain
unresolved. In the remaining sectors of the chapter, we firstly describe some basic
principles of infrastructure sharing in Section 2.7.1 and then, in Section 2.7.2 we
present open issues that arise when the concepts that were described in the previous
sectors of this chapter are applied in multi-operator HetNet deployments.
2.7.1 Multi-Operator ventures
Multi-operator ventures on network management, in the form of infrastructure
sharing, raised as alternative to complement the downsides of single-handed efforts.
Infrastructure sharing in telecommunications refers to a multi-operator network
management based on established and pre-defined agreements of the involved stake-
holders for joint utilization of assets and/or services necessary to provide telecommu-
nication service, aiming at reducing the costs of building, operating and maintaining
network infrastructure and thus at increasing profits. [12, 18, 21, 60].
Depending on the availability of infrastructure in an area, different forms of net-
work sharing agreements are possible, ranging from basic unbundling and national
roaming, to advanced forms like collocation and spectrum sharing [61]. Three are
the cases in which infrastructure sharing can be considered an option based on the
type of the studied area:
1. Areas where there is no prior network infrastructure: Indicative ex-
ample of such cases are the rural areas. Due to high initial CapEx that MNOs
are called to make in such cases, MNOs can make a joint investment so as to
deploy infrastructure from scratch.
2. Areas where only certain stakeholders are active: In such cases, MNOs
whose coverage does not reach the area can cooperate with the stakeholders,
i.e., MNOs or a third party that have activity in the area. This stakeholders
can act as the infrastructure provider (InP) for MNOs who seek to expand
their coverage and agree with them to provide a type of service providing,
such as roaming.
3. Areas where MNOs have a part or the whole of their network active
in the same areas: In such cases as well, MNOs can reach an in-between
them agreement or an agreement with a third party so as to reassure a type
of service providing.
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For each of these cases, three main forms of infrastructure sharing have been
adopted based on the way that MNOs can exploit their facilities [60, 21, 22, 62]:
1. Passive sharing, which refers to the sharing of space in passive infrastruc-
ture, such as building premises, sites and masts. Passive sharing is typically
a moderate form of network sharing, where there are still separate networks
that simply share physical space.
2. Active sharing, which is a more complex type of sharing, where operators
share elements of the active layer of a mobile network, such as antennas,
radio nodes, node controllers, backhaul and backbone transmission, as well as
elements of the core network (such as switches).
3. Roaming-based sharing, where, in the context of sharing, an MNO relies
on another MNO’s coverage for a certain, defined footprint on a permanent
basis.
In emerging and developing markets passive and active sharing are more fre-
quently adopted by MNOs, since the latter have to make considerable investments
so as to improve their coverage and capacity growth. Thus, they are more inclined to
approaches that minimise investment costs on new technologies. In developed mar-
kets, where the majority of the networks are already rolled out to a high degree, all
aforementioned types of network sharing are an option.
The option of a third party providing the infrastructure to service providers
has become popular in urban areas with multi-operator heterogeneous architecture
models. In such cases the BSs are a property of the independent third party, or an
MNO acting as an InP, and thus the latter is the one who rolls out the infrastructure.
Then, an operator, who holds a spectrum license, leases the provided infrastructure,
starting thus the operation of its network. This architecture implies lower capital
expenses for the MNO, who is only responsible for the service provision to its
users. However, the OpEx that correspond to such operation schemes depend on
the agreements between the involved stakeholders.
In the present thesis, we focus our proposals on the study case when MNOs
operate a part or the whole of their network in the same areas. This is because we
are interested in proving energy and cost efficient solutions for densely populated
urban areas, where telecommunication companies are often forced to deploy the
BSs on the same building or close to each other due to legal regulations. This in
turn results in multiple BSs of multiple MNOs covering the same area [63, 64].
Moreover, in such areas, there are cases where infrastructure sharing is mandated
by governmental regulation as a way of achieving competition between network
providers [65].
Fig. 2.5 displays an example of a HetNet scenario where a multi-operator venture
among the HetNets of rival MNOs serving the same area could be possible. The
macrocell area is overlaid by SBSs that are used for capacity enhancement.
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Figure 2.5: Indicative example of a multi-operator HetNet deployment.
2.7.2 Open issues in multi-operator HetNet deployments
In the case of multi-operator HetNet deployments, there are some different
approaches of the concepts that were described so far that could be followed for the
achievement of an efficient energy and cost management activity.
With reference to the operation of HetNets in alternate operation modes, active
or inactive, the roles of the MNOs who are involved in the agreement for sharing
the HetNet have to be clearly defined. Issues, such as which MNO will allow its BSs
to accept traffic of rival MNOs without endangering the service provision of its own
network and, dynamically, its market share, are critical. The financial impact that
such actions have on the MNO revenues is also not an issue to be neglected. Some
efforts have intended to provide contribution in these questions, such as [66, 67, 68]
and [51], where entire networks are intended to be switched off or the infrastructure
of a third party is attempted to be used for traffic offloading. However, charac-
teristics, such as the type of the BS that should be switched off or that would
take on offloaded traffic of a switching off event, are not taken into consideration.
Therefore, it would be interesting to study how MNOs would react if the switching
off and offloading procedure would take place on smaller scales than the one of a
whole network. Moreover, the calculation of the costs that correspond to an MNO
participating in a sharing agreement is also critical, as a bad management could
intrigue fairness issues and disgruntlement for the continuation of the cooperation.
In Chapter 3, we plan to focus on these issues and propose novel strategies not
only with reference to the switching off technique that addresses the problem of en-
ergy management is these scenarios, but also with regard to relevant cost allocation
issues for a cost efficient management of multi-operator shared HetNets.
With reference to the operation of grid-connected HetNets, or EH-HetNets as
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we may also be calling them interchangeably hereafter, that use RE sources for
network powering except from the SG, different energy and cost management issues
also arise in relation to the single operated HetNets that were described earlier.
Multi-operator scenarios have been presented for energy buying from the grid or an
energy market [69, 70]. However, in cooperative scenarios, the densely populated
areas compel the composition of complex EE approaches due to the variety of
stakeholders that may develop their activity in an area. Collocation of BSs may
imply as well the necessity for a shared ESS among multiple stakeholders. Moreover,
the inability to directly connect all HetNet BSs with power lines mandates the need
for a framework that would permit profitable EE acts among these stakeholders with
simultaneous preservation of the private strategy. In Chapter 4, we focus extensively
on the management of EE activities in multi-operator HetNet deployments, making
proposals that could be followed.
Chapter 3
Energy and cost issues in
multi-operator HetNet
deployments
3.1 Introduction
Our investigation on efficient energy and cost management approaches begins
with a study in multi-operator heterogeneous network (HetNet) deployments. In
order to address the challenges that arise in the case that many mobile network
operators (MNOs) are active with their HetNets in the same urban areas, we study
scenarios where MNOs may install base station (BS) sites in close proximity due to
space scarcity and share their networks based on roaming.
Motivated by the benefits of the switching off method that were described in
Chapter 2 for the case of single operated networks [42, 44, 71, 72], we study the
method in multi-operator shared networks, attempting to address related issues that
remain unresolved. Therefore, taking into account concerns about cost and revenue
issues on shared networks that have been raised in the past, [51, 73, 74, 75, 76], we
study the switching off method in shared HetNet deployments giving consideration
to the kind of infrastructure that should be switched off, i.e., macrocell BS (MBS)
or small cell BS (SBS), and the magnitude of traffic load volumes that correspond
to the MNOs who share their infrastructure.
In addition, we intend not to neglect the profitability of the MNO coalition in
relation to the chosen switching off strategy, as the latter can strongly affect the
former. For achieving a successful cost management in infrastructure sharing, there
needs to be sincerity amongst the cooperative MNOs. Apart from realising and
acknowledging the economic benefits of sharing, an incentive-based policy must
be put in place for MNOs, as a way of encouraging and growing the culture of
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infrastructure sharing on a level playing field. This policy should recognise the
individual contribution of MNOs to the cooperation scheme and ensure that there
is less or none disgruntlement of MNOs within it. To that end, we investigate the
prospect of MNOs applying a cost allocating strategy that would fairly extract their
individual cost shares from the expenses of the cooperative switching off activity,
allowing them to maintain control of their investments and growth strategies.
Thus, the contribution of this chapter can be summarized as
  A cooperative switching off scheme for HetNets that are shared by multiple
MNOs based on roaming rules. More specifically, the proposed cooperative
(BS) switching off scheme, namely CSO, considers as switching off criteria the
BS type and load, and uses a cooperative roaming-based association scheme
for offloading the user equipment devices (UEs) of the switched off site. More-
over it is conceptually rather simple and easy to implement, while it is efficient
so as to encounter a configuration of BS operation and UE association states
that improves energy efficiency of the shared HetNet meanwhile capturing
cooperation issues.
  A model for the cooperation and cost sharing decisions among MNOs based
on game theory is introduced, the Bankruptcy Shapley Value based cost allo-
cation scheme (BSV). The effect of different traffic load magnitudes of MNOs
on the model is studied.
  The proposed CSO algorithm is compared with three relevant switching off
schemes. Simulation results show that the proposed scheme outperforms its
counterparts in terms of energy efficiency.
  The proposed BSV cost allocation scheme is compared with two relevant cost
allocation schemes. Simulation results show that the proposed scheme achieves
a fairer distribution of network cost among the owner MNOs of the shared
HetNet, motivating their cooperation.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 briefly reviews
the related work. The system model and network configuration are presented in
Section 3.3. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 describe the problem formulations and the proposed
CSO and BSV schemes, respectively. A performance assessment of the proposals are
given in Section 3.6. Finally, concluding remarks can be found in Section 3.7.
3.2 Related Work
Since network infrastructure is the most power consuming part of the network,
extensive work has already been devoted to energy saving strategies, such as [40]
and [77]. Switching off algorithms have been presented towards this effort for both
single- and multi-operator networks. Indicative examples for a single-operator Het-
Net is (i) the work in [71], where open-access femtocells are switched ON and OFF
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dynamically provided that a power saving UE association (UA) scheme can ensure
the service of UEs and (ii) the work in [72], which proposes a distributed graph
based game that enables BSs to optimise their switching strategies for energy sav-
ing, meanwhile guaranteeing the minimum service of their UEs. In addition, [44]
presents a different switching off procedure that is applied to SBSs only, depending
on the UE distribution within each small cell area. In detail, when UE distribution
within each small cell area is uniform, SBSs are switched off dynamically according
to their distance from the central MBS. When UE distribution within each small cell
area though is non-uniform, SBSs are switched off according to power saving lists
that are formatted based on a power-saving efficiency indicatorQ. This power-saving
efficiency indicator Q practically represents the induced power-saving efficiency in
the case that an SBS is deactivated, which gives the saved power consumption by
deactivating this SBS per unit load. In both cases, SBS deactivation is applied with
traffic offloading to the MBS and until either no further improvement of the HetNet
power consumption can be achieved or the MBS has reached its capacity or power
limitations. Two sleeping schemes are also presented and compared in [42]: (a) a
random one and (b) a traffic load based one, with the traffic load being counted as
the number of UEs that are the nearest to the BS. A common characteristic of the
aforementioned works is that they focus on the dynamic BS operation by a single
operator.
For the case of multi-operator scenarios, the authors of [51] and [73] study the
relations between multiple MNOs and a third party. More specifically, in [51], they
propose a non-cooperative auction-based game that aims at MNOs switching off
their MBSs by totally offloading the MBS traffic to leased from a third party SBSs.
In [73], they refer to cost sharing policies with reference to a third party. Other
works consider only multi-operator scenarios. In detail, [74] discusses the deploy-
ment of extra SBSs by cooperative MNOs based on the achievable UE throughput
and the individual MNO revenues, as a result of their respective investments and
the payments of their UEs. Moreover, [75] refers to a budget-balanced mechanism
designed for MNOs of cellular networks with similar load distributions, while in [76]
cellular network operators switch off their networks in a non-cooperative manner,
aiming at energy efficiency. However, works of [75, 76] do not consider a HetNet
scenario, which could differentiate the results. Moreover, their discussion on the
revenues issues is based on payment only agreements, without considering pricing
differentiations among different types of BSs or cost sharing methods.
Unlike the aforementioned works, the contribution described in the present chap-
ter of the thesis refers to a switching off solution that incorporates multiple network
characteristics, such as traffic load, BS type and variable roaming charges MNO-
dominated scenarios, which constitute neglected elements in the aforementioned
works. Moreover, a novel fair cost sharing solution that reassures the profitable
network operation is provided.
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3.3 System set up
In the present section, we provide the system set up as well as the principles of the
network configuration that were used. The basic notation of the present section is
provided in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Basic Notation of system setup
t Time slot with duration of hour
N Set of MNOs, Cardinality: N , Index: n
Mn Set of MBSs of n, Cardinality: Mn, Index: mn
M Set of MBSs of all n ∈ N , Cardinality: M , Index: m
Sn Set of SBSs of n, Cardinality: Sn, Index: sn
S Set of SBSs of all n ∈ N , Cardinality: S, Index: s
Ln Total set of BSs of n, Cardinality: Ln, Index: ln
L Total set of BSs, L = M∪S, Cardinality L = M + S, Index: l.
Kn Set of UEs of n, Cardinality: Kn, Index: kn
K Set of UEs of all n ∈ N , Cardinality: K, Index: k
ρk Bit rate demand of a k
ρ∗ Bit rate demand of of HetNet indicated in the ∗ position
qkl Associate state indicator of k and l
θl Operation state indicator of l
P ∗ Power consumption needs of HetNet indicated in the ∗ position
Pl Power consumption of an l ∈ L
P conl Constant power consumption of l
P txl Transmit power consumption of l
P tx,subl Transmit power consumption of 1 sub-carrier of l
PRBl Transmit power consumption of 1 RB of l
ΔPl Scaling parameter for P
tx
l
Jl Allocated RBs of l
jkl Allocated RBs from l to k
ee Network energy efficiency of L
The network energy efficiency ee(t) for the duration of an t can be defined as the
total bit rate demand that is served by the network to the power consumption that
is needed for the sufficient service provision. Therefore, in order to mathematically
express the problem of increasing ee(t) during t in this sector, we proceed to the
calculation of the total bit rate demand ρL(t) of all UEs served by HetNet L during
t and the respective power consumption.
3.3.1 Network System Model and Operation
We study a densely populated macrocell-sized urban area1, where a set N 
{1, .., N} of MNOs, indexed by n, have located their Long Term Evolution Advanced
1The macrocell-sized area is defined by an the radius of an MBS in the centre of it.
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Figure 3.1: Studied macrocell-sized area with a shared HetNet. A set of N MNOs own
the depicted HetNet L, which is composed of M MBSs and S SBSs, while
it provides service to the total set K of subscribed UEs. In the figure, l is
used as an index for L and k is used as an index for K.
(LTE-A) HetNets, as in Fig. 3.1. We assume that each n ∈ N is owner of a HetNet,
composed of one MBS, located in the centre of the studied area and uniformly dis-
tributed SBSs in the rest of it. For generality though, let Mn  {1, ..,Mn} be the
set of MBSs owned by MNO n and indexed by mn, and Sn  {1, .., Sn} be the set
of SBSs owned by MNO n and indexed by sn. Thus, the HetNet of each MNO n ∈ N
can be represented as the set Ln = {1, ..,mn, ..Mn,Mn + 1, ..,Mn + sn, ..,Mn + Sn},
which is indexed with ln.
Extending the generalised notation, we represent the total set of all MBSs of all
MNOs n ∈ N as M = M1∪ ..∪Mn∪ ..∪MN , indexed with m, and the total set of
all SBSs of all MNOs n ∈ N as S = S1∪ ..∪Sn∪ ..∪SN , indexed with s. Similarly,
we represent all the BSs in the studied area, irrespective of BS type (MBS or SBS)
or owner MNO, as the set L = M∪S, with cardinality L = M + S and index l.
We moreover assume that, for a slot t, each n ∈ N is the service provider MNO
for its own group of UEs, Kn (t) = 1, .., kn(t), ..Kn(t), which are uniformly dis-
tributed in the studied area. All MNOs are assumed to have similar traffic load pat-
terns of sinusoidal form, approaching the traffic pattern in [15]. Under the roaming-
to-all assumption among the MNOs then, the total group of UEs that has to be
served by all MNOs n ∈ N is K (t) = K1 (t)∪ ..∪Kn (t)∪ ..∪KN (t), with cardinality
K = K1 + ..+Kn + ..+KN and index k.
A UE k ∈ K (t) has a specific guaranteed bit rate demand ρk (t), equal to one of
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I different categories of data throughput demands ri (bits), where i = {1, 2, .., I}2.
The probability of encountering ri is gi ∈ [0, 1], with g1 + .. + gi + .. + gI = 1.
Then, a UE k can have a bit rate demand ρk (t) (bits/sec) with random probability
gki(t) ∈ {g1, .., gi, .., gI} during t.
Each of the UEs can initially get associated to and served by only one l ∈ L,
from which it receives the best signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). We denote the associate
state of a k with an l during t as qkl(t). Then, qkl(t) is equal to 1 when k is associated
to l and 0 otherwise.
Each MNO is assumed to operate in a different frequency to avoid interference is-
sues for its network [78]. Also, orthogonal transmission is adopted to avoid intra-cell
interference, while inter-cell interference is considered to be mitigated through some
form of fractional frequency reuse scheme or sophisticated frequency allocation [79].
We assume a form of roaming-based sharing [21], according to which UEs of
different MNOs can be served by the network of any MNO that is active in the
certain area, for a pre-defined period of time and at the expense of pre-defined
inter-operator charges. Each re-association event of a k from BS l to a neighbouring
one l′ is considered unique and charged by the owner MNO of l′ with a price, c. Each
MNO is able to define a different c in order to serve the traffic of other MNOs. In the
context of this work, we propose a roaming pricing model described in Section 3.4.3.
BS Power Consumption Model
One of our main interests are the power needs in the studied area. Consequently,
we focus on network power needs of BSs, as a result of their signalling processes,
cooling, battery needs and transmission activity. The uplink transmissions between
UEs and BSs are considered negligible in terms of energy needs and in compari-
son to downlink (DL) transmissions. Therefore, the DL case is considered only for
the network power consumption, where the orthogonal frequency division multiple
access (OFDMA) scheme is employed.
The power consumption of a BS l at t is calculated based on eqs. (2.1) and (2.2)
as [37]
Pl(t) = θl(t) ·
(
P conl +ΔPl · P txl (t)
)
, (3.1)
where P conl is the constant power consumption of l attributed to signal process-
ing, battery backup and cooling. ΔPl stands for the variable that scales the power
consumption of l with the radiated power, due to amplifier and feeder losses and
P txl refers to the transmit power of the l BS
3. Finally, each l ∈ L, has two possible
operation modes θl(t) during slot t: (i) active, which corresponds to θl(t) = 1 and
(ii) inactive, which corresponds to θl(t) = 0.
Thus, the power needs of the HetNet BS set L, which is roaming-based shared
2It is noted that, in the general case, I may be equal to K (t), as each k may have different
throughput needs.
3It is noted that P conl and ΔPl take different values when l refers to an MBS, i.e., l ≤ M , or
an SBS, i.e., M < l ≤ M + S, which are given later in the paper.
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during t by all MNOs in N , are
PL(t) =
L∑
l=1
θl(t) · (P conl +ΔPl · P txl (t)). (3.2)
Channel Model
The power that a BS needs for its transmission activities, P txl , is related to the
number of its associate UEs and their respective bit rate demands. Since we study
the DL case of an OFDMA scheme, we assume that information is transmitted in
pairs of resource blocks (RBs) of 0.5 ms duration in the time domain. Therefore,
we calculate P txl (t) as the total power needs that correspond to all the RBs that
BS l has allocated to its associate UEs during t.
Let Jl(t) be the number of allocated RBs by l (or the traffic load of l as we will
call it hereafter) during t. Then, Jl(t) is
Jl(t) =
∑
k∈K(t)
qkl(t) · jkl(t), (3.3)
where qkl(t) denotes the associate state of a k with l at t and jkl(t) is the number
of RBs that l has to transmit to k at t in order to provide it with the service it has
requested (i.e., the ρk that k demands).
Then, P txl can be calculated as
P txl (t) = Jl(t) · PRBl , (3.4)
where PRBl expressed the power needed for the transmission of 1 RB from BS l.
The value of jkl(t) in eq. (3.3) is dependent on quality of the channel between k
and l, and, consequently, on the estimated SNR of their link, SNRkl(t). Based on
the above, jkl(t) can be expressed as [79]
jkl(t) =  ρk(t)
WRBl f(SNRkl(t))
, (3.5)
where WRBl is the bandwidth that corresponds to an RB pair of l and f(SNRkl(t))
is the spectral efficiency of the link between k and l at t. We remind that ρk(t)
represents the guaranteed bit rate of k during t.
In order to calculate f(SNRkl(t)), we first calculate the SNRkl(t) as follows
[79]
SNRkl(t) = P
tx,sub
l +G
tx
l − PLkl(t)− FLkl −Nth −NF, (3.6)
where P tx,subl represents the allocated power to each subcarrier of a BS l (dBm), G
tx
l
denotes the antenna gain (including feeder loss, dBi) and PLkl(t) is the pathloss
between k and l at t (dB). FLkl represents the slow fading losses (dB) as a random
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variable of log-normal distribution and with a mean and standard deviation μl and
σl, respectively. Finally, Nth is the thermal noise and NF is the noise figure. More-
over, we adopt the adaptive modulation and coding scheme (AMC) over any radio
link. Consequently, the appropriate SNRkl(t) will eventually define the modulation
and coding scheme (MCS) that will be used over the link. More specifically, QPSK,
16QAM and 64QAM modulation schemes of different respective coding rates are
considered. The mapping between requested ρk(t) and SNRkl(t) to the achievable
f(SNRkl(t)) is executed as indicated in [21, Table A.2] [80].
As far as P tx,subl is concerned, having assumed that P
tx
l , is equally distributed
among subcarriers, P tx,subl is defined as
P tx,subl =
P tx,maxl
12 · hl · Jl,max , (3.7)
where P tr,maxl is the maximum transmit power of l, hl is the number of antennas
of l and Jl,max stands for the maximum capacity of l, i.e. the total number of RBs
that l can allocate. Based on this, we can calculate PRBl of eq. (3.4), as
PRBl =
P tx,maxl
hl · Jl,max . (3.8)
3.4 Energy Efficiency Problem
This sector focuses on the energy management issues in shared HetNet infrastruc-
ture with the adoption of switching off. The switching off method aims at increasing
energy efficiency by assessing the switching off possibilities of BSs that are under-
loaded or have no load. A roaming-based network sharing method is adopted to
facilitate the switching off procedure by offloading traffic to BSs of all networks. In
this context, we formulate the HetNet energy efficiency maximization problem and
propose a heuristic solution to address it.
3.4.1 Energy Efficiency Problem Formulation
The network energy efficiency ee(t) for the duration of an t can be defined as the
total bit rate demand that is served by the network to the power consumption that
is needed for the sufficient service provision. Therefore, in order to mathematically
express the problem of increasing ee(t) during t in this sector, we proceed to the
calculation of the total bit rate demand ρL(t) of all UEs served by HetNet L during
t and the respective power consumption needs PL(t) of the unified HetNet L. Given
that we intend to increase ee through roaming-based sharing and switching off. We
also consider the traffic load Jl(t) of each BS l for t as the significant criterion for
its operational state and the total HetNet’s power consumption.
Let us express first the total bit rate demand of all HetNet UEs, ρL(t), in the
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studied area during t. ρL(t) is defined by the individual bit rate demands ρk(t) of
each k ∈ K (t), as well as by their association state qkl(t) of k with a BS l as
ρL(t) =
∑
∀k∈K(t)
∑
∀l∈L
qkl(t) · ρk(t). (3.9)
Based on the above and in accordance with eq. (3.2), the power consumption of
the unified HetNet L is described analytically in eq. (3.10) as
PL(t) =
l=|L|∑
l=1
θl(t)·
⎛
⎝P conl +ΔPl · P tx,maxlhl · Jl,max ·
∑
k∈K(t)
qkl(t) ·  ρk(t)
WRBl f(SNRkl(t))

⎞
⎠ .
(3.10)
Consequently, the network energy efficiency problem can be expressed in math-
ematical terms as follows
max
θl,qkl
ee(θl(t), qkl(t)) =
ρL(qkl(t))
PL (θl(t), qkl(t))
(3.11a)
s.t.
∑
∀l∈L
θl(t) ≤ |L|, θl(t) ∈ {0, 1} , (3.11b)
∑
∀l∈L
qkl(t) ≤ 1, qkl(t) ∈ {0, 1} , (3.11c)
Jl(t) ≤ Jl,max, (3.11d)∑
∀l∈L
θl(t) · Jl(t) ≤
∑
∀l∈L
Jl,max. (3.11e)
The problem of eq. (3.11a) practically expresses ee(t) as the fraction of the total bit
rate demand that is served by HetNet L, ρL(t), to its respective power consumption
needs, PL(t). Moreover, eq. (3.11a) clearly displays that the problem is dependent on
the operation state indicator θl(t) of BS l and the association state indicator qkl(t)
of UE k with l. Constraint (3.11b) ensures that only the BSs of the cooperative
MNOs are studied and that an l can interchange its operation state only between
active and inactive. Constraint (3.11c) ensures that a UE k can only be served by
one l, MBS or SBS, and is considered non-associated otherwise. The total traffic
load Jl(t) of an l is limited by its maximum capacity, Jl,max according to constraint
(3.11d). Lastly, as indicated by constraint (3.11e), the total traffic load of active
BSs in the studied network cannot exceed the total maximum network capacity.
The problem described in eqs. (3.11a)-(3.11e) is a non-linear4 integer5 NP-hard6
4It is classified as a non-linear problem because it contains at least one non-linear function (i.e.,
the step function f(SNRk,l(t)) ).
5It is classified as an integer problem as the set of integer variables is non-empty. More specifi-
cally, all variables θl, qk,l of the problem are integers, with θl, qkl ∈ {0, 1}.
6It is an NP-hard problem as the solution of problem described in eqs. (3.11a)-(3.11e) typically
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problem [82, 83]. In order to address the problem, while taking into consideration
the cooperation issues of MNOs, such as which BS of which MNO to deactivate, we
propose a greedy heuristic scheme. Our proposal, Cooperative Switching Off Algo-
rithm (CSO), constitutes a switching off scheme suitable for application to a multi-
operator shared HetNet and is described in detail in the following Section 3.4.2.
3.4.2 Cooperative Switching Off Algorithm (CSO)
We propose a greedy heuristic algorithm that aims at reducing the network
energy consumption by applying the method of switching off to both MBSs and
SBSs [84]. At the same time, it offloads the UEs of switched off BSs to neighbouring
cells of the unified HetNet, as a result of roaming-based sharing among MNOs. The
proposed scheme, namely Cooperative Switching Off (CSO), considers as switching-
off criterion the traffic load of each l ∈ L in combination with an energy and
roaming-cost related UE re-association scheme and is of centralised application.
Being a greedy heuristic scheme, CSO follows the mentality of the greedy heuristic
schemes. In detail, given a starting solution, the greedy algorithm directs it to
an updated solution that gives the largest increase (or reduction, depending on
the problem) in the objective of the studied problem. This procedure is repeated
until no increase in the objective can be obtained. CSO implements this philosophy
following four steps:
1. Initial Setting, for setting the starting solution,
2. Execution of Greedy Component, for executing the loop that finds the solution
that achieves an energy efficiency increase,
3. Acceptance criterion, for updating the solutions with the ones that achieve
larger increase and
4. Repetition stage and Termination criterion, for repeating the procedure until
no increase in the objective, i.e., increase of network energy efficiency, can be
obtained.
CSO is executed during low-traffic hours (i.e., 00:00 - 06:00), on a t slot basis that
is equal to an hour, and is depicted in Algorithm 1 and Fig. 3.2.
Its steps are described as follows:
requires searching big search trees of possible configurations of BS operation states (θl ∈ {0, 1})
and UE associations (qkl ∈ {0, 1}) that result in various different energy efficiency values. [81]
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Figure 3.2: CSO flowchart
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Algorithm 1 Cooperative Switching Off algorithm (CSO)
1: Set initial values θInl , q
In
kl , J
In
l and ee
In
δ according to a FON for t = 1 and equal
to results of (t− 1) otherwise
2: Set: θl = θ
In
l , qkl = q
In
kl , Jl = J
In
l , eeδ = ee
In
δ
3: Set: θV il = θ
In
l , q
V i
kl = q
In
kl , J
V i
l = J
In
l , ee
V i
δ = ee
In
δ ,
4: while eeδ > ee
V i
δ or (eeδ = ee
V i
δ for two times) do
5: Update ∀l ∈ L and ∀k ∈ K: θV il , qV ikl , JV il of eeV iδ
6: for n = 1 : N do
7: Sort all mn ∈ Mn : θV imn = 1,mn = MN , by their load JV imn (eq. (3.3) for
qV ikl ), in ascending order
8: Sort all sn ∈ Sn : by their load JV isn (eq. (3.3) for qV ikl ), in ascending order
9: for l = 1 : (Ln) withmn ∈ Mn first and sn ∈ Sn following in the previously
defined order and as long as l = MN do
10: for ∀k : qkl = 1 do
11: for ∀l′ : θl′ = 1 and l′ = l do
12: Calculate SNRkl′ =l and sort them in ascending order
13: Calculate ckl′ for the two first BSs of the SNR sorted list
14: Select as ldestk the BS l
′ with the least ckl′
15: if BS ldestk has sufficient RBs then
16: Associate UE k to it and calculate current available resources
17: else
18: Move to the next BS l′ in the sorted list
19: end if
20: end for
21: end for
22: if ALL UEs of l are reassociated then
23: Switch off BS l
24: Update ∀l ∈ L and ∀k ∈ K:
25: end if
26: end for
27: end for
28: Calculate eeV iδ
29: δ = δ + 1
30: end while
31: Update ∀l ∈ L and ∀k ∈ K: eeδ = eeV iδ , θl = θV il , qkl = qV ikl , Jl = JV il
Initial Setting
Before the application of CSO, i.e., when t = 1, networks are considered to be
full operational (FON), i.e., all BSs are in active mode and no cooperation scheme
exists among MNOs. Then, the BS operation and UE association states of FON and
thus, the respective BS traffic load and network energy efficiency of FON are set as
input for the procedures of CSO that follow (θInl , q
In
kl , J
In
l and ee
In
δ , respectively,
where δ represents an execution step of CSO). Otherwise, i.e., when t = 1, each of
the aforementioned values is set equal to the respective results of slot (t− 1).
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Execution of Greedy Component
The greedy part of CSO is the main body of the algorithm and is composed of
a BS switching off assessment along with a UE re-association assessment. The BS
switching off assessment is described in the present section. The UE re-association
assessment is presented in this section and described in Section 3.4.3.
(i) BS Switching off assessment
It aims at saving energy by reducing the number of active BSs. Active BSs, their
respective traffic load and UE association states are assessed virtually during this
part in order to estimate their final values. Its basic steps consist of:
  Estimation of traffic demands : Expected number of UEs K(t) with their bit
rate demands ρk(t) for the following slot t are estimated at the beginning of
t. Thus, average data traffic demands are calculated according to eq. (3.9).
  Choice of BS for application of the switching off method: The traffic load Jl(t)
of an l during t is calculated according to eq. (3.3) and constitutes the criterion
for assessing l to switch off during t.
The switching off assessing procedure initiates with a sorting of MNOs in
ascending order and according to the total bit rate demands of their subscribed
UEs. Then, MNOs are studied consecutively. For each MNO n, the its MBSs
is assessed to switch off first, since MBSs are the most power consuming
nodes of the network. It is noted though that through the entire procedure of
CSO, at least one of the collocated MBSs, 1 ≤ l ≤ M , remains active in the
studied area. This happens because, despite being the most power consuming
node, an MBSs provides the highest coverage to the macrocell area. Moreover,
since MNOs with the least bit rate demands are assessed first to enhance
network switching off possibilities, an MBS of the MNO with the most traffic
load, l = M , remains active. CSO proceeds with assessing the switching off
possibilities of the rest BSs that belong to the studied MNO n, i.e., its SBSs.
The SBSs are sorted by their Jl(t) in ascending order. Therefore, CSO starts
assessing the switching off possibilities of the least loaded one.
Aiming at better coverage, SBSs may transit between active and inactive oper-
ation state over the hourly application of CSO, depending on the expectations
over traffic demands in the studied area during t. However, unlike SBSs and
in order to avoid extensive extra power consumption, MBSs remain inactive
during all studied hours, once it is decided by CSO as such.
  Application of UE re-association scheme: Associated UEs to BS l need to be
offloaded to other BSs so that l can switch off. The UE re-association scheme
that is used to this end is based on (i) the channel conditions between a UE k
and a destination BS l′ to which k may get associated to (SNRkl′(t)), and (ii)
the respective roaming charges. The roaming charges ckl′ that are attributed
to k, so that k can connect to the destination BS l′, are considered dependent
on the type of l′, i.e., if it is an MBS or an SBS, and the owner MNO of l′. The
UE re-association scheme and the considered roaming charges are described
in detail in Section 3.4.3.
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  End of Greedy component: If and only if ∀k ∈ K(t) for which qV ikl (t) = 1, l ∈ L
and l = M , can be re-associated to a neighbouring l′ ∈ L, l′ = l, BS l is
eligible to switch off. Otherwise, it remains active. Virtual variables θV il , q
V i
kl ,
JV il are updated ∀l ∈ L and ∀k ∈ K.
Acceptance criterion
If eeδ ≥ eeV iδ , then eeδ is set equal to eeV iδ . Otherwise, it remains equal to eeδ.
Depending on the chosen value of eeδ, values of θl, qkl, Jl are updated accordingly.
Repetition stage and Termination criterion
Energy efficiency improvement is achieved through the repeated application
of the two previous steps, i.e., the “Execution of the greedy component” and the
“Acceptance criterion”. As long as eeδ > ee
V i
δ or eeδ = ee
V i
δ for two steps δ, the
virtual values are normally applied to (i) the real ones of the next step (δ+1), i.e.,
eeδ+1 = ee
V i
δ , while values of θl, qkl, Jl are updated accordingly, and (ii) to the
virtual ones of the next step (δ + 1), i.e., eeV iδ+1 = ee
V i
δ , while values of θl, qkl, Jl
are updated accordingly.
3.4.3 Cooperative UA Scheme
As previously described, the UE re-association scheme assesses the channel be-
tween a UE k and a neighbouring BS l′, and the cost of the re-association process.
Apparently, it is highly likely for a k to associate to an MBS, l′, 1 ≤ l′ ≤ M , as the
transmitted signal of the latter is often stronger than the one of SBSs. Nevertheless,
MBSs have at the same time more load-dependent power consumption. Therefore,
in order to achieve further energy saving, the re-association scheme adopts a com-
parison between two l′. The comparison is a form of biasing on cell selection towards
SBSs ( M ≤ l′ ≤ L ), thanks to the calculation of the re-association cost we present
in eq. (3.12). The re-association scheme of a k from a BS l to an neighbouring BS
l′ includes the following steps:
  For every k ∈ K for which qkl = 1 with a studied BS l: the two BSs l′1 and l′2
with the best SNRkl′1 and SNRkl′2 and thus with the minimum jkl′1 and jkl′2 ,
are selected.
  The re-association process cost of a k, subscriber of n, to a destination l′,
owned by a different n′, is
ckl′(t) =
{
cpqkl′(t)jkl′(t)P
RB
l′ ΔPl′ t, n = n
′
cpqkl′(t)jkl′(t)P
RB
l′ ΔPl′ t+ c
n · ρk, n = n′ (3.12)
where cp is the fixed power consumption charge ( /kWh) and cn is the inter-
operator charge ( /MB) set among the co-operative MNOs for providing
Chapter 3. Energy and cost issues in multi-operator HetNet deployments 41
their services to a roamed k. It has to be noted that it is possible that each
MNO defines a different cn in order to host the traffic of rival MNOs.
  Finally, the UE k is associated to the BS l′ which results into the minimum
re-association cost ckl′(t).
3.4.4 CSO Complexity
Based on the description of CSO in Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3, multiple searches
are implemented for the extraction of its solution. More specifically, an initial sub-
optimal configuration of BS operation states (θl) and UE associations (qkl), along
with their resulting BS traffic loads (Jl) and network energy efficiency (ee), are pro-
vided as an input to CSO at the beginning of a studied period, T = [t1, t2]. Then,
for each of the cooperative MNOs, a quick-sorting of BS ∀l ∈ L based on their
traffic load Jl(t) is executed. Given that quick-sort complexity is O (n · log (n)) and
that no more than N = L MNOs can be found in the studied system, the resulting
complexity of CSO is O (L · L · log (L)) or O (L2 · log (L)). However, CSO continues
with the assessment of each BS’s switching off possibilities. In detail, for the BSs of
each of the sorted HetNets Ln, starting from the MBS and proceeding to SBSs, the
UE re-association scheme of Section 3.4.3 is applied. Thus, for each associated k, a
BS quick-sorting in executed based on the in-between them SNR (SNRkl). After
all the UEs of the studied to switch off l have been considered, a BS quick-sorting
may be necessary again so that all BS traffic loads, Jl(t), are updated. Given the
two quick-sorting procedures that take place and that the maximum number of UEs
that can be associated to l is max (K(t)), the complexity that is introduced by the
procedure of the switching off assessment is
O (max (K(t)) · L · log (L)) +O (L · log (L)) = O (max (K(t)) · L · log (L)).
The total complexity of CSO then becomes:
O (L2 · log (L)) · O (max (K(t)) · L · log (L)) = O (max (K(t)) · L3 · log2 (L)).
Based on the extracted complexity of CSO, it can be noticed that the CSO
complexity is affected by the relative number of BSs and UEs. Low number of
BSs and high number of UEs make the latter the main contributor to the CSO
complexity and vice versa. The CSO procedure takes multiple steps δ in order to
extract its solution, as described in Algorithm 1. However, the complexity of CSO
is not affected by the number of these steps. It is noted that the BS traffic load
volume that associated UEs create affects the performance of CSO in terms of energy
efficiency only. Thus, as far as CSO complexity is concerned, CSO has a theoretically
high complexity equal to O (max (K(t)) · L3 · log2 (L)), but can provide results in
a reasonable and acceptable execution time for extreme, though realistic, scenarios.
3.5 Cost allocation Problem
The proposed energy efficient solution is based on network sharing. Thus, MNOs
need to always be motivated to refrain from individually applying switching off and
42 3.5. Cost allocation Problem
Table 3.2: Basic Notation of Cost allocation problem
N Set of MNOs, Cardinality: N , Index: n
Ω Coalition set of MNOs, Ω ⊆ N
EL Cost due to energy consumption of L with CSO
T Studied time period
cp Fixed power consumption charge
SEL {Ω} Total cost savings between application of CSO and IndSO
φn {Ω} Cost payoff of MNO n from participating in Ω.
ψn Cost due to energy consumption of L with IndSO or claim or “marginal cost”
Φ′n {Ω} Contribution cost savings of n from participating in Ω
revn {Ω} Roaming revenues of MNO n from participating in Ω
P ∗ Power consumption needs of HetNet indicated in the ∗ position
B Bankruptcy problem
VB (Ω) Characteristic function of B
EIn {Ω} Expectation index as metric of satisfaction of n from participating in Ω
instead remain committed to their cooperation. The latter presumes not only that
cooperative MNOs reduce their expenses, but also that a fair cost allocation among
them is adopted. A predefined agreement that is applied on an set basis could
achieve the desirable profitability and fairness. The cost that will be allocated to
each MNO after its participation in a coalition should mirror its contribution to
the network cost savings acquired from applying CSO. Moreover, revenues obtained
from the roamed traffic served by rival host MNOs should not be neglected. The
final cost allocation should be validated as fair by each MNO n ∈ N , while it should
also remain profitable in comparison to the non-cooperative action of each MNO.
In this section, we study the parameters of the created cost allocation problem
and provide our proposed solution scheme. The basic notation of the section can be
observed in Table 3.2.
3.5.1 Cost allocation Problem Formulation
Let Ω ⊆ N be a coalition of MNOs who cooperate in order to apply the switching
off algorithm CSO on their shared network. Each coalition Ω leads to an amount of
total cost EL {Ω} that is attributed to the total energy consumption of the formed
HetNet L. All MNOs n ∈ Ω are responsible to share and pay the cost EL {Ω}.
Given that we study the low-traffic hours, which correspond to a period T = [t1, t2]
and that the power consumption of the HetNet, PL
n
, is calculated according to eq.
(3.10), with Ln and ln instead of L and l, respectively, EL {Ω} is
EL {Ω} = cp
∑
n∈Ω
∑
t∈T
PL
n
t. (3.13)
If φn {Ω} is the part of EL {Ω} that each MNO n ∈ Ω will eventually take on
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to pay, we will proceed to its calculation by defining
  the roaming revenues revn {Ω} that correspond to each MNO n when it par-
ticipates in coalition Ω,
  the contribution Φ′n {Ω} of each n to the total cost savings SEL {Ω} that are
achieved from (i) the operation of the total HetNet when CSO is applied and
(ii) the operation of the total HetNet when CSO is applied in a non-cooperative
application manner, namely Individually applied CSO (IndSO),
  the expenses ψn of MNO n when it applies IndSO.
Based on the above, φn {Ω} is calculated as follows
φn {Ω} = ψn − Φ′n {Ω} − revn {Ω} . (3.14)
Parameters ψn and revn {Ω} of n ∈ Ω can be easily calculated. More specifically,
it is
ψn =
∑
t∈T
cpP Ind,n(t)t, (3.15)
where P Ind,n(t) denotes the power consumption of Ln in the IndSO case, in accor-
dance with eq. (3.10), with Ln and ln instead of L and l, and
revn {Ω} =
∑
t∈T
∑
kn∈Kn
∑
ln /∈Ln
(
cpqknln(t)jknln(t)P
RB
ln ΔPlnt+ c
n′pkn(t)
)
,
(3.16)
where n′ is the MNO of coalition Ω to the infrastructure of which UE k is re-
associated to and is different than the provider n.
Unlike revn {Ω} and ψn of n ∈ Ω though, calculation of contribution Φ′n {Ω}
to energy cost savings SEL {Ω} implicates fairness issues, as other MNOs may
contribute to cost savings either by switching off BSs or by serving offloaded traffic,
i.e., UEs. It is possible that cooperative MNOs could proceed to an equal allocation
of SEL {Ω} among them to determine Φ′n {Ω} or proceed to an allocation based on
their individual action. However, such strategies could result into a cost distribution
that could be unfair to some MNOs. Thus, we propose a more cooperative approach
that could set aside possible fairness issues and provide an applicable solution to
the described problem. Our proposal is a centralised solution that models the cost
allocation problem as a bankruptcy game.
A bankruptcy game combines the characteristics of a bankruptcy problem [85,
86] and cooperative games [87]. A bankruptcy game is defined by a specific entity
that needs to be totally allocated among a group of players. Each of the players
makes a claim on the obtained entity. A utility function is set for the game, according
to cooperative game theory, which eventually allocates to each player a part of the
entity, i.e., the payoff.
As a consequence, SEL {Ω} is an entity that has to be completely allocated
among the MNOs of a coalition Ω ⊆ N , so that Φ′n {Ω} and eventually φn {Ω} can
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be determined. Taking into consideration that different coalitions Ω can be formed
among the MNOs, SEL {Ω} is calculated as follows
SEL {Ω} =
∑
n∈Ω
ψn − EL {Ω} . (3.17)
It is noted that ψn is calculated as in eq. (3.15) and serves as an upper limit of the
eagerness of n to join Ω. In other words, no MNO would be interested in paying an
amount of cost greater than ψn while, at the same time, no MNO could save more
money than ψn for a Ω. Thus, ψn represents the claim or “marginal cost”, as we
will name it hereafter, of MNO n.
The obtained allocation problem of the cost savings SEL {Ω} can be modelled as
a bankruptcy problem, B, which allocates to each n its contribution to the network
cost savings, Φ′n {Ω} and can be expressed in mathematical terms as
B =
{(
SEL {Ω} , ψn ∈  ++ × |Ω|+
)
: SEL {Ω} ≤
∑
n∈Ω
ψn,
}
(3.18)
We use coalitional game theory, and more specifically, coalitional games of trans-
ferable utility (TU), to define the characteristic function, VB , VB : 2
N ×  , which
will evaluate each bankruptcy problem B and associate it to a real value:
VB (Ω) =
{
min
{
ψn∈Ω, SEL {Ω} −
∑
n/∈Ω ψn
}
, Ω = {n}
min
{∑
n∈Ω VB ({n}) , SEL {Ω} −
∑
n/∈Ω ψn
}
,Ω = {n} . (3.19)
It is noted that if VB (Ω) <
(
SEL − ∑n/∈Ω ψn), then VB (Ω) = 0, since the
entity cannot be totally allocated to the cooperative MNOs.
Given the fact that SEL {Ω} is in any case defined only by the player MNOs of
the coalition, (3.19) becomes
VB (Ω) =
{
min
{
ψn∈Ω, SEL {Ω}
}
, Ω = {n}
min
{∑
n∈Ω VB ({n}) , SEL {Ω}
}
,Ω = {n} , (3.20)
with VB (Ω) = 0 when VB (Ω) < SE
L. Based on eq. (3.20), the value of the game
among MNOs of coalition Ω, VB (Ω), is calculated based on the game values in case
of an MNO individual activity, i.e., when Ω = {n}.
Payoff of cost savings for each n, Φ′n {Ω} or Φ′n (VB(Ω)), as it can be written
in the case of the B game with utility function VB , is subjected to the following
constraints so that the bankruptcy game holds:
  The sum of allocated payoffs should equal VB(Ω):∑
n∈Ω
Φ′n (VB(Ω)) = VB(Ω). (3.21)
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  The payoff of a player n in a coalition Ω should not be less than the respective
one of the player’s stand-alone action:
Φ′n ({n}) ≤ Φ′n (VB(Ω)) . (3.22)
  A player n cannot receive a higher payoff than its claim, so that fairness is
preserved.
0 ≤ Φ′n (VB(Ω)) ≤ ψn. (3.23)
3.5.2 Bankruptcy game with Shapley Value
We use Shapley Value (SV) to determine the payoffs, Φ′n (VB(Ω)), of each n ∈ Ω,
player of the bankruptcy game, with eq. (3.20) set as the characteristic function
which corresponds each game to a value. SV has the important characteristic of
quantifying the contribution of a player, i.e., its worth and value, in a game when
the player joins a coalition, which highly motivated us to selected it as part of
our solution. Similarly, in the present work, SV rewards a player n with a payoff
Φ′n (VB(Ω)) according to its contribution in the obtained cost which. SV is based
on four basic axioms [87]:
  Efficiency axiom:
∑
n∈Ω Φ
′
n (VB(Ω)) = VB (Ω).
  Symmetry axiom: if two players n1 and n2 are such that VB (Ω ∪ {n1}) =
VB (Ω ∪ {n2}), for every coalition Ω containing the player n1 and n2, then
Φ′n1 (VB(Ω)) = Φ
′
n2 (VB(Ω)).
  Dummy axiom: If a player n is such that VB (Ω) = VB (Ω ∪ {n}), for every
coalition Ω not containing n, then Φ′n (VB(Ω)) = 0.
  Additivity axiom: if u and v are characteristic functions, then Φ′ (u+ v) =
Φ′ (v + u) = Φ′ (u) + Φ′ (v).
SV payoff of a player in a game when it joins coalition Ω, is computed based on
the chosen utility function of the game, VB , as follows [87]
Φ′n (VB(Ω)) =
∑
Ω⊆N\{n}
|Ω|!(N−|Ω|−1)!
N ! [VB (Ω ∪ {n})− VB (Ω)] . (3.24)
With the contribution Φ′n (VB(Ω)) defined from SV, the cost φn {Ω} that each n will
eventually take on to pay can be calculated according to eq. (3.14). Our proposal,
namely bankruptcy SV based cost allocation scheme (BSV), is presented in Fig.3.3.
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Figure 3.3: BSV flowchart: Flowchart of the bankruptcy Shapley Value based cost
allocation scheme (BSV)
Aiming at further portraying the fairness of the allocated cost to each MNO,
φn {Ω}, we employ an expectation index, EIn {Ω}, corresponding to each n ∈ Ω
defined as
EIn {Ω} = (ψn − φn {Ω})
ψn
, ∀n ∈ Ω, (3.25)
where φn {Ω} and ψn are calculated according to eq. (3.14) and (3.15), respectively.
The meaning of EIn {Ω} is to portray a metric of satisfaction for an MNO n between
the case of being in a coalition Ω and opting for an individual action, based on the
achieved cost difference. An estimation for the whole method’s fairness is extracted
based on the mean value of EIn {Ω}.
3.6 Performance Evaluation
We implemented a system-level simulator in MATLAB in order to examine the
performance of CSO and bankruptcy cost allocation scheme. In the present sec-
tion, we present the considered simulation scenario and the performance evaluation
results that we extracted.
3.6.1 Simulation Scenario
We study seven macrocell sized areas, with the system model described in
Section 3.3.1. Without loss of generality, we assume that N = 3 MNOs are active in
each macrocell sized area. We consider that all MNOs are motivated to cooperate,
aiming at increasing the energy savings of their shared network and then proceed
in a fair balancing of their expenses. We consider uniform UE distribution in each
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Table 3.3: Simulation Parameter Values
Parameter Value
hl≤M 6
hl>M 2
P tx,maxl≤M 46 dBm
P tx,maxl>M 30 dBm
Gtxkl≤M 15 dBi
Gtxkl>M 5 dBi
PLkl≤M 128.1+37.6logdkl,d in km
PLkl>M 140.7+36.7logdkl,d in km
μl≤M 0 dB
μl>M 0 dB
σl≤M 8 dB
σl>M 10 dB
Nth -174 dBm/Hz
NF 5 dB
ΔPl≤M 21.45
ΔPl>M 7.4
P conl≤M 354.44 W
P conl>M 71 W
macrocell sized area, with all MNOs having similar traffic load patterns of sinusoidal
form, approaching the traffic pattern in [15] as in Fig. 3.4, unless otherwise stated.
Their traffic loads, expressed in number of UEs, are equal to ξ ·K1, K2 = 2 · ξ ·K1
and K3 = 3 · ξ · K1. Parameter ξ is a multiplicative real-number factor, ξ ∈ ,
which is multiplied by the whole MNO traffic pattern curve thus differentiating
both the load magnitudes for each MNO and the total traffic load volume served
by the cooperative HetNet and intensifying load differences among MNOs. Unless
otherwise stated, ξ is set equal to 1. The network infrastructure in each macrocell
sized area is in total L = 45 with L1 = 11 , L2 = 15 and L3 = 19. One MBS
corresponds to each of the three MNOs from the aforementioned infrastructure.
The MBSs are collocated in the centre of each macrocell sized area, while the SBSs,
are uniformly distributed in it. We assume two possible BS operational states, active
and inactive and represent their state with the θl value, as mentioned in Section
3.3.1. All MNOs adopt orthogonal LTE-A transmission of Wl = 20 MHz. Therefore
Jl,max = 100 RBs, ∀l ∈ L [80]. We set I = 3 classes of data throughput demands.
Thus, a k may require ρ1 = 1.5 Mbps, ρ2 = 1 Mbps or ρ3 = 0.75 Mbps with random
probability gki ∈ [0, 1]. We set cp = 0.1  /kWh [88] as a cost of power consumption
and an inter-operator roaming charge equal to cn = 0.003  /MB7 [89]. Each k ∈ K
is initially associated to an l ∈ Ln that is owned by the MNO n to which k is
7Different inter-operator roaming charges could be applied by each MNO for accepting offloaded
traffic of rival networks. However, in such a case the simulation scenario would then become case
specific. Therefore, same inter-operator roaming charges were considered. Moreover, it is noted
that the inter-operator roaming charge value can affect the roaming revenues for MNOs. The
proposed cost allocation scheme, BSV, can be then used for balancing cost differences.
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Figure 3.4: Normalised MNO UE traffic, Kn, with n=1, 2 and 3 corresponding to
MNO 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
subscribed and that provides the highest SNRkl. We set the threshold SNR for the
establishment of a channel SNRthreshold = −10 dB [80]. Our focus is on the low
traffic hours of a day (00 : 00)−(06 : 00), when switching off probabilities are higher.
The rest of the simulation parameters are summarized in Table I [15, 90, 80, 37].
The proposed CSO algorithm is compared with
1. a full operational network (FON), when all l ∈ L are in active mode and no
cooperation scheme exists among MNOs,
2. an individual network operation according to the proposed CSO, namely In-
dividually applied CSO (IndSO), when each n ∈ N individually applies CSO,
3. a random switching off scheme (RSO), when MNOs apply both the switching
off and roaming-based network sharing method by switching off half BSs of the
united network in a random manner so that the geographic area corresponding
to a switched off l′ ∈ L is covered by the remaining active ones [40] and
4. a switching off scheme that is based on a power saving efficiency indicator Q.
We will hereafter call it Q-based switching off scheme (QSO) [44]. As QSO
is designed for a single-operator system model, we adjust it in our results for
a multi-operator one by using a roaming-based shared network with traffic
offloading to an MBS with available resources and giving priority to the MBS
of their provider MNO. We also apply QSO on an hourly basis, as in our work.
The proposed BSV cost allocation scheme is compared with
1. an equal cost allocation (EQ) among the cooperative MNOs participants of a
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coalition Ω, when each n takes on the responsibility of paying an equal part
of the network expenses except from the roaming revenues and
2. the Generalized Ibn Ezra (GIE) value [86], when the allocated cost φGIEn
(
EHet, ψn
)
to each MNO n is dependent on their marginal costs, ψn.
Moreover, when necessary, we consider in our results the case when no cost allocation
strategy is adopted (NoCA).
Finally, network energy efficiency (bits/Joule) and network operation cost ( )
were used as indicative metrics for validating the algorithms’ performance results.
Concerning the MNO satisfaction from the cost allocation methods, we used as
a metric the EI which is given in (3.25), while the mean value of EI is used for
assessing the overall fairness of the methods.
3.6.2 Performance Results
Fig. 3.5 depicts the average network energy efficiency for the studied area dur-
ing low-traffic hours, when MNO traffic variations are as in Fig. 3.4 and with the
consideration of four different switching off schemes that were described in Section
3.6.1: IndSO, RSO, QSO and CSO. It can be observed that CSO outperforms its
counterparts throughout the studied hours, as it manages to serve the same amount
of traffic with less active infrastructure. QSO, performs worse than CSO in spite of
the network sharing assumption, as it offloads traffic only to MBSs and does not ex-
ploit the available resources of other SBSs, as CSO does. QSO though outperforms
IndSO and RSO. On one hand, IndSO is outperformed by both CSO and QSO, be-
cause it does not apply network sharing. Moreover, in a macrocell sized area, IndSO
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Figure 3.5: Average hourly network energy efficiency vs. switching off schemes.
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keeps the MBSs of each MNO active and adjusts the SBS operational states to traf-
fic variations. In comparison to QSO, this results in higher power consumption for
IndSO and thus, in lower network energy efficiency. On the other hand, RSO limits
the amount of active infrastructure to half to save energy and provide coverage.
In each macrocell sized area thus, more than one MBS may remain active, along
with some underloaded SBSs. This results in poorer performance in comparison to
its counterparts. Interesting is the fact that when traffic is a bit higher, i.e., 00:00-
01:00, IndSO is outperformed by RSO, as RSO exploits more efficiently the active
infrastructure. On the other hand, IndSO performs better than RSO for the rest
of studied hours, since IndSO adjusts to traffic variations with SBSs. In order to
quantify the differences to its counterparts, it can be noticed that CSO can achieve
an increase in energy efficiency between 55–78% in comparison to IndSO, 66–107%
in comparison to RSO and 43–50% in comparison to QSO.
With an aim to study the performance of CSO under different traffic scenarios,
we have also assumed a scenario where the load peaks of all MNOs take place during
the night hours (e.g., at a student residence) in Fig. 3.6. A general comment for
Fig. 3.6 is that all studied schemes are more energy efficient in comparison to their
performances in Fig. 3.5, as higher traffic load is served by the network. Amongst
all schemes, CSO is the most energy efficient one, as it serves the traffic with less
power consumption. In detail, it is mainly the network of MNO 3, that serves
the majority of traffic. Its infrastructure is quite loaded, with some SBSs of other
MNOs being active, too. MNO cooperation though allows MBSs and several SBSs
to switch off, which leads to energy savings. Although CSO performs better than
its counterparts in Fig. 3.6 as it also did in Fig. 3.5, the performance results of the
rest considered schemes have changed. RSO has now the second best performance.
It is outperformed by CSO, as it keeps more MBSs active in each macrocell sized
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Figure 3.7: Average network energy efficiency vs. analogy factor ξ and switching off
schemes.
area. However, RSO energy efficiency results are better than those of QSO and
IndSO. With RSO, SBSs serve more traffic, whereas with QSO and IndSO, all
MBSs are active and serve the majority of traffic. QSO is outperformed by IndSO
in Fig. 3.6 despite the adoption of network sharing, because IndSO applies offloading
to both MBSs and SBSs, whereas QSO allows traffic offloading only from SBSs to
MBSs. Concluding, CSO achieves an increase in energy efficiency between 49–87% in
comparison to IndSO, 22–37% in comparison to RSO and 143–174% in comparison
to QSO.
In order to obtain further insights on the performance of the studied schemes in
terms of network energy efficiency, in Fig. 3.7, we alter the differences among the
traffic load volumes of each MNO. More specifically, assuming the traffic pattern
curves of Fig. 3.4, the magnitude of the individual MNO traffic load volumes is
altered with the help of the factor ξ, which was described in Section 3.6.1 8. Hav-
ing already assumed MNOs of different traffic loads, as described in Section 3.6.1,
a cooperation of MNOs, whose traffic load discrepancies change, could result in a
different load offloading among BSs and thus alter the energy efficiency of the con-
sidered system for the different switching off schemes. According to Fig. 3.7, CSO
outperforms its counterparts for low and high traffic load differences with changes of
ξ, thanks to the joint consideration of its switching off and network sharing scheme.
Meanwhile though, CSO improves its energy efficiency by 103.5% for different ξ,
while the respective numbers for its counterparts are 184.2% for QSO, 260.9% for
RSO, 241.8% for IndSO and 292.7% for FON. The more moderate responses to
8It is reminded at this point that parameter ξ is a multiplicative real-number factor, ξ ∈ ,
that is multiplied by the whole MNO traffic pattern curve, thus differentiating both the load
magnitudes for each MNO and the total traffic load volume served by the cooperative HetNet and
intensifying load differences among MNOs.
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Figure 3.8: Average Network Energy Efficiency vs. analogy factor ξ and Coalitions.
traffic load changes of CSO, QSO and IndSO in comparison to RSO and FON are
attributed to the fact that the former increase active infrastructure to cover the
traffic, while the latter keep it stable.
The content of Fig. 3.7 is extended in Fig. 3.8 out of interest to assess the
effects of the different coalitions that MNOs can form on the performance of CSO,
in terms of energy efficiency. In more detail, applying CSO, three kinds of coalition
can be noticed: (i) one MNO (blue dashed line), (ii) two MNOs (black dotted
line) and (iii) three MNOs (pink solid line). It is noted that case (i) represents the
application of IndSO, as it was described in Section 3.6.1. According to Fig. 3.8,
in most cases, IndSO is less energy efficient in comparison to any other coalition of
MNOs, since MNOs do not reap the benefits of sharing, i.e., offloading their traffic
to any BS in the area. Comparing a coalition of two and three MNOs, the coalition
of three proves to be more energy efficient that a coalition of two. Even though
the amount of traffic that needs to be offloaded increases with the consideration
of more cooperative MNOs, the traffic can be better distributed among the extra
infrastructure that is available from the extra participant MNO, increasing thus the
network energy efficiency.
Fig. 3.9 indicates the distribution of the total HetNet cost to each of the three
MNOs. This network cost that corresponds to each MNO n, with n = 1, 2 or 3 is
represented with φn in eq. (3.14) and three cooperation cases are studied for it:
  IndSO-NoCA: It corresponds to an individual switching off action of all MNOs
and thus no cost allocation method is needed. However, MNOs are responsible
for the expenses of their own network, ψn. Therefore, in this case, the MNO
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Figure 3.9: Average MNO network cost, φn, vs. cooperation cases.
costs of eq. (3.14) are calculated as: φn = ψn.
  CSO-NoCA: It corresponds to a coalition of the three MNOs, with no adoption
of a cost allocation method. Instead, MNOs are responsible for the cost cor-
responding to their active infrastructure, ψn, and for their roaming revenues,
revn. Therefore, in this case, the MNO costs of eq. (3.14) are calculated as:
φn = ψn − revn.
  CSO-BSV: It represents a coalition of the three MNOs and the adoption of the
proposed BSV cost allocation method. Therefore, in this case, the contribution
of each MNO to saving costs through the coalition is recognised and the MNO
costs are calculated as in eq. (3.14).
As can be observed in Fig. 3.9, with CSO-NoCA, there is a big decrease of 79.6%
and 63.2% for the network costs of MNOs 1 and 2, respectively, in comparison to
the IndSO-NoCA case, as their infrastructure is assessed first to switch off, accord-
ing to CSO. Despite the fact that the benefits of infrastructure sharing are already
apparent for MNOs 1 and 2 with CSO-NoCA, MNO 3 has an increase of 14% in its
costs. This phenomenon can be considered unfair for MNO 3, since it takes on the
majority of total traffic, when at the same time MNOs 1 and 2 have most of their
infrastructure switched off. In addition, MNO 3 is also faced with increased expenses
in comparison to the strictly non-cooperative approach of IndSO-NoCA, when at
the same time MNOs 1 and 2 notice considerable reduction of their costs in the re-
spective scenario. Thus, at this point, Fig. 3.9 highlights the need for applying a fair
cost allocation procedure among the cooperative MNOs. The respective results for
CSO-BSV are included in Fig. 3.9 as well. BSV cost allocation indicates a decrease
of 32.8% and 12.9% in the costs of MNOs 1 and 2 respectively, in comparison to
their respective marginal cost, i.e., IndSO-NoCA case. Both cost reductions, how-
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ever, are more limited in comparison to the CSO-NoCA case, as BSV allows MNOs
1 and 2 to take on a larger share of the total costs. As far as MNO 3 is concerned, a
big decrease of 65.4% is noticed in its allocated cost between the IndSO-NoCA and
CSO-BSV cases, in contrast to the cost increase noticed with CSO-NoCA. BSV
rewards the contribution of MNO 3 for providing service to the offloaded traffic,
limiting thus its BS switching off possibilities. MNO 3 thus is motivated to remain
in the coalition. The consideration of SV, which is used in BSV, contributes so that
all MNOs reduce their expenses and remain encouraged to share their networks by
adopting a cost allocation that portrays each one’s contribution to the cost savings.
Fig. 3.10 presents the cost distribution among the MNOs of a coalition Ω, as
a result of the different cost allocation methods they can follow. On one hand,
Fig. 3.10a displays the influence of the considered methods on the cost that is
attributed to network power consumption. EQ cost allocation does not take into
consideration any individual contribution of MNOs and thus the allocated costs are
equal. The GIE method, being based on the declared marginal cost of each MNO,
results in a more balanced cost allocation vector, especially between MNOs 1 and 3.
Lastly, given that the BSV method portrays the contribution of each MNO to the
cost savings, it approaches the GIE method. On the other hand, Fig. 3.10b depicts
the results of Fig. 3.10a, as they are formed after the consideration of each MNO’s
roaming revenues, revn. The results of Fig. 3.10b constitute the final allocated costs.
When roaming charges are considered after an EQ cost allocation, big discrepancies
appear between MNO 3 and MNOs 1, 2. According to the figure, MNOs 1 and 2
approach their marginal costs and MNO 3 considerably benefits from the roaming
charges. Undoubtedly, the big differences of 257.7% and 424.2% between MNO 3
and MNOs 1 and 2, respectively in their allocated costs, raise questions on the
fairness of the method. GIE and BSV however, reduce the big gap between MNO 3
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Figure 3.10: MNO cost allocation before and after consideration of roaming revenues:
Allocation of the cost to cooperative MNOs considering different cost
allocation methods before and after the consideration of inter-operator
roaming revenues.
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Figure 3.11: MNO EI vs. studied cost allocation methods.
and MNOs 1 and 2, thanks to their criteria. BSV achieves a more balanced cost
allocation between MNO 3 and MNOs 1 and 2, with respective differences of 44.3%
and 123.1%, in comparison to GIE, where the respective differences are equal to
85.3% and 163.1%. It is noted that, for the three methods, MNO 2 has the least
decrease in its allocated cost due to its large roamed traffic load, which induces
larger roaming expenses.
The satisfaction of MNOs from the distribution of costs among them, as the
latter was extracted Fig. 3.10b, is expressed in Fig. 3.11, via the expectation index
(EI) metric of eq. (3.25) 9. Moreover, the CSO-NoCA case of Fig. 3.9 is also included
in the results. According to the figure, MNO 3 has a negative EI in the NoCA
case, as the fact that it takes on the majority of the traffic results in increased
expenses. It is noticed that when a cost allocation strategy is applied, EI of MNO 3
increases, indicating its satisfaction over the fact that it received a cost reduction
as a payoff for providing a considerable part of its network capacity to cover the
traffic of MNOs 1 and 2. On the other hand, MNOs 1 and 2, are more satisfied in
the NoCA case, i.e., they have higher EI, since they have to pay only for the power
consumption of their limited active infrastructure. When a cost allocation method is
applied, MNOs 1 and 2 have to take on a larger part of the total network expenses,
limiting their individual satisfaction from the cooperation. However, an adoption
of a cost allocation method leads to a more balanced distribution of the cost and
consequently the reassurance of a minimal satisfaction of all cooperative MNOs.
Among the cost allocation methods, the EQ one results in the most unbalanced
MNO satisfaction, favouring MNO 3. However, GIE and BSV balance the EQ’s
method differences of EI for the cooperative MNOs thanks to the adoption of cost
9It is reminded that the EI metric of eq. (3.25) represents the satisfaction of an MNO from
the achieved difference in the cost (i) that corresponds to its own activity within a coalition with
other MNOs and (ii) that is created from its individual activity, away from a coalition.
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Figure 3.12: Mean EI of each cost allocation method vs. analogy factor ξ for the MNO
traffic loads.
allocation criteria (marginal cost and saved energy contribution respectively), with
the BSV criteria achieving the most balanced EI for the cooperative MNOs.
Having considered the results of Fig. 3.11, it is only rational to assume that the
BSV balanced cost allocation among all cooperative MNOs, which is also represen-
tative of their contribution to the achieved reduction of the cost, is a fairer option
to follow. Fig. 3.12 confirms the latter conclusion with the display of the mean EI
of each cost allocation method, EQ, GIE and BSV, versus the traffic load analogy
factor ξ. According to the obtained results, all studied methods provide a fairness of
similar levels in the system for various traffic load differences among MNOs. Despite
the fact that all studied cost allocation methods result in close performance, espe-
cially when traffic load differences are vague among the MNOs, the performance gap
among the methods slightly expands as traffic load differences intensify as well. The
BSV method though presents a slight precedence that is attributed to the use of
SV, as the latter quantifies each MNO’s contribution to cost savings for the extrac-
tion of their allocated costs. The GIE method, being based to the criterion of each
MNO’s marginal cost performs close, though still below, to BSV for the various ξ.
Finally, there is a slightly more intense deterioration in the performance of EQ in
comparison to the others as differences in MNO traffic load volumes broaden, which
indicates the necessity of adopting fairer cost allocation criteria.
3.7 Conclusion
With a view to the expected increase in the traffic load volume, the possibility
for MNOs to switch off infrastructure and to cooperate, expand the expectations
Chapter 3. Energy and cost issues in multi-operator HetNet deployments 57
for a greener operation of the wireless telecommunication network, with reduced
OpEx and CO2 emissions and increased energy savings. At the same time, fairness
issues are raised over the cost allocation among the cooperative MNOs that could
jeopardise their incentive for a cooperation. In this thesis chapter, we introduced a
switching off algorithm, CSO, which can achieve an energy efficient network oper-
ation during low traffic hours, when infrastructure is underloaded and exploit the
benefits of network sharing by roaming traffic to the networks of all cooperative
MNOs. By considering the different types of HetNet BSs, their owner MNO and
the channel quality among BSs and UEs in the studied area, CSO assesses the
best candidate BS to switch off, implements a roaming cost based cooperative UA
scheme to offload traffic and eventually defines the operational state of the BSs.
The obtained results highlight not only the network’s potential energy efficiency
gains, but also the potential cost savings. In order to address the fairness issues over
the cost allocation among cooperating MNOs, we proposed a bankruptcy game as
a cost allocation method, namely BSV. BSV is Shapley Value based and thus takes
into account each MNO’s contribution to network cost savings according to its
power consumption cost in a cooperative and non-cooperative case. The proposed
BSV cost allocation scheme determines the final cost for each MNO based on their
roaming revenues. The extracted results project the adaptability of BSV to pro-
vide a balanced cost allocation among MNOs for their different traffic loads while
managing to be overall satisfying as well.
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Chapter 4
Energy and cost issues in
grid-connected
multi-operator HetNet
deployments
4.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 was dedicated to wireless networks that are powered only from the
traditional grid. However, with a view to the wireless networks of the next era and
the augmented data traffic volumes that are expected, utilisation of renewable en-
ergy sources (RE) is becoming more popular in the industrial and research world.
Despite the high capital expenditure (CapEx) they may introduce, the adoption of
RE sources and the distribution of RE have been both embraced as effective green
cost-saving techniques that power network infrastructure, shared or not [91, 92].
On one hand, thanks to the production of low or no carbon dioxide (CO2) emis-
sions attributed to RE sources, research has been focused on the implementation
possibilities of energy harvesting (EH) base stations (BSs) of both macrocell and
small cell type, i.e., macrocell BSs (MBSs) and small cell BSs (SBSs) [29, 93, 94].
On the other hand, thanks to the technology revolution in smart grid (SG) net-
works [30, 31], research on energy exchange (EE) with the SG or among network
elements with energy abundance and energy shortage is progressively becoming
popular [33, 34, 35, 69, 95, 96]. Motivated by this trend in energy utilisation, this
chapter focuses on the incorporation of RE sources and EE to wireless networks so
that a greener and more cost efficient operation of the network can be achieved.
Besides the benefits that the adoption of network sharing in combination with
the use of RE sources and EE provide to network operation, issues that seek provi-
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sion arise. With regard to network sharing, protection of individual data and profits,
as well as fairness in sharing agreements are critical issues. Towards this direction,
related economical issues have been assessed in past works [73, 97, 98]. In cases of RE
use, RE shortage events due to RE generation unpredictability is a preoccupation
for mobile network operators (MNOs). The use of a supporting energy storage sys-
tem (ESS), consisted of battery series, is usually adopted as a countermeasure [26].
However, the storage capacity of an ESS is upper limited, while both the RE and
ESS equipment aggravate the space scarcity issues that MNOs face when seeking
installation points of their network equipment [64]. The EE technique complements
the benefits of an ESS, while it balances the drawbacks of storage limitation and
space scarcity that come along with its use. Energy can be exchanged at volumes
that are adjustable to needs, and with or without payment, which corresponds to
energy trading and sharing, respectively.
EE can be implemented using power lines [33], the SG [34, 35, 69, 95] or with
the aid of an aggregator [96]. It is reminded that the utility of the aggregator is
attributed to a threshold energy volume that is required by the current SG mar-
ket structure. This threshold of minimum 10 MW is usually required for a bid in
energy markets1 and thus for a direct EE via the SG lines. The aggregator pools
several smaller consumers into larger aggregated clumps that are sold on existing
power markets or through bilateral agreements. Thus, smaller consumers that do
not surpass the 10 MW threshold, e.g., the EH-SBSs, and that therefore have no
possibility of direct access to the market, can adopt a more flexible approach of trad-
ing that can also save money to those who use it. Gathering energy from different
small sources, the aggregator can benefit from the SG lines and, using its software,
it can request immediate provision of power at different places of a network.
The basic principles of using RE sources at the BS site and EE have received
notable attention. Nevertheless, only limited and recent works explore implications
of their adoption in multi-operator environments. This aspect is important as col-
location and ownership of networks affect the choice of the EE model that can be
adopted. Multi-operator collaborative energy trading agreements with energy re-
tailers and directly with the energy market are studied in [99] and [70], respectively.
In detail, the work in [99] describes energy trading acts of MNOs, owners of an EH
heterogeneous network (HetNet), that seek collaboration agreements among them
in order to achieve profitable RE purchases from energy retailers. The authors use as
a main criterion for the agreements the level of produced pollution. Aiming at fur-
ther cost and CO2 emissions reduction, they also apply network switching off. The
work in [70] studies the economical transactions between only two cellular MNOs
and the hybrid energy market. Aiming at optimally saving costs due to purchases
from the day-ahead and real-time energy market, the authors study different MNO
collaboration schemes in both the purchasing acts and service providing.
The aforementioned works study the activity of multiple MNOs in the same
area. However, they omit space scarcity scenarios that oblige sharing of both the
network and EH infrastructure. In such cases, allocating harvested RE to the shared
network infrastructure should be given careful consideration, as the RE volume may
1http://econgrid.com/index.php/the-role-of-aggregator/?lang=en
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be insufficient to cover the individual energy needs of the stakeholders involved
in the sharing. Unless appropriate allocation schemes are adopted, sharing such
strictly defined energy volumes could affect negatively the green operation and
profitability of MNO cooperation. Thus, although the aforementioned works explore
basic aspects of energy trading in multi-operator environments, there are still critical
open issues regarding a fair allocation of RE volumes that need to be addressed.
The issue of fairness in energy sharing was studied only recently in [100] and with
respect to the improvement of the communication service quality in the network.
The studied scenario though assumes only collocated BSs of rival MNOs, while
energy sharing is implemented through the SG. Thus, the work omits exploring
challenging EE prospects in multi-MNO scenarios. An indicative example is the
use of private power lines among network elements of rival MNOs, which has been
studied as a permanent solution only in single-MNO scenarios [33, 35]. Lastly, it
leaves out popular multi-MNO architectures, e.g., those involving a third party [20],
where EE could be hindered due to the conflicting interests of stakeholders.
More challenges though are encountered in an EE act among multiple MNOs.
Achieving energy neutrality for a multi-tier wireless network with EE is a chal-
lenging task, as the BS type and location change greatly the EE roads to follow.
Energy neutrality for MBSs is more challenging and expensive than for SBSs, since
MBSs provide the umbrella coverage in an area and thus are more energy hungry.
Moreover, MBSs of rival MNOs are often co-located in urban areas due to the high
traffic load volumes and site regulation issues, whereas SBSs are overlaid all over a
macrocell area. Thus, the encounter of a both permanent and unified solution for
MBSs and SBSs is difficult. At the same time, for all stakeholders that participate
in a sharing agreement, disclosure of private information is a hot potato issue. The
extend to which they can do it, e.g., for one or for more cells, is a critical deci-
sion. Involving an impartial entity might be necessary when information disclosure
is considered extensive. Finally, addressing all aforementioned issues with simple
approaches, meanwhile ensuring fairness for the stakeholders that participate in a
multi-MNO EE act is a more demanding task. Therefore, it is necessary to strictly
define an EE cooperation framework that clarifies such issues.
In this chapter, we go beyond the existing literature by exploring EE in late-
trend multi-operator HetNet deployments that use EH as energy source, along with
the SG. To this end, we study a scenario in which MNOs manage a two-tier wireless
HetNet that uses a supporting EH system (EHS) and an ESS at each BS site. More
specifically, in our scenario, MNOs apply passive sharing to the macrocell tier, due
to the network planning limitations, i.e., encountering a BS placement site [64] and
in order to address the high energy needs, CO2 emissions and costs, of an MBS [15].
The small cell tier infrastructure, is composed of EH-SBSs, i.e., SBSs with respective
EHSs and ESSs, and is provided by an infrastructure provider (InP). We aim at
studying the prospects of EE in both tiers, meanwhile addressing the challenges of
a network sharing model, with multiple stakeholders of different interests involved.
To this end, the contribution of this chapter is described as
  a cooperative energy sharing scheme via power lines, applicable to passively
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shared EH-MBSs. Passive sharing is assumed as a sharing of not only the
MBS infrastructure, but also the EHS and ESS. We propose an energy shar-
ing scheme among EH-MBSs, or their owner MNOs in the case of one-to-one
correspondence, that refers to the sharing of the RE that is harvested by the
shared EHS and stored at the shared ESS. We assume that EE is carried
out via power lines due to the passive sharing, which presumes collocated
EH-MBSs that are unlikely to be relocated, even though they belong to rival
MNOs. Short-lengthened power lines are assumed, which result in negligi-
ble losses on energy transfer and circumvent of additional costs due to the
involvement of the SG or an aggregator.
We propose a cooperative energy sharing scheme, as, even though the involved
in the sharing MNOs have rival interests, they are of similar characteristics.
Cooperative game theory provides the possibility to increase the value of the
total sharing effort, meanwhile preserving the individual benefits of players
[87]. On this basis, we describe the problem of allocating the harvested and
stored RE to the cooperative MNOs as a bankruptcy game (BG). BGs refer to
the allocation of a determined entity to a group of players who are interested
in it [85]. RE volumes can be such an entity when they are insufficient to
cover the individual MNO needs. Our proposal, namely RE BG (RE-BG),
uses Shapley Value (SV) so that the cooperative act continues. SV ensures
fairness in RE volume allocation among players MNOs, as it assesses their
individual contribution to the obtained result [87].
  a non-cooperative aggregator-assisted energy trading scheme, applicable to
InP provided EH-SBSs that are managed by rival MNOs. We propose an
aggregator-assisted energy trading among the EH-SBSs of rival MNOs that
follows after an aggregator-assisted energy trading within the network man-
aged by each single MNO. The aggregator ensures the exchange of low RE
volumes among EH-SBSs via the SG, given that they are randomly located
within the macrocell area and cannot be connected with power lines. Moreover,
the aggregator prevents the extensive disclosure of private MNO information
to rival ones, e.g., traffic levels of all their EH-SBSs. However, the aggregator
has different characteristics from and rival interests with the MNOs.
Thus, we propose a non-cooperative RE double auction (DA) scheme, namely
RE-DA, for RE trading. DA has been used to describe resource allocation
based on price regulations [87, 101, 102, 103, 104], resource allocation in
combination with power allocation and interference control [105], e-markets
[106, 107] and energy exchange among micro-grids [108]. A DA energy trad-
ing scheme is proposed in [34] for wireless networks, without making reference
though to multi-MNO implications. Our RE-DA scheme regulates trading of
harvested and stored RE of each EH-SBS of the different MNOs, after an
initial internal REE has taken place among the EH-SBSs of the same MNO.
Eventually, the EH-SBSs of an MNO apply DA either having only abundant
or shortage in RE volume, thus acting only as seller or buyer players, respec-
tively. It is noted that a seller EH-SBS enters the DA supplying the RE volume
at the price that best fits its future needs. The aggregator acts as auctioneer,
preserving privacy of information and receiving a fit compensation.
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  an evaluation of the schemes based on (i) the green energy utilisation, (ii) the
reduction of expenses on SG energy purchases and (iii) the satisfaction of all
parties involved, as they are main aims of our proposed solutions.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 provides the system
model of our work and Section 4.3 refers to the challenges it addresses with respect
to EE. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 describe our EE proposals. Section 4.6 presents the
performance results of our proposals. Section 4.7 concludes the chapter. Finally, it
is noted that Table 4.1 provides the basic notation used in this chapter.
Table 4.1: Basic Notation
N Set of MNOs, Set of EH-MBSs, with cardinality N , indexed by n
S Set of cooperative MNOs, with cardinality S, indexed by s, S ⊆ N
t Time slot with duration τ
K Set of UEs, with cardinality K, indexed by k
L Set of EH-SBSs provided by the InP, with cardinality L, indexed by l.
νn Percentage of L managed by MNO n.
M Set of EH-BSs, MBS or SBS, with cardinality M = N + L, indexed by m
m ≤ N : EH-MBS, N < m ≤ (N + L) : EH-SBS
Pm Power needs of m, (Watt)
P outm Output transmit power of m, (Watt)
P passm Shared power needs of m at min. non-zero P
out
m , (Watt)
P conm Non-shared power needs of m at min. non-zero P
out
m , (Watt)
hm Harvested RE at m, (Wh)
zm Stored RE at ESS of m, (Wh)
cb Unit price of buying energy from the SG, ( /Wh)
cs Unit price for selling energy to the SG, ( /Wh)
ca Unit price for practising initial interior REE, ( /Wh)
g∗m Max. RE volume exchanged by m with the SG, (Wh)
e∗m Max. RE volume exchanged by m via REE, (Wh)
B Bankruptcy problem
VB Utility function for B
Ω Sum of RE for allocation with bankruptcy
X Set of seller EH-SBSs, with cardinality X, indexed by x, X ⊆ L
Y Set of buyer EH-SBSs, with cardinality Y , indexed by y, Y ⊆ L
−r RE supplied by indicated r, member of indicated set R, via IndREE, (Wh)
+l RE received by indicated r, member of indicated set R, via IndREE, (Wh)
ERr Claim/Reservation RE of indicated r, member of indicated set R, (Wh)
ΦRr Reservation price of indicated r, member of indicated set R
eRr Payoff RE volume of indicated r, member of indicated set R, (Wh)
φRr Trading price of indicated r, member of indicated set R
G Critical point of trading with double auction
Q Total RE volume traded with double auction, (Wh)
ADA Payoff allocated to the auctioneer of double auction
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4.2 System Model
In the present section, we describe the technical details of our system model,
which can be observed in Fig. 4.1.
4.2.1 System Model and Operation
In accordance to Fig. 4.1a, we assume a set of MNOs N = {1, .., n, .., N} in a
macrocell-sized area serving in time slot t a total set K(t) = {1, .., k, ..,K(t)} of user
equipment devices (UEs), uniformly distributed in space2. Each MNO n operates a
two-tier HetNet that is consisted of EH-BSs, i.e., BSs powered by a hybrid use of an
EHS, an ESS and, finally, the SG with the aid of an aggregator. Thus, based on the
categorisation of Chapter 2, all EH-BSs are considered grid-connected, with an ESS.
The small cell tier is consisted of a total set L = {1, .., l, .., L} of EH-SBSs, uniformly
distributed in the studied area and owned by an InP. Each MNO n ∈ N has the
management of an νn percentage of L. The macrocell tier of each MNO n is consisted
of one EH-MBS, forming a total EH-MBS set that is equal to the MNO one, N . The
EH-MBSs are owned and passively shared by N . As can be observed in Fig. 4.1b,
the passive sharing includes sharing of energy and expenses corresponding to the
main supply, cooling system, shelter, ESS and EH infrastructure. On the contrary,
operation and expenses corresponding to the baseband unit (BBU), feeders and
antennas are an individual and exclusive responsibility of each MNO. Let the total
set of BSs in the studied area be M = {1.., N, (N + 1) , .., (N + L)}. If m ≤ N ,
then m ∈ M corresponds to an EH-MBS, while if N < m ≤ (N + L), to an
EH-SBS. In case of RE shortage, all m ∈ M can proceed to an aggregator-aided
energy trade with the SG3.
In order to analyse the power consumption at a BS site, we focus on the down-
link (DL) network side, where BS power consumption can follow a linear model of
power consumption with regard to traffic load volumes [15]. In the DL, orthogonal
frequency division multiple access is assumed, with transmission of information in
resource blocks (RBs). Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.1 that follow describe thus the channel
and energy consumption model that have been assumed, respectively.
Channel Model
Let χ(t) be a UE traffic pattern. Then, the UE traffic load of an MNO n ∈ N can
be described as χn(t) = κnχ(t), where κn ∈  ++ for a slot t, with uniform space
distribution. Thus, a total UE set K(t) is formed at t, with cardinality K(t) =∑N
n=1 χn(t). Each UE k ∈ K(t) gets connected to an m ∈ M, that is owned or
managed by its own provider MNO and with which it has the best signal-to-noise
2The macrocell-sized area is defined by an the radius of an MBS in the centre of it, while SBSs
are uniformly overlaid in its coverage by the InP.
3The load of a BS is not larger than 10MW. Therefore trading with the SG has to be aggregator
aided.
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Figure 4.1: Detailed system model.
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ratio, SNRkm(t), larger than an SNR threshold, SNRth. We calculate SNRkm(t)
as [79]
SNRkm(t) = P
tx,sub
m +G
tx
m − PLkm(t)− FLkm −Nth −NF, (4.1)
where P tx,subm = 10log10 (P
tr
m / (12TRXmPRBm)) represents the power allocated to
each subcarrier of EH-BS m (dBm), with P trm being the maximum transmission
power of m (W), TRXm being the number of transceiver chains at m and PRBm
being the number of allocated RBs to m 4. Moreover, in eq. (4.1), Gtxm denotes
the antenna gain of m (including feeder losses (dBi)) and PLkm(t) is the pathloss
between UE k and BS m at t (dB). Finally, FLkm represents the slow fading losses
(dB) as a random variable of log-normal distribution, with zero mean deviation and
a standard deviation σm, Nth is the thermal noise and NF is the noise figure.
The guaranteed bit rate demand, k (Mb/s) of a UE k ∈ K(t), can be expressed
in RBs as
wkm(t) =
∑
k inK
ζkm(t) ·  k
WRBm f(SNRkm(t))
. (4.2)
In eq. (4.2), WRBm is the bandwidth that corresponds to an RB pair of m and
f(SNRkm(t)) is the spectral efficiency of the link between k and m at slot t. Given
that adaptive modulation and coding is adopted over any radio link, we map the
requested data rate k and SNRkm(t) to a respective spectral efficiency as indicated
in [80, Table A.2]. We also denote with ζkm(t) the association state of k with m at
t, which is equal to 1 when k is associated to m and 0 otherwise.
Power consumption system model of EH-BSs
Based on [15], we model the power needs Pm(t) of an EH-BS m ∈ M at slot t as
Pm(t) = TRXm
(
P passm +ΔmP
out
m (t)
)
, P outm (t) =
∑K
k=1 wkm(t)
Wm
P trm , (4.3)
where Δm is the slope of load-dependent power consumption and P
out
m is the output
transmit power of BS m. P outm is described as the portion of the maximum transmit
power of m, P trm , as it is defined by the occupied number of RBs at m during t,
i.e.,
∑K
k=1 wkm(t), and the total number of RBs, Wm, that is allocated to m by
default. It is noted that the consideration of the
∑K
k=1 wkm(t)
Wm
term was based on the
assumption that P trm is equally allocated to the each subcarrier and RB that are
available by default at the BS. Finally, P passm stands for the total power consumption
of m at minimum non-zero output power. Based on [15], we model P passm as
P passm = P
con
m /S. (4.4)
In eq. (4.4), P conm represents the power needs of a non-shared BS m at the minimum
non-zero output power, while S is the cardinality of the set S ⊆ N of MNOs who
4It is noted that 1 RB is equal to 12 subcarriers in the frequency domain and 0.5 ms in the
time domain.
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participate in the passive sharing of m. When m ≤ |S|, i.e., when m is an MBS,
then, apparently, |S| > 1. Otherwise, |S| = 1.
The energy procurement source of an EH-BS m ∈ M is controlled and changed
accordingly by a charge control system (CCS)5 that is able to measure and arrange
energy availability from each source. Aiming at achieving a purely green network
operation with reduced operational expenses (OpEx), we assume the hereafter de-
scribed energy sources.
Energy harvesting (EH)
EH is the primary energy procurement source for the EH-BSs and is either so-
lar (harvested with photovoltaic panels) or aeolian (harvested with wind turbines).
Solar energy has been opted as RE source for the energy hungry MBSs, since its har-
vesting is periodic and reduces probability for energy outages. However, we assume
both solar and wind as RE source for SBSs to enhance chances of RE availability
in the whole network.
Depending on the case, we calculate the amount of harvested RE hm(t) (J) at
BS m for the duration τ of a slot t as [109, 110]
hm(t) =
{
PVm ·Hm · τ · (1− ηsol,m) · sin(2πτ/TRE), sun
1
2
·WNm · ρ ·A · v3 · Cm · τ, wind. (4.5)
In the sun case of eq. (4.5), PVm is the number of photovoltaic panels at BS m,
Hm stands for the average solar generation of the panel at m and in the studied
area (Wh/m2/hour), while ηsol,m ∈ [0, 1] is the percentage of panel RE losses due
to temperature, cleanness and shading, mismatching operation of elements, wiring
and ageing [111]. Lastly, TRE is the period of solar generation. In the wind case of
eq. (4.5), WNm is the number of wind turbines at m, ρ is the air density
(
kg/m3
)
and v is the wind velocity (m/s). A = πb2 is the area swept by the turbine rotor
blades
(
m2
)
, where b corresponds to the rotor blade radius. Lastly, Cm is the power
coefficient or rotor efficiency and is a function of tip speed ratio and pitch angle.
ESS
The utility of an ESS is described as the storage of abundant harvested RE, i.e.,
max {hm(t)− τPm(t), 0}, as a provision against RE shortage events. Therefore, it is
the second energy procurement source to which the CCS prompts the EH-BS. The
RE volume that is stored in the ESS during slot t ismax
{
(hm(t− 1)− τPm(t− 1)) · (1− ηESS,m), 0
}
,
where ηESS,m ∈ [0, 1] is an energy loss factor due to battery deficiencies [54]. How-
ever, if zm(t) is the energy available at the ESS of m at the beginning of slot t, zm(t)
has an upper and lower bound. zm(t) is upper bounded by the maximum storage
capacity Zm at m. We calculate Zm based on the nominal values of the batteries
5CCS is referred to as integrated power unit (IPU) in Chapter 2.
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used to compose the ESS and their number. More specifically, it is
Zm = ΨmVmIm, (4.6)
where Ψm is the total number of batteries composing the ESS (in serial connection)
of BS m, while Vm and Im is the nominal voltage and capacity, respectively, of each
battery. Each ESS battery is also characterised by its depth of discharge, DOD,
which prevents the degradation of its health. Thus, zm(t) is both upper and lower
bounded with: (1−DOD) · Zm ≤ zm(t) ≤ Zm.
Aggregator and Smart grid (SG)
SG connection via an aggregator is assumed for every BS m ∈ M as the last energy
procurement source for the EH-BS, so that energy provision is reassured in case of
RE outages and so that MNOs can trade with the SG. In detail, EH-BSs can trade
an energy amount gm with the SG via the aggregator. The trade can be either a
purchase from the SG at a unit price cb ( /J) or a sale to the SG at a unit price
cs ( /J), with cs ≤ cb, of an energy amount with maximum absolute value
|g∗m(t)| =
∣∣hm(t) + zm(t−)− τPm(t)∣∣ . (4.7)
In eq. (4.7), zm(t−) = max {(hm(t− 1)− τPm(t− 1)) · (1− ηESS,m), 0} represents the
ESS energy that BSm has at the beginning of slot t, before any energy procurement
takes place from it.
4.3 RE exchange (REE) and challenges
Aiming at further extending the prospects of cost and energy saving in the multi-
stakeholder network deployment of our system model, we suggest the inclusion of
RE exchange (REE) acts among the EH-BSs of both the macro- and small cell tier,
before their MNOs proceed to trades with the SG. In detail, we suggest that REE
acts occur if the sum of stored and abundant RE is
  sufficient to cover the energy needs of EH-BS m ∈ M, i.e., τPm(t) ≤ hm(t) +
zm(t
−).
  insufficient to cover the energy needs of EH-BSm ∈ M, i.e., τPm(t) > hm(t)+
zm(t
−).
Let em(t) (J) be the RE volume that m exchanges through REE acts for slot t.
The highest absolute value of em(t) is
|e∗m(t)| =
∣∣hm(t) + zm(t−)− τPm(t)∣∣ , (4.8)
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while energy volume traded with the SG of eq. (4.7) becomes
|g∗m(t)| =
∣∣hm(t) + zm(t−)± e∗m(t)− τPm(t)∣∣ . (4.9)
However, challenges are presented about how to extract the em(t) RE volumes with
an REE scheme that is, firstly, applicable to multi-MNO and multi-tiered network
architectures, and, secondly, fairly regulated among the stakeholders of the REE.
As explained in Section 4.1, in order to address this challenge, we proceed to study
the REE prospects in our system model as a two-branched study case, which is
described as (i) the passively shared EH-MBSs and (ii) the InP provided EH-SBSs.
For the first case, we formulate REE as a cooperative energy sharing scheme
via power lines for the energy transfer that addresses fairness issues. The passively
shared EH-MBSs of our system model, have the fundamental role of providing
seamless umbrella coverage, while doing a green and economic energy management
of the utmost fairness for the owner MNOs. Thus, fairness in sharing the harvested
and stored RE volumes of the site’s EHS and ESS, respectively, is a critical issue
to address, as both group and individual MNO profits have to be protected. Simple
strategies, such as equal allocation of the total RE volume or allocation with demand
magnitude priority could be easy solutions to adopt and ultimately extract the em(t)
RE volumes. However, such strategies may result into a distribution that could be
not only energy and cost inefficient, but also unfair to some MNOs. MNOs have
to overcome any arisen inefficiency and fairness issues and seek an energy neutral
EH-MBS operation.
For the second case, we formulate REE as a non-cooperative aggregator-assisted
energy trading scheme. The EH-SBSs are overlaid in the whole macrocell area and
an REE act among them would demand revealing extensive information on the indi-
vidual MNO activity. However, MNOs may prefer to keep this information private,
especially when sharing of the macrocell tier makes public some of their character-
istics. MNOs could negotiate directly amongst them for the encounter of a solution
and the extraction of the em(t) RE volumes. However, this can lead to strategy ex-
posure and hazard both their individual future energy planning and profits, while
multiple negotiations for multiple network elements with energy needs increase the
complexity of negotiations.
Fig. 4.2 describes our suggested energy procurement strategy to be followed
by the EH-MBSs and EH-SBSs. As can be observed, for the passively shared EH-
MBSs, we propose an approach, namely RE-BG, that treats the abundant and
stored RE as a predefined entity that has to be completely allocated in em(t) RE
volumes to the passively shared EH-MBSs. RE-BG is executed at the CCS of the
site. After the application of RE-BG, EH-MBSs can trade energy with the SG, via
the aggregator. For the InP provided EH-SBSs, we propose an aggregator-assisted
approach, namely RE-DA, that runs in parallel with the RE-BG scheme. RE-DA
can be applied by EH-SBSs of the different MNOs after the EH-SBSs have procured
RE, firstly, from the EHS and, secondly, from the ESS of the site. Moreover, for an
inter-MNO REE to occur, we assume that an initial interior REE, which is based on
the least difference in the abundant and lacked RE volume at the EH-SBSs of the
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Figure 4.2: Suggested energy procurement order.
same MNO, is preceded. Thus, with RE-DA, MNOs carefully extract at the CCS
the information pieces they reveal to rival MNOs, i.e., the abundant or lacked RE
at their site and respective unit prices, which they communicate to the impartial
aggregator. For a decision, they take into consideration current and, occasionally,
future energy needs, as well as the profitability of their options. The latter then
extracts the traded multi-MNO em(t) RE volumes and respective trading prices.
After the application of RE-DA, EH-SBSs can trade energy with the SG, with the
help of the aggregator.
4.4 Energy sharing among EH-MBSs
As a result of the adopted passive sharing, we assume that MNOs share an EHS,
composed of solar panels, and an ESS along with the equipment of their collocated
MBSs. Then, the EH-MBSs apply an REE scheme of sharing the harvested and
stored RE in order to ultimately achieve energy neutrality before proceeding to an
energy trade with the SG. The transfer of RE is implemented via power lines that
have been installed by the MNOs. Energy losses due to power lines are considered
negligible due to the short length of power lines.
During daylight, when solar energy generation varies, and at the beginning of a
slot t, each shared EH-MBS makes an estimation of its expected energy needs for
the duration τ of t. Based on the extracted estimation, the shared CCS makes the
energy management of the shared EH-MBSs for the duration τ of t. However, during
night-time, when solar energy harvesting is zero6, a decision has to be made for the
REE act, based only on the stored RE. Therefore, each shared EH-MBS makes an
estimation of its expected energy needs during a slot t′, which corresponds to a set
of slots t 7. Based on the extracted estimation, the shared CCS makes the energy
6It is noted that, in terms of simplicity, for periods of non-existent solar energy generation,
solar energy harvesting is zero.
7In terms of simplicity and without loss of generality, we continue the analysis in the present
section making reference to slot t.
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management of the shared EH-MBSs for the duration τ ′ of t′.
We model the energy sharing problem among the shared shared EH-MBSs, using
cooperative game theory. Motivated by the utilities of the bankruptcy games, which
we explained in Chapter 3, we apply the method in the case of energy sharing as
well. In detail, we use the concept of a bankruptcy game, according to which a
specific entity needs to be completely allocated among a specific group of players
[85, 86]. Each player makes a claim on the entity. A utility function is set for the
game, which eventually allocates to each player a part of the entity, i.e., the payoff.
Regarding the considered scenario, this entity, let Ω(t), corresponds to the sum
of (i) the harvested RE h(t) that is collected from the shared EHS and (ii) the
available stored RE z(t−) at the shared ESS, when the sum is either over-sufficient
or insufficient to cover the power needs P (t) of the passively shared EH-MBSs for the
duration τ of a slot t, i.e., τP (t) ≤ h(t) + z(t−) = Ω(t) and τP (t) > h(t) + z(t−) =
Ω(t), respectively. Entity Ω(t) has to be fairly and completely provided to the EH-
MBSs that are passively shared a set of MNOs S ⊆ N . The EH-MBSs, or, as there
is a one-to-one correspondence, their owner MNO, of coalition S can be portrayed
as the players of the game. Each player s ∈ S claims an amount Es(t) = τPs(t) of
the entity Ω(t) so as to achieve an purely green operation of its EH-MBS, s, with
Ps(t) being defined as in eq. (4.3).
Thus, we have a bankruptcy problem, B(t) modelled as
B(t) =
{ (
Ω(t), Es(t) ∈  ++ × |S|+
)
: Ω(t) ≤∑|S|s=1 Es(t)
}
. (4.10)
We define the utility function of the bankruptcy game, VB(t), VB(t) : 2
N × ,
which evaluates the bankruptcy problem B(t) and associates it to a real value, as
VB(t) (S) =
{
min
{
Es∈S(t),Ω(t)−
∑
s/∈S Es(t)
}
,S = {s}
min
{∑
s∈S VB(t) (s) ,Ω(t)−
∑
s/∈S Es(t)
}
,S = {s} . (4.11)
Eq. (4.11) practically represents the amount of energy that can be allocated, after
the non-participants in coalition S have received their claim. Thus, in an individual
act of MNO, i.e., S = {s}, the game value VB(t) (s) is equal to either the total
amount of its claim, Es(t), or the remaining amount of Ω(t), after non-participant
MNOs in S have taken their share. Similarly, in a coalition with more than one par-
ticipants, i.e., S = {s}, the game value VB(t) (S) can be either the sum of individual
act values VB(t) (s) or the remaining Ω(t), after non-participant MNOs in S have
satisfied their needs.
However, if VB(t) (S) <
(
Ω(t) − ∑s/∈S Es(t)), then VB(t) (S) = 0. This is due
to the fact that entity Ω(t) needs to be totally allocated to the cooperative MNOs
[85, 86]. Consequently, when VB(t) (S) <
(
Ω(t) − ∑s/∈S Es(t)), Ω(t) is insufficient
to cover the energy needs of the total shared system and the game value is 0.
In order to ensure a viable solution for the bankruptcy game, the energy amounts
that will eventually be allocated to the participants in a coalition S, i.e., the ex-
tracted payoffs, need to fulfil certain constraints. Let es(VB(t)(S)) be the payoff of
player s ∈ S for participating in the bankruptcy game B(t) with the utility function
VB(t). Then, es(VB(t)(S)) is the volume of Ω(t) that is allocated to a player s ∈ S
and is subjected to the following constraints:
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  The sum of allocated payoffs should equal VB(t)(S):∑
s∈S
es(VB(t)(S)) = VB(t)(S). (4.12)
  The payoff of a player s in a coalition S should be at least equal to the payoff
of its stand-alone action:
es(VB(t)({s})) ≤ es(VB(t)(S)). (4.13)
  A player s cannot receive a higher payoff than its claim, so that fairness is
preserved.
0 ≤ es(VB(t)(S)) ≤ Es(t). (4.14)
We use Shapley Value (SV) so as to solve the problem, i.e., to calculate the
payoffs es(VB(t)(S)) of the described bankruptcy game [87]. SV rewards a player
s ∈ S with the SV payoff that portrays its marginal contribution to the coalition
value, based on the utility function of the game. In the present case, SV payoffs
es(VB(t)(S)) represent the contribution in generating Ω(t), when an S is formed
and based on the utility function VB(t)(S) of eq. (4.11). SV has four basic axioms
[87]:
  Efficiency axiom:
∑
s∈S es(VB(t)(S)) = VB(t) (S).
  Dummy axiom: If a player s is such that VB(t) (S) = VB(t) (S ∪ {s}), then for
∀S ′, S ′ = S − {s}, it is es(VB(t)(S ′)) = 0.
  Symmetry axiom: If two players s1 and s2 are such that VB(t) (S ∪ {s1}) =
VB(t) (S ∪ {s2}), then for ∀S ′, S ′ = S∪{s1, s2} it is es1(VB(t)(S ′)) = es2(VB(t)(S ′)).
  Additivity axiom: If V1 and V2 are characteristic functions, then e (V1 + V2) =
e (V1 + V2) = e (V1) + e (V2).
For the bankruptcy game, the efficiency axiom of SV remains valid when the game
is defined by the player set, i.e., coalition S. The remaining axioms remain valid for
the proposed game.
SV has an impact as a solution to the described problem since it displays a
player’s worth in the studied game, when the player joins coalition S. Thus, we
calculate the payoff of each player s ∈ S via the canonical definition of the SV
payoff, which, based on the utility function VB of eq. (4.11), is
es
(
VB(t) (S)
)
=
∑
S⊆N\{s}
|S|! (|N | − |S| − 1)!
|N |!
[
VB(t) (S ∪ {s})− VB(t) (S)
]
. (4.15)
The computational complexity of RE-BG is O(2N ), where N is the number of
MNOs participating in the sharing [112]. This is because, results of all different
coalition forms of N MNOs have to be examined. Given a large |N |, the scheme’s
complexity increases tremendously. In the studied case though, it is acceptable as
the number of MNOs, N cannot be too high.
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4.5 Energy trading among EH-SBSs
We assume that MNOs lease EH-SBSs from an InP. All EH-SBSs are connected to
the SG via an aggregator. We prompt MNOs to adopt an REE scheme of aggregator-
assisted energy trading among their EH-SBSs, so as to ultimately achieve energy
neutrality before trading energy with the SG. In detail, at the beginning of a slot t,
each EH-SBS makes an evaluation of its expected energy needs and harvested RE
for the duration τ of t. Taking into consideration the available stored RE at the
ESS at the beginning of t, the CCS of the site calculates the RE volume that the
EH-SBS is able to supply or demand at a trade.
This information is communicated to the impartial aggregator, who arranges an
initial interior REE amongst the EH-SBSs managed by the same MNO. This initial
interior REE sorts the buyer EH-SBSs in descending order based on their requested
RE volume and matches it to the seller EH-SBS of the same MNO with which it
has the least difference between its requested RE volume and the supplied one by
each seller EH-SBS. The available RE volumes at the EH-SBSs are updated and
the procedure continues until there are no remains either of requested or supplied
RE volume at the EH-SBSs of the MNO. The initial internal REE is carried out
by the aggregator at the cost of the same unit price ca ≤ cb ( /Wh). After the
initial interior REE, the CCS of each EH-SBS site calculates again the RE volume
that the EH-SBS is able to supply or demand for a trade with the EH-SBSs of a
different MNO, along with a respective unit price. It is noted that, at this point, the
EH-SBSs that are managed by the same MNO enter an energy trading procedure
with EH-SBSs of a rival MNO either having abundant RE at their EH-SBSs only
or shortage in it.
The new reservation RE volumes and prices of each EH-SBS are communicated
to the impartial aggregator, who eventually extracts the new RE trading volume
and price for each EH-SBS and for slot t, and the payoff for its service. Payments
are executed through monetary transactions among the involved parties, while the
aggregator arranges the energy transfer act through the SG. Therefore, we assume
that the energy transfer is managed by the aggregator on a cloud level and that
the SG delivers RE volumes to recipient EH-SBSs with energy shortage having
negligible energy losses.
We model the energy trading problem of the EH-SBSs managed by different
MNOs using non-cooperative game theory. More specifically, we use the concept
of double auction (DA), which is applicable to cases where multiple sellers and
buyers are active [87]. In a DA, each seller and each buyer supplies and demands,
respectively, a number of items. All sellers report a price for the item, i.e., the
asking price, while all buyers propose another price, i.e., the bidding price. The
prices correspond to a single item unit. A trading point among sellers and buyers is
eventually determined based on the demanded and supplied quantities of the traded
item, as well as from the asking and bidding prices. The DA can be executed in a
distributed manner or in a central location by an auctioneer.
Regarding the considered scenario, we simulate as a DA the procedure of the
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aggregator-assisted energy trading among the EH-SBSs that are managed by differ-
ent MNOs. We set harvested and stored RE, as well as the RE volumes exchanged
with initial interior REE, as the trade item of the DA, the EH-SBSs as the DA buy-
ers and sellers and the aggregator as the DA auctioneer. The total set of EH-SBSs,
L = 1, .., l, .., L, is consisted of
  a set of EH-SBSs that have abundant RE in comparison to their energy needs
τPl(t), i.e., τPl(t) ≤ hl(t) + zl(t−)− −l (t) + +l (t).
  a set of EH-SBSs that have shortage in RE in comparison to their energy
needs τPl(t), i.e., τPl(t) > hl(t) + zl(t
−)− −l (t) + +l (t)),
where −l (t) and 
+
l (t) are the RE volumes provided and received with the initial
interior REE, respectively.
The RE volume El(t) that each EH-SBSs l has at this point in abundance or
shortage corresponds to the reservation RE volume that the EH-SBS l wants to
supply or demand, respectively, by an EH-SBS of a rival MNO. El(t) is
El(t) = hl(t) + zl(t
−)− −l (t) + +l (t)− τPl(t). (4.16)
The El(t) is communicated to the auctioneer-aggregator, who then separates the
set L to ordered sets of seller and buyer EH-SBSs, X and Y, respectively. If
  El(t) ≥ 0, then EH-SBS l is a seller and l ∈ X . We will hereafter refer to the
El(t) of a seller as E
X
l (t) = El(t).
  El(t) < 0, then EH-SBS l is a buyer and l ∈ Y. We will hereafter refer to the
El(t) of a buyer as E
Y
l (t) = |El(t)|.
Along with the reservation RE volumes, each EH-SBS l ∈ L communicates to the
auctioneer-aggregator as well its reservation, asking or bidding, unit price ( /Wh)
to reserve its participation in the DA. Let ΦXl be the reservation asking price of a
seller l ∈ X and ΦYl the reservation bidding price of a buyer l ∈ Y. Let us note that
none of the buyers or sellers splits its volume so as to ask a different reservation
price for each category. For the extraction of their values, we assume that seller and
buyer EH-SBSs follow a different strategy.
4.5.1 Sellers
Each seller EH-SBS l ∈ X is characterised by a utility function, UXl (t), which
values the significance of its El(t) in relation to its own energy needs. We set
UXl (t) = δ
X
l (t)·ln
(
1 + EXl (t)
)
+ΦXl (t)·
(
hl(t) + zl(t
−)− −l (t) + +l (t)− EXl (t)
)
, (4.17)
where δXl (t) =
τPl(t+1)
hl(t)+zl(t
−−−
l
(t)+
+
l
(t))+hl(t+1)
τPl(t)
hl(t)+zl(t
−−−
l
(t)+
+
l
(t))
> 0 is a preference value, which indi-
cates the value of EXl (t) of the seller for the current and next slot, t and (t+ 1),
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respectively. Thus, the first part of eq. (4.17) represents the value of EXl (t) for a
future private use by seller l ∈ X . The second part of eq. (4.17) corresponds to the
revenues that l ∈ X can obtain during slot t by selling EXl (t) at a price ΦXl (t).
UXl (t) is strictly concave, i.e.,
∂2UXl (t)(E
X
l (t))
∂(EXl (t))
2 < 0 and has a unique optimal that
maximises its value. Hence, for a strictly defined ΦXl (t) and a preference δ
X
l (t),
there is a one-to-one correspondence between the best value of EXl (t) and Φ
X
l (t). In
eq. (4.16), we calculated the best value of EXl (t), E
X ,∗
l (t). Given the E
X ,∗
l (t), a best
reservation asking price ΦX ,∗l (t) can be found for seller l when
∂UXl (t)(E
X
l (t))
∂EXl (t)
= 0,
with
ΦX ,∗l (t) =
δXl (t)
1 + EX ,∗l (t)
. (4.18)
4.5.2 Buyers
Each buyer EH-SBSs l ∈ Y makes a reservation for an RE volume El(t)Y for slot
t. The RE volume El(t)
Y represents the total energy volume that a buyer EH-SBS
demands to purchase so that it ensures energy neutrality for t.
For the extraction of their reservation bidding price ΦYl (t), we assume that each
buyer l ∈ Y extracts a random value for ΦYl . However, we assume that cs ≤ ΦYl (t) ≤
ΦYl (t) ≤ cb. The restriction implies that the bidding price of the buyer EH-SBS has
to be higher than the offered prices by both the set of sellers and the SG and, and
at the same time, lower that the price cb at the cost of which it is able to buy SG
energy.
4.5.3 Auctioneer-aggregator
As the DA auctioneer, the aggregator extracts the sets of seller and buyer EH-
SBSs, X and Y, respectively, from the different MNOs that will trade amongst
them. Let us remind that, before the DA, the aggregator firstly applies the initial
interior REE among the EH-SBSs of a single MNO, matching its buyer EH-SBSs
to its seller ones, based on the least difference in their requested and supplied RE
volume and until there are no remains either of requested or supplied RE volume.
The aggregator then extracts the new sets of seller and buyer EH-SBSs, X and
Y, respectively, based on the revised reservation RE volumes, EXl (t) and EYl (t),
and prices, ΦXl (t) and Φ
Y
l (t), of all the seller and buyer EH-SBSs, respectively. We
assume that EXl (t), E
Y
l (t), Φ
X
l (t) and Φ
Y
l (t) are static, i.e., sellers buyers cannot
change their values, once they announce them to the aggregator.
Based on these sets and reservation values, the aim of the aggregator is to
determine for slot t
  the set of winner seller EH-SBSs, the final RE volumes they have to supply,
eXl (t), as well as the trading selling price, φ
X
l (t), at the cost of which they
have to sell eXl (t).
76 4.5. Energy trading among EH-SBSs
  the set of winner buyer EH-SBSs, the final RE volumes they will purchase,
eYl (t), as well as the trading selling price, φ
Y
l (t), at the cost of which they have
to buy eYl (t).
The decision of the aggregator is subjected to the following restrictions
 
∑
l∈X e
X
l (t) ≤ EXl (t), ∀l ∈ X , which ensures that none of the sellers sells
more energy than it supplies,
 
∑
l∈Y e
Y
l (t) ≤ EYl (t), ∀l ∈ Y, which ensures that none of the buyers buys
more energy than it demands,
  eXl (t), e
Y
l (t) ≥ 0, ∀l ∈ L, which ensures the exchange of a non-zero energy
volume,
  cs ≤ φXl (t) ≤ φYl (t) ≤ cb, which ensures the profitability of the DA trades in
relation to ones with the SG.
4.5.4 The auction
For the extraction of the aggregator’s final decision, our proposed scheme, namely
RE-DA, applies a DA, which fulfils the presented aims and restrictions through the
hereafter described procedure.
Step 1
The auctioneer-aggregator applies a Vickrey-like auction on each side of the market,
so that buyers and sellers report their reservation prices [87, 106]. Without loss of
generality and with prices of the same value being randomly sorted, the auctioneer-
aggregator sorts the reservation prices of sellers ∀l ∈ X and buyers ∀l ∈ Y in
ascending and descending order. Let X and Y be the cardinalities of sets X and Y,
respectively, and j and i the indices for the ordered set of X and Y, respectively. It
is
ΦXj=1(t) ≤ ... ≤ ΦXj (t) ≤ ΦXj=X(t), (4.19)
and
ΦYi=1(t) ≥ ... ≥ ΦYi (t) ≥ ΦYi=Y (t). (4.20)
The reservation prices with the corresponding RE volumes are organised as in
Fig. 4.3. The point at which the offered RE volumes and asking prices of sellers
intersect with the demanded RE volumes and bidding prices of buyers indicate the
critical point of trading G. The critical point G is also the intersection point of the
jth seller and the ith buyer EH-SBS. In accordance with the Vickrey auction rules,
(j − 1) are the winner sellers that trade with (i− 1) winner buyers. Two cases are
discriminated that can reassure the existence of G:
  Asking and bidding prices satisfy ΦYi+1(t) ≤ ΦXj (t) ≤ ΦYi (t) and aggregate
energy supply and demand satisfy
∑j=j−1
j=1 E
X
j (t) ≤
∑i=i
i=1 E
Y
i (t) ≤
∑j=j
j=1 E
X
j (t).
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Figure 4.3: Typical DA case between the set of buyer EH-SBSs, Y and the set of seller
EH-SBSs, X (Y and X correspond to the Y and X characters that are
indicated in the legend of the figure). The figure depicts the ordering of
the DA reservation RE volumes and prices, the critical trade point G with
the DA and the DA payoff of the auctioneer-aggregator, ADA.
  Asking and bidding prices satisfy Φ
X
j (t) ≤ ΦYi (t) ≤ ΦXj+1(t) and aggregate
energy supply and demand satisfy
∑i=i−1
i=1 E
Y
i (t) ≤
∑j=j
j=1 E
X
j (t) ≤
∑i=i
i=1 E
Y
i (t).
In both cases, the market is cleared.
Step 2
The cleared prices of winner sellers and buyers for t, φXj′ (t) with j
′ = 1, .., j − 1 and
φYi′ (t) with i
′ = 1, .., i− 1, respectively are set by the auctioneer-aggregator as{
φXj′ (t) = Φ
X
j (t),
φYi′ (t) = Φ
Y
i (t).
(4.21)
The cleared RE volumes for each seller and buyer EH-SBS for t is defined differ-
ently for each one of them based on the sum of reservation energy volumes until G.
Depending on whether there is RE over-supply from winner sellers or over-demand
from winner buyers, the following cases are extracted:
  Case Overdemand
(∑i′=i−1
i′=1 E
Y
i′ (t) ≥
∑j′=j−1
j′=1 E
X
j′ (t)
)
, where the aggregated
demanded RE from winner buyers EH-SBSs exceeds the supplied by winner
sellers EH-SBSs RE sum. In this case, all winner sellers EH-SBSs sell their
total supplied RE volume, i.e., eXj′ (t) = E
X
j′ (t), j
′ = 1, .., j − 1, at the cleared
seller price φXj′ (t) of eq. (4.21). However, all winner buyers EH-SBSs with
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indices i′ = 1, .., i− 1 buy at the cleared buyer price φYi′ (t) of eq. (4.21) an RE
volume eYi′ (t) with
eYi′ (t) = E
Y
i′ (t)−
∑i′=i−1
i′=1 E
Y
i′ (t)−
∑j′=j−1
j′=1 E
X
j′ (t)
i− 1 . (4.22)
In the case that EYi′ (t) <
∑i′=i−1
i′=1 E
Y
i′ (t)−
∑j′=j−1
j′=1 E
X
j′ (t)
i−1 , winner buyer i
′ pays
for a winning traded entity eYi′ (t) = E
Y
i′ (t). The remaining RE, described as
∑i′=i−1
i′=1 E
Y
i′ (t)−
∑j′=j−1
j′=1 E
X
j′ (t)
i−1 − EYi′ (t), is allocated and bought equally by the
remaining winner buyer EH-SBSs.
  Case Oversupply
(∑i′=i−1
i′=1 E
Y
i′ (t) ≤
∑j′=j−1
j′=1 E
X
j′ (t)
)
, where the aggregated
supplied RE from winner seller EH-SBSs exceeds the demanded by winner
buyer EH-SBSs RE sum. In this case, all winner buyer EH-SBSs buy their
total demanded RE volume, i.e., eYi′ (t) = E
Y
i′ (t), i
′ = 1, .., i− 1, at the cleared
buyer price φYi′ (t) of eq. (4.21). However, all winner seller EH-SBSs with indices
j′ = 1, .., j−1 sell at the cleared seller price φXj′ (t) of eq. (4.21) an RE volume
eXj′ (t) with
eXj′ (t) = E
X
j′ (t)−
∑j′=j−1
j′=1 E
X
j′ (t)−
∑i′=i−1
i′=1 E
Y
i′ (t)
j − 1 . (4.23)
In the case that EXj′ (t) <
∑j′=j−1
j′=1 E
X
j′ (t)−
∑i′=i−1
i′=1 E
Y
i′ (t)
j−1 , winner seller j
′ sells
a winning traded entity eXj′ (t) = E
X
j′ (t). The remaining RE, described as
∑j′=j−1
j′=1 E
X
j′ (t)−
∑i′=i−1
i′=1 E
Y
i′ (t)
j−1 − EXj′ (t), is allocated and sold equally by the re-
maining winner seller EH-SBSs.
Step 3
For the extraction of the payoff compensation corresponding to the auctioneer-
aggregator, ADA(t), we consider the total traded RE volume among the winner
EH-SBSs, Q(t), as it was extracted from the DA of our scheme RE-DA. Q(t) is
calculated as
Q(t) = min
⎛
⎝i
′=i−1∑
i′=1
EYi′ (t),
j′=j−1∑
j′=1
EXj′ (t)
⎞
⎠ . (4.24)
Thus, we define a payoff for the auctioneer-aggregator ADA(t) at each DA event
of slot t equal to
ADA(t) =
(
ΦYi (t)− ΦXj (t)
) ·Q(t), (4.25)
where ΦXj (t) and Φ
Y
i (t) are determined at G. Practically, in order to extract the
payoff ADA(t), we take advantage of the difference between the (i) trading prices,
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ΦXj (t) and Φ
Y
i (t), at critical point G, and (ii) the sum of reservation energies of seller
and buyer EH-SBSs until critical point G and winner seller and buyer EH-SBSs.
Step 4
After the extraction of the payoff RE volumes and prices, the values are returned
to the winner seller and buyer EH-SBSs. Payments are then implemented through
monetary transactions among MNOs and aggregator, while the latter proceeds to
energy transfer through the SG.
The complexity of RE-DA is O(L2). For the execution of RE-DA, the aggregator
firstly executes the initial internal REE for each MNO. The initial internal REE
makes a quick-sort procedure for the buyer EH-SBSs of each MNO. Then, for each
of the buyer EH-SBSs, the RE volume differences with each of the seller EH-SBSs of
the MNO is calculated. Finally, a quick-sort procedure of the RE volume differences
takes place so that the smallest one can be elected for each of the buyer EH-SBSs of
the MNO. The RE volumes of the matched buyer and seller EH-SBSs are updated
and the same procedure is repeated for the next buyer EH-SBS in the sorted initial
list. The worst case for the initial internal REE of RE-DA occurs when there are
two MNO with buyers and sellers whose population is equal in numbers, i.e., their
number is equal to L4 . Based on the above and given that the quick-sort complexity
is O(nlog(n)), the complexity of the RE-DA algorithm up to this point is: O(N) ·[
O(L4 log(
L
4 )) +O(
L
4 ) ·
[
O(L4 ) +O(
L
4 log(
L
4 ))
]]
= O(N) ·O(L4 log(L4 ))+O(N) ·O(L4 ) ·
O(L4 ) + O(N) · O(L4 ) · O
(
L
4 log(
L
4 )
)
= O(
(
L
4
)2
) = O(L2), since usually N << L.
Then, each EH-SBS locally calculates its reservation RE volume and price, while
two individual quick-sortings are performed by the auctioneer-aggregator: one for
the seller set X and one for the buyer set Y. The local calculation at the EH-SBSs is
of negligible complexity. The quick-sort complexity is O(nlog(n)), with n = L, i.e.,
the maximum cardinality that X or Y can have. However, the encounter of critical
point G and the final payoff extraction that follow are both characterised by an O(n)
complexity, with n = L2 in the worst case scenario. Therefore, with a cardinality
of X and Y equal to L2 , the complexity of RE-DA is O(
(
L
4
)2
) + O(L2 log(
L
2 )) +
O(L2 log(
L
2 )) +O(
L
2 ) +O(
L
2 ) = O(
(
L
4
)2
) = O(L2).
4.5.5 Analysis on RE-DA
The presents section investigates the properties of the proposed RE-DA scheme,
in terms of the adopted DA.
Proposition 1: RE-DA is strategy proof with respect to reservation prices.
Proof: In order to prove this, we have to show that none of the players has a reason
to misreport their reservation prices to EH-SBSs of rival MNOs.
A seller EH-SBS may (i) misreport its reservation price asking a higher than
ΦXj (t) one, (ii) misreport its reservation price asking a lower than Φ
X
j (t) one, or
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(iii) supply a lower than EXj (t) reservation RE volume. In the first case, the seller
risks its participation in the DA, as its asking price may be a lot higher than the
bidding ones of the buyers. Moreover, the trading price might be determined by
another seller, while the seller itself cannot have knowledge of other players’ private
reservation prices so as to ask the ideally high price. Finally, in any case, the seller
asks the best price for its supplied RE volume, as it is extracted from its utility
function. Thus, the seller has no reason to ask a higher than ΦXj (t) reservation
price. In the case that the seller under-reports its reservation price, then it does
not value sufficiently the RE volume it is willing to supply. This is proved by its
concave utility function of eq. (4.17). Thus, the seller has no reason to ask a lower
than ΦXj (t) reservation price. In the last case, the seller does not have a clear vision
if under-reporting its reservation RE volume is a more beneficial decision, as the
set of winner EH-SBSs is determined by another BS. Therefore, the seller has no
reason to under-report its reservation RE volume.
A buyer EH-SBS may (i) overbid its reservation price asking a higher than
ΦYj (t) one, (ii) underbid its reservation price asking a lower than Φ
X
j (t) one, or
(iii) request a higher than EYi (t) reservation RE volume. As far as the two first
cases are concerned, buyer EH-SBSs cannot over- or under-estimate their bidding
price, as bidding prices are extracted randomly in the proposed scheme. However,
a buyer overestimate the demanded RE volume, as no restriction is preserved from
our algorithm. Such a decision, does not affect the sellers though, as they value
appropriately their supplied RE volumes. Based on the above, it can be said that
our proposed scheme is strategy proof with respect to reservation prices.
Proposition 2: RE-DA is weakly budget balanced.
Proof: A DA scheme is weakly budget balanced if the sum of sellers’ and buyers’
payments sum to a non-negative number. In the DA of RE-DA, buyers and sell-
ers are ordered in descending and ascending order, respectively, until the trading
point G is encountered. Therefore, buyer EH-SBSs of RE-DA trade at a unit price
φ
Y(t)
i′ which is always higher than the one that corresponds to sellers, i.e., φ
X (t)
j′ .
The difference between the two prices though is exploited in eq. (4.25) so that the
payoff compensation of the auctioneer-aggregator, ADA(t) is extracted. ADA(t) is
always non-negative and equal to the difference of the buyers’ payment and sellers’
compensation. Based on the above, RE-DA is weakly budget balanced.
Proposition 3: RE-DA is individually rational.
Proof: A DA is characterised as individually rational when individual agents are
attracted to voluntarily participate in it, because they expect non-negative ex-ante
profits. As far as sellers are concerned, a seller EH-SBS is willing to supply an RE
volume EXj (t) at the cost of an asking price Φ
X
j (t), provided that it does not affect
negatively its future activity. However, this is taken into consideration by the seller
EH-SBS when it extracts the asking price for a specific RE volume that maximizes
its utility function of eq. (4.17). In addition, the cleared trading price is always
higher than to the reservation one, ΦXj (t) for the winner sellers, due to the sorting.
Thus, the trade is always profitable for seller EH-SBSs. Finally, a seller EH-SBS
participates in the DA if and only if its asking price is higher than the one it has
the right to ask from the SG market, i.e., ΦXj (t) ≥ cs. A seller EH-SBS though
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cannot participate in the RE-DA unless this restriction is fulfilled. This ensures the
profitability of its action. As far as buyers are concerned, a buyer EH-SBS is willing
to demand an RE volume EYi (t) at the cost of an asking price Φ
Y
i (t). Our scheme
does not necessarily ensure to buyers the highest price possible. A buyer EH-SBS
though cannot participate in the RE-DA unless its bidding price is lower than the
one it trades with the SG, i.e., ΦYi (t) ≥ cb. This ensures the profitability of its
action. Finally, both seller and buyer EH-SBSs are not burdened with any cost so
as to participate in the auction, as the auctioneer-aggregator receives its payoff only
from the winner buyer EH-SBSs. Based on the above, none seller or buyer EH-SBS
can have a negative profit by participating in the DA. Hence, RE-DA is individually
rational for the EH-SBSs.
Proposition 4: RE-DA is asymptotically efficient with respect to the number of
players.
Proof: For buyers and sellers, the payoff to the auctioneer-aggregator, ADA(t) is
perceived as the total efficiency loss in a DA transaction. However, the auctioneer-
aggregator may have specific requests with regard to the payoff it wishes to receive.
Therefore, we evaluate the efficiency of the method from both perspectives in Section
4.6.2. In order to do that, we use an efficiency indicator of the game, ef(t):
ef(t) =
(
ADA(t)
F1 + F2 + F3
)−1
(4.26a)
where F1 =
i′=i−1∑
i′=1
(
φYi′(t)− ΦYi (t)
)
· EYi′ (t), (4.26b)
F2 =
j′=j−1∑
j′=1
(
φXj′(t)− ΦXj (t)
)
· EXj′ (t), (4.26c)
F3 = ADA(t). (4.26d)
In eq. (4.26a), the denominator of eq. (4.26a) represents the total market value, with
the consideration of all trading entities, i.e., the reservation and trading RE volumes
and prices of winner sellers and buyers in eqs. (4.26b) and (4.26c), as well as the
payoff of the auctioneer-aggregator in eq. (4.26d). From the players’ perspective, an
RE-DA is favoured when ef(t) diverges from 0. However, from the perspective of
the auctioneer-aggregator, an RE-DA trade is efficient when ef(t) has a value close
to 0, while its payoff is over a certain percentage λ(t) = ADA(t)∑i′=i−1
i′=1 E
Y
i′ (t)φ
Y
i′ (t)
. In the
following section and more specifically, in Fig. 4.9, we display that RE-DA becomes
more efficient when more players participate in the auction. However, the efficiency
is upper bounded by λ(t).
4.6 Performance Evaluation
In the present section, we introduce in Section 4.6.1 the parameters we used for
building our simulation scenario and for evaluating the performance of our propos-
als, while in Section 4.6.2, we present the relative extracted results.
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4.6.1 Simulation scenario
We study a macrocell-sized urban area in Barcelona, Spain, as it can be defined
by an MBS with a radius equal to 500 m in the centre of it. N = 3 MNOs are
assumed to have activity in the studied area with a HetNet as in Fig. 4.1. Each
MNO owns the 1 EH-MBS of its HetNet, which is located in the centre of the studied
area. All MNOs passively share their EH-MBSs, while MNO n = 1, 2, 3 manages
the operation of 2, 10 and 13 InP provided EH-SBSs (L = 25), respectively. The
small cell infrastructure is considered uniformly distributed in the area for each
MNO. A bandwidth of 10 MHz and an SNRth = −10 dB are used [80]. For
the traffic profiles, we use κn = 0.3, 1.0, 1.3 for n = 1, 2, 3, respectively, unless
otherwise stated, and a χ(t) of users as in [15]. A UE k has a bit rate demand
k = {1024, 512, 256} kb/s, with random probability.
EH-MBSs and EH-SBSs use photovoltaic panels of 4 kW and 100 W, respec-
tively. EH-SBSs are considered solar powered to a β = 0.6 degree for each n ∈ N ,
unless otherwise stated. The remaining infrastructure uses a wind turbine of 100 W
at an EH-SBS m, with power coefficient Cm randomly chosen from a range of
[0.38, 0.45] [110], and with statistical data used for the wind velocity value v [113].
All ESSs are consisted of lithium batteries with initial charge (1−DOD).
The system is studied on the best day of the year in terms of solar insolation
(June 21st). For the shared EH-MBSs, we focus on a period slot τ ′ between 20:00-
07:00, when no solar RE is generated. At the beginning of the period slot τ ′, MNOs
of coalition S ≡ N have to determine their corresponding stored RE in the ESS
for the period slot, which has been previously collected (between 07:00-20:00 of the
same day). For the RE-DA procedure, we assume slots of τ = 1 h throughout the
day, as different RE sources are used. The RE harvesting profiles used for EH-SBSs,
as they were generated with the assumed parameters, can be observed in Fig. 4.4.
The remaining simulation parameters are portrayed in Table 4.2 [15, 80, 111].
For the evaluation of the proposed RE-BG, we compare it with
  Equal allocation (EQ), where each MNO n ∈ N gets an equal share of the
shared RE volume, and
  Prioritised-claim allocation (PC), where MNOs receive their complete claim
of RE in a descending order.
We assess the performance of the studied methods based on the hours of SG
independence (hours) and their fairness in energy allocation based on the indicator
of Jain’s fairness index J . With αn defined as the ratio of bought SG energy to each
EH-MBS’s claim, it is
J =
(∑
n∈N αn
)2
|N |∑n∈N α2n . (4.27)
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Figure 4.4: RE Generation vs. Time, June 21st, Barcelona, Spain.
Table 4.2: System Parameter Values
Parameter Value
Nth -174 dBm
NF 5 dB
Solar radiation 5.14 kWh/m2/day, BCN, Jun.
ηsol,m 14%
TRE 24 h
ρ 1.1849 kg/m3
b 0.5 m
DOD 0.8
cb 0.10  /kWh
cs cb/100
ca cb/100
m ≤ N N < m ≤ M
P trm 20 W 0.13 W
TRXm 6 2
Gtxm 15 dBi 5 dBi
PLk,m 128.1+37.6logDk,m 140+36.7logDk,m
Δm 4.7 4
P conm 130 W 6.8 W
PVm 6 1
WNm 0 1
Ψm 3 1
Vm 48 V 12 V
Im 150 Ah 28 Ah
ηESS,m 15% 15%
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For the evaluation of the proposed RE-DA, we compare it to the cases when the
set L of EH-SBSs is powered by
  the SG only (SG-only),
  its individual EHS, ESS and the SG (NoREE), while no REE scheme is ap-
plied, and
  its individual EHS, ESS, an REE act in the form of RE-DA, among a single-
MNO managed infrastructure and without the initial internal REE, and the
SG (IndREE).
We use for the comparison an indicator
γ(t) =
∑m=N+L
m=N gm(t)|studied scheme∑m=N+L
m=N gm(t)|SG−only
(4.28)
to estimate the SG energy procurements. Thus, γ represents the ratio of SG energy
procurements gm|studied scheme in each studied scheme to the SG energy procure-
ments in the SG-only case. Moreover, we assess the normalised payoff distribution
produced for the winner sellers and the auctioneer-aggregator from the execution of
the DA, based on what the winner buyers pay, while we also evaluate the efficiency
of RE-DA based on indicator ef(t).
Finally, the profitability for each MNO individually from the proposed schemes
is evaluated in terms of the created costs.
4.6.2 Performance results
In order to display the energy benefits that MNOs can obtain with RE-BG, in
Fig. 4.5 we evaluate the hours of SG-independence an EH-MBS n can ensure with
the en
(
VB(t) (N )
)
payoff it receives from the shared ESS and compare it with the
EQ and PC allocation strategies8. Figs. 4.5a, 4.5b and 4.5c depict the performance
of EQ, PC and proposed RE-BG, respectively. According to Fig. 4.5a, n = 2 and 3
use their RE payoff for 8 h, while during the 9th hour, they need the SG to continue
their operation. n = 1 though is SG-independent during all night hours, while a part
of its RE remains unused. This happens because n = 1 gets the same amount of
RE as n = 2 and 3, even though its traffic volume is considerably lower. However,
the stored RE should be exploited to the maximum by all EH-MBSs sharing the
ESS for fairness issues. This does not comply with the performance of neither EQ,
nor PC, as can be observed for the latter in Fig. 4.5b. In detail, with PC, n = 2, 3
procure energy from the ESS all night long, since they have the biggest claim and,
thus, are awarded with their total RE claim. n = 1 though, is at disadvantage, since
its payoff corresponds to no more than 5 h of SG-independence. Unlike EQ and PC,
RE-BG allocation offers a satisfying number of SG-independent hours to all coope-
8Harvested RE from the shared EHS during the daylight hours was evaluated sufficient for the
individual EH-MBSs needs and therefore have not been included in the figures.
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(b) Prioritised-claim allocation (PC)
19:00 21:00 23:00 01:00 03:00 05:00 07:00
Hour
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
E
n
e
rg
y 
(W
h
)
SG n=1
SG n=2
SG n=3
RE n=1
RE n=2
RE n=3
(c) RE bankruptcy game (RE-BG)
Figure 4.5: Monitoring of energy for different energy sharing methods.
86 4.6. Performance Evaluation
rative EH-MBSs. According to Fig. 4.5c, when RE-BG is applied, between 20:00-
07:00, it ensures to all EH-MBSs complete SG-independence for 9 h. After that
period, they use the remains of their allocated RE payoff and obtain their energy
deficits from the SG. In total, RE-BG offers a more balanced period of green network
operation to all MNOs, since it considers both their cumulative energy needs and
their marginal contribution to completely allocate the stored RE.
As traffic load volumes and profiles differentiate for MNOs making thus energy
allocation fairness an issue, in Fig. 4.6 we see the effects of various MNO traffic
volumes on each allocation method’s fairness, based on their respective Jain’s fair-
ness index, J . In detail, we vary traffic load factor κ1, while κ2 and κ3 remain
unchanged. We also consider similar and different traffic load peaks of MNOs n = 1
and n = 2, 3 in Fig. 4.6a and Fig. 4.6b, respectively. It is noticeable in both figures
that J of RE-BG remains close to 1 irrespective of any traffic load volume or peak
differentiation, since it considers each player’s contribution to storing RE. Also,
compared to its counterparts, we notice that it performs better than both EQ and
PC allocation. More specifically, EQ performs closer to RE-BG when traffic load
peaks are similar in Fig. 4.6a, especially for κ1 > 1. This is when the traffic volume
of MNOs become more similar and all allocated RE payoffs are consumed by their
EH-MBSs during the night. However, when peaks are different in Fig. 4.6b, fairness
of EQ deteriorates since traffic load differences among MNOs are intensified. Lastly,
PC allocation is far below EQ and RE-BG in both figures, as there is always an
EH-MBS in the need of SG energy. PC though performs better when traffic peaks
are different in Fig. 4.6b. This is attributed to the fact that, when EH-MBS n = 1
receives its payoff for its high peak traffic load, MNOs n = 2, 3 are in their low
peak traffic load and thus, their EH-MBSs cover their energy needs with RE to a
high degree. In the reverse case that MNO n = 1 is in its low peak traffic load and
thus has lower needs in RE than n = 2, 3, the EH-MBSs of the latter have more
remaining RE to share for their RE needs.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6
1
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
J
EQ
PC
RE-BG
(a) Same traffic load peaks for n = 1 and n = 2, 3.
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Figure 4.6: Jain’s fairness index, J , (i) for the studied energy sharing methods, EQ,
PC and RE-BG, (ii) for varied traffic loads, κ1 and (iii) peaks of n = 1.
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Figure 4.7: 24-hour evaluation of SG energy purchases based on ratio γ(t) for the (i)
NoREE, (ii) IndREE and (iii) RE-DA energy procurement schemes.
In order to display the energy benefits that MNOs can obtain with RE-DA, in
Fig. 4.7, we study the indicator γ(t) of eq. (4.28) for the comparison of NoREE,
IndREE and, our proposed, RE-DA to the SG-only operation of EH-SBSs in L,
during a day. As can be noticed, between 07:00-14:00, the EH-SBSs consume their
harvested and stored RE and cover their energy needs with the aid of the SG in
all study comparisons. However, SG purchases are still considerably reduced, up to
80% at 11:00 when γ  2, for all studied methods. When γ = 0 between 14:00-19:00,
in all cases, EH-SBSs consume only harvested RE, while RE is also stored in their
ESSs. After 19:00, IndREE almost coincides with NoREE until 22:00 with support
of SG energy as well. With NoREE, the EH-SBSs cannot exchange RE amongst
themselves. In the case of IndREE, despite the fact that ESSs of both solar and
aeolian EH-SBSs, have abundant stored RE, REE acts do not take place as MNO
traffic load volumes are still considerable, making seller EH-SBSs reserved towards
selling RE. Nevertheless, IndREE acts then become more intense, especially after
23:00, when traffic load volumes are low and there are EH-SBSs with abundant
harvested (mainly aeolian) and stored RE. In contrast to its counterparts, RE-DA
ensures SG independence for the studied system after 19:00 and until 04:00. RE-
DA overcomes sellers’ reservation towards selling energy with the initial interior
REE among the EH-SBSs of the same MNO. Then, the trades with EH-SBSs of
rival MNOs further reduce SG-energy expenses, especially when MNO traffic load
volumes are low. Finally, in the course of a day, NoREE, IndREE and RE-DA reduce
significantly the sum of SG energy purchases, reaching a 34%, 31% and 12% of the
SG-only case, respectively, while a further 63% and 60% reduction is achieved by
RE-DA in comparison to NoREE and IndREE, respectively.
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Figure 4.8: Normalised total daily DA (i) cost for winner buyers, (ii) payoff of winner
seller EH-SBSs, and (iii) payoff of the auctioneer-aggregator, vs. the ratio
of solar powered SBSs, β.
Varying percentages of solar powered EH-SBSs, β, can drastically affect RE
availability at EH-SBSs and, thus, the profitability of RE-DA for the stakeholders.
Therefore, in Fig. 4.8, we display the total normalised daily DA payoff (i.e., cost)∑t=TRE
t=1
∑i′=i−1
i′=1 e
Y
i′(t)φ
Y
i′(t) of winner buyer EH-SBSs, the total normalised daily DA
payoff
∑t=TRE
t=1
∑j′=j−1
j′=1 e
X
j′(t)φ
X
j′(t) of winner seller EH-SBSs and the total normalised
daily DA payoff
∑t=TRE
t=1 ADA(t) of the auctioneer-aggregator, for varying β. As
can be observed, no profits or costs are created with RE-DA when β = 0 and
β = 1, as EH-SBSs have completely homogeneous EH profiles for these β values.
Hence, no RE-DA trades take place. For β = {0, 1} though, RE-DA acts are
executed, with the payoff distribution among winner seller EH-SBSs and auctioneer-
aggregator occasionally intensely uneven. In detail, when β ≤ 0.5, the total trades
among EH-SBSs of rival MNOs are considerably fewer in comparison to the case
β > 0.5. For β ≤ 0.5, the majority of EH-SBSs are wind powered and therefore,
during the night, can power the solar-power EH-SBSs, primarily with an initial
internal REE, while during the day, the reverse happens. RE-DA trades with player
EH-SBSs of other MNOs take place in the early morning hours, when some ESSs
may not be charged. The remaining seller player EH-SBSs though, have enough
abundant energy and, based on eq. (4.18), propose not considerably high prices to
the buyer EH-SBSs. Thus, as can be observed in Fig. 4.8, a similar distribution of the
buyers’ expenses is in most cases encountered between the seller EH-SBSs and the
auctioneer-aggregator. When β > 0.5, the majority of EH-SBSs are solar powered
and EH is mostly distributed throughout the day. At the same time, there are
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some wind-powered EH-SBSs to supply RE when solar EH is low or non-available
and to allow more frequent RE-DA trades among EH-SBSs of rival MNOs. This
explains the higher expenses of buyer EH-SBSs when β = 0.7, 0.8 and 0.9. RE-DA
trades occur mainly during low-traffic hours, when wind RE can compensate energy
deficits of solar powered EH-SBSs. However, seller reservation prices are lower than
the average buyer reservation prices, creating thus this vast gap noticed in the figure
for β = 0.8, 0.9. Therefore, it can be said that mediocre β values allows exchange
of RE with RE-DA, reducing thus expenses on SG energy purchases with satisfying
payoff for the auctioneer-aggregator.
As β affects the number of winner seller and buyer EH-SBSs, in Fig. 4.9, we
study its effect on the efficiency of RE-DA, based on the mean ef value of eq.
(4.26a). Our method’s efficiency is also evaluated in relation to threshold values
λ(t) that the auctioneer-aggregator may impose so as to execute the DA of the
RE-DA. According to the figure, when no limitation is imposed by the aggregator,
i.e., λ = 0, the method is more efficient for 0.2 ≤ β ≤ 0.6. This means that for this
value of λ, the more diverse the RE sources used at the EH-SBSs are, the more
equal the payoff distribution among seller EH-SBSs and the auctioneer-aggregator
is. Thus, the mean ef diverges from 0, i.e., the more efficient RE-DA becomes.
The efficiency is the highest for β = 0.6, since for these β value, more players
participate in and eventually trade with RE-DA. Therefore, for this case, the method
is asymptotically efficient with respect to the number of RE-DA players. However,
our method’s efficiency is limited by threshold λ(t) of higher values. In order to
satisfy the requests of the auctioneer-aggregator in these cases, either considerably
wind- or solar-powered dominated infrastructure is needed. In these cases, there are
periods of time during a day, when available RE at seller EH-SBSs is enough to over-
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Figure 4.9: Efficiency of RE-DA trades based on mean ef vs. indicator β.
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cover the energy needs of their MNO’s network and trade energy with EH-SBSs of
rival MNOs with large profit margin for the auctioneer-aggregator. Otherwise, the
requests of the latter cannot be satisfied and therefore RE-DA is totally prevented.
Once again though, when RE-DA is allowed, its efficiency is higher when more
players participate in and eventually trade with it. As a conclusion, low λ thresholds
are important for RE-DA, while player EH-SBSs need to keep a level of diverse RE-
sources as a power source to achieve trades.
In Fig. 4.10, we display the monthly costs that are created by the individual and
combined application of our proposed approaches in a macrocell area. We compare
the created costs by our applications with the adoption or not of passive sharing
and with the SG-only case. In the figure, we display with green shades the case of
passive sharing at the EH-MBS site, with the application of our proposed scheme
RE-BG. Red shades correspond to the case when no passive sharing is applied to
the EH-MBS site, i.e., when MNOs cannot apply the RE-BG scheme (No RE-BG).
Dark shades indicate the application of RE-DA, while the light ones stand for the
use of SG-only energy for the EH-SBSs. As can be observed, both individual and
combined use of the proposed methods in a macrocell area induces significantly
lower daily costs to all MNOs, n = 1, 2, 3. According to the figure, all MNOs are
significantly benefited by both RE-BG (green-red comparison) and RE-DA (dark-
light shades comparison), even resulting in an elimination of their produced costs.
In detail, in comparison to the SG-only case, MNOs n = 1, 2 and 3 achieve a 63%,
44%, 36% reduction of expenses, respectively, thanks to RE-BG and an 85%, 62%
and 65% one, respectively thanks to RE-DA.
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Figure 4.10: Monthly MNO costs per macrocell area with the application of proposed
and traditional methods.
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4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we studied the problem of REE in late-trend multi-MNO net-
works. In detail, we proposed REE methods (i) among collocated and passively
shared EH-MBSs with an RE sharing approach, RE-BG, which is based on co-
operative bankruptcy games and (ii) an aggregator-assisted RE trading approach,
RE-DA, that applies an initial internal REE followed by a double auction among
the InP provided EH-SBSs managed by the same and different MNOs, respectively.
In the first case, we showed that RE-BG allows at least 9 hours of SG energy in-
dependence for all EH-MBSs of the MNOs during non-solar hours and a fairer RE
allocation in comparison to baseline schemes. In the second case, we showed that
our proposed scheme, RE-DA, reduces SG energy consumption to a 12% of the one
resulted with a SG-only network support. Moreover, combined use of solar and wind
powered EH-SBSs at a mediocre analogy indicated more efficient use of RE, with
the allocation of sufficient payoffs to both players and the auctioneer-aggregator.
Careful consideration though should be given to the limitations imposed by the
aggregator who acts as an auctioneer. Finally, the adoption of our proposals con-
siderably reduces individual MNO costs, resulting even to an elimination of MNO
expenses on SG energy purchases in their combined application.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
This chapter summarizes the main contributions of this dissertation, while it also
provides some potential research lines for future investigation. Section 5.1 contains
the most significant remarks from each chapter, while Section 5.2 reveals some open
issues in relation to the contributions of this thesis.
5.1 Conclusion
The increase in the data traffic demands, which has been noticed in the recent
years and which is expected to further augment in the forthcoming ones, has re-
vealed the necessity and main concern of mobile network operators (MNOs) to boost
the capacity of their networks, while maintaining flat the energy consumption and
the cost expenses for their operation. In this context, rolling out of heterogeneous
network (HetNet) deployments and sharing of infrastructure have been techniques
that have greatly aided the achievement of this goal. At the same time though,
several issues have been left unexplored. For instance:
  How can a successful MNO cooperation be reassured in such architectures?
  And how can it be ensured that, when other technologies, such as infras-
tructure switching off, the usage of renewable energy (RE) sources and the
exploitation of the smart grid (SG) network, are used in order to complement
the energy and cost efficiency attributed to the deployment of shared HetNets?
  How can an energy and cost management be characterised as fair towards the
stakeholders that are involved in such architectures and initiate them?
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The objective of this Ph.D thesis has been to ensure an efficient energy and
cost management in shared HetNet deployments, using techniques that exploit the
different types of the installed network infrastructure and that take into account
the interests and characteristics of the different stakeholders participating in the
sharing. In order to achieve this goal, we proposed novel frameworks that regulate
various forms of sharing, while optimization and game theory were used as the key
mathematical tools to express these frameworks. In particular, two main research
directions were followed.
With regard to the first research direction, presented in Chapter 3, the thesis
concentrated on the switching off strategies and their feasibility for application in
HetNet deployments that are powered exclusively by the grid and where the coop-
erative activity of multiple MNOs is possible. We proposed a novel greedy heuristic
switching off algorithm, namely cooperative switching off algorithm (CSO), that
achieved considerable energy savings in comparison to other schemes. Moreover, it
emphasized that except from the base station (BS) load, consideration should be
given on the type of the BS that would remain active, as both network energy con-
sumption and coverage provision differentiate greatly depending on the studied BS
type. The scheme addressed at the same time economical aspects of the switching
off procedure, as it takes into account both the different network expenses that
are required for service provision from a macrocell base station (MBS) and a small
cell base station (SBS), and the roaming charges that are provisioned when traffic
is transferred between roaming-based shared networks. The proposed scheme was
evaluated in terms of energy efficiency throughout the low traffic hours, for vari-
ous traffic load differences among the cooperative MNOs and for different coalition
formations among them. The results showed that our proposal can significantly
improve network energy efficiency, meanwhile promoting the cooperation among
multiple MNOs. More cost management issues were addressed with the proposal
of a cost allocation scheme that, after taking into account the revenues of each
MNO from its roaming activity, fairly extracts the portion of cost corresponding
to the activity and contribution to savings of each cooperative MNO. Our pro-
posal, namely bankruptcy Shapley Value based cost allocation scheme (BSV), was
evaluated for the fairness of its extracted cost allocation in comparison to baseline
schemes, indicating that it achieves a good and balanced performance.
For the support of our second research direction, presented in Chapter 4, we fo-
cused on grid-connected energy harvesting (EH) HetNet deployments, where stake-
holders of multiple interests may need to form a type of cooperation, e.g., MNOs
and an aggregator. In terms of achieving an efficient energy management, RE ex-
change (REE) in a late-trend multi-operator HetNets with passively shared and
collocated EH-MBSs and EH-SBSs provided by an infrastructure provider (InP)
was investigated. On this basis, for the former case of the EH-MBSs, we proposed
a RE-sharing framework, namely RE bankruptcy game (RE-BG). We proved that
it provides a fair solution to the complicating case of EH-MBSs that are passively
shared by rival MNOs, along with their EH and energy storage system. Our pro-
posal can allocate to the cooperative MNOs an amount of harvested or stored RE
that mirrors their individual energy needs. The proposed scheme was evaluated
based on the hours of the system’s independent activity from SG purchased energy,
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and in terms of the fairness of its extracted solution. In all cases, it was compared
with baseline schemes, which it outperformed. For the latter case of the EH-SBSs,
we used non-cooperative game theory and proposed a energy trading framework,
namely RE-DA. Our proposal, provisioned the energy exchange between EH-SBSs,
which are provided by an InP and managed by multiple MNOs, with an aim to
reduce purchases of energy from the SG and increase utilization of RE sources. In
the meantime, it also preserving the individual energy strategy of the EH-SBSs with
energy abundance. In order to achieve these goals, our scheme implements a double
auction among the EH-SBSs of the different MNOs that have abundant energy or
shortage in it, which follows after a process of an initial internal REE amongst the
EH-SBSs of the same MNO. Through the RE-DA energy trading framework, we
studied the prospects of a fair RE trading among EH-SBSs managed by different
MNOs and the way they affect the profitability and activity of the stakeholders
involved in the trading. Our performance evaluation showed that the scheme can
achieve higher energy savings in comparison to other schemes, especially when dif-
ferent RE sources are used, with satisfactory cost and payoffs for the involved in
the trading stakeholders.
5.2 Future work
The research contributions presented in this work can be the starting point of new
research lines for investigation. The cloud-based technologies used in the fifth gen-
eration (5G) networks introduce new parameters to take into account and change
the perspective of managing the problems studied in the present thesis.
The main goals for future work with respect to the first part of the thesis on
energy and cost management in multi-operator shared HetNet deployments can be
summarized as follows:
  Application of machine learning techniques: A weak point of BS switch-
ing off has always been the prediction of traffic load density in time and space.
An even more challenging task is the coordination of the predictions with the
application of the switching off method at accurate time intervals, which are
necessary so that the operation mode of a BS can alternate without degrada-
tion of service quality. With a view to the 5G era, when traffic outbursts could
be more sudden, a more intelligent BS switching off is necessary to the aid
of a proper network management. To this end, machine learning techniques,
such as neural networks, can be applied to predict the user distribution, the
traffic load and the traffic type of each BS. This can be done mainly based
on historical data that may refer to the average number of users and their
time arrival at the coverage area of a BS. As a consequence, the cooperation
capabilities among MNOs could be improved as well. The technical challenges
that come along with the 5G technologies mandate further investigation on
the implementation possibilities of such approaches as future goal.
  Wireless backhaul: Due to the dense urban deployments, not all SBSs in
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a HetNet are expected to have a direct link connection to the core network.
Thus, wireless backhaul networks have been gaining attention. However, a
proper configuration of such networks is more than necessary so that network
performance is not limited by bottlenecks that can be created in the resource
provision of BSs. Therefore, in the possibility of deactivating an SBS, pressure
would be put to the neighbouring SBSs so that they deliver the aggregated
data rate requirements. Guaranteeing the effectiveness and scheduling of the
procedure is another design factor for both single- and multi-operator HetNets
with wireless backhaul on which further research could be implemented.
  millimeter (mmWave) communications: It is one of the main 5G tech-
nologies, used for large capacity augmentation at SBSs, mainly for line-of-sight
transmissions. Thus, the deployment their technology though, can be intrigu-
ing for the application of network switching off not only for the amount of
traffic load volume whose service will have to be compensated, but also for
the high propagation losses to which mmWave communications are vulnerable.
Therefore, future research efforts can be focused to finding suitable offloading
frameworks among networks that use mmWave communications.
  Massive MIMO: Being another fundamental 5G technology, massive MIMO
in combination with mmWave could be given consideration in our SBS system.
Massive MIMO improve greatly the energy efficiency issue in the transmis-
sion components of BSs. However, with that cloud/fog computing and cache
communications emerging for 5G networks, more and more data storage and
computation processes will be performed at 5G SBSs [114]. It was recently
suggested that when power needs for computation processes are considered
for massive MIMO systems, apart from transmission power needs, then the
energy efficiency of massive MIMO systems decreases for increasing number of
antennas and RF chains [115]. On the other hand, when applied in combina-
tion with the switching off strategy and mmWave technology, energy efficiency
prospects of Massive MIMO are high [116]. Therefore, it would be interesting
to explore the prospects of further increasing energy efficiency by applying
network switching off with respect to the power consumed for data computa-
tion and storage at BSs with massive MIMO systems.
  Software based 5G technologies: Upcoming software based 5G technolo-
gies, such as network slicing (NS) and network function virtualization, change
the perspective from which one of our solutions, CSO, can be observed. NS de-
scribes how a physical network is divided into multiple logical networks, with
specific capabilities and related to a specific service [117, 118]. It also allows
several operators to share the same physical network and thereby save cost
for deployment and maintenance of the physical network equipment. How-
ever, NS requires a virtualization of the network to be able to run several
logical networks on top of the physical network. An effort to exploit the util-
ities of virtualization in multi-operator environments with respect to energy
efficiency, as was intended by CSO, has already been initiated [119]. However,
it would be interesting to take the existing literature and the contribution
of CSO a step forward by exploring the possibilities of creating an in-depth
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multi-operator service as a slice for resource allocation and dynamically for
switching off, that would simultaneously allow to convey sensitive private de-
tails on the operator traffic. For example, thanks to the division of the cloud
radio access network into a distributed unit and a centralised unit, then with
a functional split, information exchange could be limited to functions of one
of the units.
There are also several open issues regarding the second part of this thesis, fo-
cusing on energy and cost management in multi-operator EH-HetNets that are also
connected to the SG:
  Alternative mathematical tools: In the considered scenario, an issue that
could be further investigated are the levels of tolerance from the part of InP
with reference to the health deterioration of the infrastructure that it provides
due to the continuous energy trading acts. The health of a battery deteriorates
as the number of charges and discharges cycles of the battery approach the
maximum nominal value. This in turn could dynamically create an amount
capital expenses for the replacement of infrastructure with deteriorated health.
In the long term, this could prove to be a financial burden to the InP that
could have been lower. Tools that could be considered for the encounter of
a solution for better management of infrastructure and simultaneous energy
and cost benefits for the involved entities, are the optimization and matching
theory.
  Alternative energy sharing criteria: In the considered scenario, we study
the cases of the EH- MBSs and SBSs separately and propose different solu-
tions for each case. Another approach would be the assumption that MNOs
exchange energy amongst all their EH-BSs. In this case, energy transfer be-
tween EH- MBSs and SBSs of the same HetNet could be considered through
power lines as well, while exchange of energy with other MNOs could still
involve other stakeholders, as is the aggregator. However, exchange of energy
amongst BS of such different energy need levels needs further investigation.
On one hand, energy transfer from SBSs to an MBS could result in the energy
outage in multiple SBSs. In the reverse event that an MBS transfers energy
to SBSs, more attention should be paid on the future energy needs of the
MBS itself before proceeding to the exchange of energy. These scenarios could
prove to be of value for MNOs and give ideas for setting new criteria of energy
sharing and trading that worth being studied.
  Network slicing: Supporting end-to-end network slices and services across
operators has become an important use case of study for 5G networks. Multi-
ple network slices required by different stakeholders may have the same type
of service but different requests on the service indicators [117]. On this basis,
the proposed RE-DA scheme could be approached on a more software level
approach in relation to network slices instead of the aggregator-assisted dou-
ble auction. In detail, an effort could be made to investigate the prospects of
making a slice scheduler that would assign bandwidth slices for each sharing
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operator. The assignment of the bandwidth slices by the slice scheduler could
become in accordance with a frame scheduler that would implement an cus-
tom scheduling policy in accordance with the RE availability during a specific
time slot. Based on these inter-operator sharing framework, REE would be
performed in a load balancing form. In such a case however, each operator
would be able to adopt customized scheduling policies, and even preserve the
respective service indicators for its own subscribers or for the visiting sub-
scribers as well. Thus, the management exposure of the operators over the
network slices could be arranged accordingly with respect to their individ-
ual optimization policies. Practically, such an approach implies circumventing
the presence of the aggregator in the case of the SBSs, as low-range energy
prosumers.
Concluding, this thesis has complemented the state-of-the-art works by studying
the case of shared HetNet deployments and by promoting the deployment of energy
saving solutions, such as switching off and exchange of renewable energy. Moreover,
in order to provide cost efficiency in the management of wireless networks except
from energy efficiency, reference was made to cost issues that may arise. The two
parts of the thesis were treated separately. However, it is possible to envision a net-
work were all parts can be combined. The road ahead lies open for further research,
following the new lines of investigation that have been identified.
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